

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

Humanitarian Responders

in**focus**

NORTHERN SHAN STATE;
MOGOKE TOWNSHIP, MANDALAY REGION

TNLA and SSPC Reach Ceasefire

W43-45 | 2025

23
05

OCTOBER
NOVEMBER

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in focus

TNLA AND SSPC REACH CEASEFIRE

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in**focus**

TNLA and SSPC Reach Ceasefire

NORTHERN SHAN STATE; MOGOKE TOWNSHIP, MANDALAY REGION

On 27–28 October, Chinese Special for Asian Affairs Deng Xijun **reportedly facilitated** peace talks between the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) — specifically the State Security and Peace Commission's (SSPC) National Solidarity and Peace Negotiation Committee (NSPNC) — in Kunming, in China's Yunnan Province. The meeting concluded with a ceasefire agreement, effective 29 October, in which: the TNLA agreed to withdraw from Mogoke and Mongmit townships, in Northern Shan State (NSS) and Mandalay Region, respectively; and the MAF allegedly — according to the TNLA — **committed** to ceasing airstrikes and offensives in NSS territory still **held** by the TNLA, including in Namhsan, Manton, Namtu, Kutkai, and Namkham townships. Both sides allegedly committed to “stop advancing” beyond their current positions, meaning that the MAF **would retain** uncontested control of Nawngkhio town (captured in July) and Kyaukme and Hsipaw towns (captured in October). While the time-frame for withdrawal was not clearly stated in the agreement, the TNLA **confirmed** a gradual withdrawal from Mogoke, and local sources told this analytical unit that MAF airstrikes and shelling appeared to have stopped. TNLA General Secretary Ta Bone Kyaw **stated** the truce was a strategic pause to regroup, rather than a surrender. Meanwhile, other resistance actors in Mogoke Township suggested that they **would not cede control** to the MAF, even if the TNLA was doing so. As of 1 November, the MAF did not appear to have issued a public statement regarding the arrangement. Civilians and observers welcomed the pause in fighting but reportedly **remained wary** of the agreement breaking down.

Durability and doubt

The durability of the TNLA–SSPC ceasefire will largely depend on China's sustained involvement and both parties' willingness to align with Beijing's regional priorities. China's mediation this time followed **nine rounds** of negotiations and significant **diplomatic pressure**, including temporary closure of border gates and restrictions on TNLA and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) support networks. While the MAF/SSPC is likely motivated by prospective elections and the TNLA may have also been swayed by MAF attacks and choking of trade from central Myanmar, Beijing's **interests** in stabilising its borders, safeguarding infrastructure investments, and preventing further disruption of cross-border trade are crucial for the ceasefire's durability; Beijing's ability to enforce compliance through economic and political leverage likely gives the truce short- to medium-term credibility. At the same time, underlying political grievances — autonomy, governance, and representation — remain unresolved, and both the TNLA and the MAF could imaginably seek to improve their positions or perceive violation by the other, leading to a breakdown. Other ceasefires in Myanmar have provided only temporary relief before collapsing once domestic pressures shifted. The current truce could hold while Chinese monitoring continues, but it risks unravelling if either side perceives strategic disadvantage or if hostilities resume in nearby contested areas, particularly those shared by the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and MNDAA. Sustained Chinese engagement will likely therefore be a crucial factor in determining whether the ceasefire endures or fades.

Humanitarian headway

The immediate impact of the ceasefire is a reduction in civilian harm across NSS and parts of Mandalay Region, where months of airstrikes and artillery attacks had devastated communities and infrastructure. Although reports suggest shelling has ceased, widespread displacement persists. Many families reportedly remain hesitant to return due to damaged housing, unexploded ordnance (UXO), and fear of renewed fighting. Humanitarian agencies now face the challenge of shifting from emergency response to early recovery while maintaining readiness for renewed fighting. Short-term priorities include shelter repair, food assistance, mine clearance, and restoring access to health services and water. Local civil society groups and Chinese intermediaries may play critical roles in facilitating safe returns and humanitarian access.

Humanitarian agencies now face the challenge of shifting from emergency response to early recovery while maintaining readiness for renewed fighting.

Economically, the truce could gradually reopen key trade corridors from both China and central Myanmar. Following the recent (tentative) reopening of the Mandalay-Lashio route, the Lashio-Chinshwehaw corridor has now been prioritised for resumption, and the Lashio-Muse route could follow, though infrastructure damage, checkpoints, and informal taxation continue to impede movement. Stability along these routes would help restore formal commerce, lower transport costs, and benefit northern communities reliant on border trade. However, renewed fighting or instability in adjacent zones — particularly in Kutkai, Hseni, or areas under the KIA — could again disrupt traffic and humanitarian delivery.

For humanitarian actors, the ceasefire provides both opportunity and uncertainty. It opens temporary access windows for aid delivery, assessment, and pre-positioning of supplies, but also demands caution given fluid military movements. UXO contamination remains a critical concern, with agricultural recovery and safe housing contingent on its effective removal. In the longer term, durable recovery will require sustained protection, coordination with local authorities, and likely continued Chinese involvement. The agreement thus represents a fragile, if vital, humanitarian respite whose benefits can be improved through emerging trade and aid corridors.

trendlines

HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK

TWO-WEEK TREND
+279.6%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER


186

NUMBER OF HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACKS (NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 4 NOVEMBER 2025


TOTAL DAMAGE
93,356

TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION

with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



trendwatch

MAF airstrikes and artillery continued to hit civilian areas.

On 24 October, MAF airstrikes reportedly killed four and wounded 15 at a wedding in Kanpetlet town, Chin State.

On 29 October, MAF airstrikes reportedly killed five civilians and injured eight in Katha Township, Sagaing Region.

On 31 October, the MAF reportedly dropped over 30 bombs on a village in Machanbaw Township, Kachin State.

On 3 November MAF air and drone strikes in Demoso Township, Karenni State, reportedly killed five people and destroyed IDP shelters.

MAF troops continued to conduct arson, raids, and arbitrary killings.

On 29 October, MAF troops reportedly set fire to villages in Sittwe Township, Rakhine State.

MAF arson reportedly left residents struggling for food and shelter in Tanintharyi Region.

On 3 November, the MAF reportedly detained approximately 40 villagers in Wetlet Township, Sagaing Region, a week after detaining 50 villagers in nearby Chaung-U Township. ►

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND

-18.5%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER



101

NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES (NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 4 NOVEMBER 2025

TOTAL
14,124

■ Civilian
 ■ Civilian (Alleged Informer)
 ■ Civilian (Other)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON
 [Q1 2021 – Q3 2025]

NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION


trendwatch (cont.)

Resistance forces ambushed and used drones against MAF troops.

On 26 October, a PDF reportedly ambushed police in Mindon Township, Magway Region.

On 31 October, PDFs reportedly ambushed MAF troops in Sagaing Township.

On 30 October, DSNDA forces reportedly ambushed an MAF convoy in Ywangan Township, Shan State.

Humanitarian pressures worsened amid widespread displacement and deteriorating living conditions.

On 27 October, it was reported that there were nearly 100,000 displaced people in Kyaukpyu Township, Rakhine State.

During 20–28 October, erosion reportedly destroyed 27 houses in Kyaukkyi Township, Bago Region, displacing 153 people.

Pregnant women in Rakhine State reportedly sought abortions due to economic insecurity.

Tensions continued between EAOs and smaller groups.

On 28 October, KIA-led groups reportedly seized two MAF and militia positions in Khaunglanhpu Township, Kachin State. On 30 October, it was reported that KIA-led forces had captured another. ►

CIVILIAN FACILITIES
DAMAGE AND ATTACKS

TWO-WEEK TREND
-60.9%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER
9
NUMBER OF CIVILIAN FACILITIES DAMAGED
(NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 4 NOVEMBER 2025


Health Facility: 270
Education Facility: 470
Religious Facility: 689

TOTAL DAMAGE
1,462

Aerial Shelling EDA


IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES:
DAMAGE AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES:
DAMAGE AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



trendwatch (cont.)

On 27 October, the Ye Balu group reportedly attacked DKBA troops at a checkpoint in Ye Township, Tanintharyi Region, killing five.

Political and military manoeuvres suggest preparations for elections and territorial consolidation.

On 31 October, the SSPC designated Matman as the new capital of the Wa SAD.

Reports indicated that the MAF deployed troops to election-listed areas in Kachin State's Khaunglanhpu and Mon State's Kyaikmaraw Township.

On 25 October, it was reported that the MAF fought with PDFs in Yebyu Township, Tanintharyi Region, along the road connecting the Dawei SEZ to Thailand.

Changes suggest possible improvement of conditions in parts of Kachin State.

On 27 October, it was reported that all international trade gates in KIA-controlled areas had officially reopened for most items.

On 28 October, telecommunications were reportedly restored in Puta-O for the first time since 2024.

primaryconcerns

1 Northern Mandalay Bridges Bombed

SINGU AND MADAYA TOWNSHIPS, MANDALAY REGION

On 28 October, the Yadana Theinga Bridge (also known as the Ayeyarwady Bridge), linking Sagaing Region's Shwebo Township with Mandalay Region's Singu Township, was **damaged**, reportedly by mines. The blasts caused severe structural damage between two piers and along an approach section of the bridge. Pro-military outlets **accused** the Mandalay People's Defence Force (PDF) and its allies of planting the explosives, and Singu Township residents told this analytical unit that the Mandalay PDF had destroyed the bridge as a defensive measure. Two days later, parts of the Kyauk Sa Yit Kone Bridge in Madaya Township were also **damaged** by explosions, with the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) **blaming** resistance actors. While the Mandalay PDF did not respond to these accusations, it **said** on 29 October that it would continue to work "tirelessly with all its might, hand-in-hand with allied revolutionary forces, to protect and maintain the controlled territories it has gained." Locals told this analytical unit that the destruction on the two bridges had halted traffic and disrupted the movement of goods and humanitarian supplies — including food and medicine — across northern Mandalay.

At the same time, the MAF continued to launch airstrikes and other attacks across Thabeikkyin, Singu, and Madaya townships. MAF airstrikes in Thabeikkyin Township, on **21** and **24** October, reportedly killed five civilians and injured 16 others in total. On 26 October, MAF airstrikes in

Singu Township killed one person and injured six. Locals reported that the MAF conducted at least ten airstrikes in the township during 29–30 October. On 27 October, MAF troops reportedly **raided** a village and torched houses in Madaya Township. The MAF reportedly **deployed** at least 1,000 troops in three columns, accompanying armoured tanks and drones squads, in northern Madaya Township following its agreement with the TNLA on 29 October, **displacing** about 20,000 people from 14 villages. A volunteer assisting IDPs in Madaya Township told this analytical unit: "The number of displaced people is extremely high. [...] Right now, we are just focused on arranging their living situation."

Bridges burnt

The recent destruction, particularly on the Yadana Theinga Bridge, marks a pivotal moment in northern Mandalay Region. Facing intensified offensives from the MAF and the loss of Ta'ang National Liberation Army support following a recent peace deal, the Mandalay PDF and its allies appear to be shifting to heavy defensive operations, damaging bridges to slow MAF reinforcements and disrupt logistics. However, this defensive posture has dire humanitarian consequences. The Yadana Theinga Bridge had served as a vital conduit for food, medicine, and other essentials transported from Sagaing into northern Mandalay, particularly as a consequence of the MAF's 2024 blockade of the Mandalay-Thabeikkyin road. Markets are thus likely to be seriously undermined by this new loss of routes, affecting access to essentials for communities, IDPs, and responders. Local retailers and aid organisations told this analytical unit that they now struggle to sustain market access, with severe shortages and price surges expected in the coming weeks.

The destruction also coincides with MAF airstrikes and ground assaults that have increased displacement across Madaya, Singu, and Thabeikkyin townships. In late October, UNHCR [said](#) there were 93,200 people displaced in Mandalay Region, though local sources told this analytical unit that there were at least 30,000 more than that, including 20,000 newly displaced. Indiscriminate airstrikes have further endangered civilians; according to tracking by this analytical unit, MAF airstrikes killed 157 civilians in northern Mandalay Region between February 2021 and October 2025, including 89 just in 2025. The combination of collapsed infrastructure, disrupted aid routes, and continuing bombardment is likely to precipitate heavily worsening humanitarian conditions. Access for responders will be increasingly constrained, while displaced families face growing shortages of food, shelter, and medical care. Without urgent intervention, humanitarian needs across northern Mandalay could escalate sharply as fighting intensifies and aid corridors collapse.

2. AA Orders Rohingya and Mro to Serve

MAUNGDAW TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

On 2 November, the Arakan Army (AA) reportedly [convened](#) a meeting in Kyauk Hlay Gar village with the Muslim Jury Committee (a township-level Muslim committee formed by the AA), as well as Rohingya elders and shopkeepers, at which ordered that every household send one member or pay 500,000 Myanmar Kyat. This followed a [similar](#) meeting in Hla Phoe Khaung village, in late October, at which AA members stressed that all ethnic groups must “contribute to the Rakhine liberation effort”. They also reportedly said that men aged 18–45 must serve, while households without men must send a woman (age 18–35) to serve; those serving must complete a 45-day military training; and then they will be deployed. Also in late October,

the AA reportedly [pressured](#) Mro communities in Maungdaw to enlist, citing threats from the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). Between 31 October and 2 November, AA troops have reportedly collected household lists, to enforce recruitment, across 26 Mro villages. One Rohingya analyst [said](#) the AA’s actions were coercive, alleging that forcing vulnerable Rohingya into combat zones — including against ARSA — was a “malicious strategy” to turn Rohingya against Rohingya. Both [Rohingya](#) and [Mro](#) villagers have reportedly voiced concerns about this conscription, with some young Rohingya men even attempting to flee to Bangladesh to avoid it.

Ro, Mro must fight

The AA’s apparent expansion of recruitment efforts are likely to have disproportionately negative impacts on ethnic non-Rakhine minorities in the state. Its recent recruitment drive in Maungdaw forms part of its broader National Defence Emergency Provision (NDEP), enacted in March 2025, which [mandates](#) compulsory service for all military-age adults in areas under its control in Rakhine State. Under this measure, it has reportedly barred men and women of fighting age, except those who are severely ill, from leaving the state. While this provision is intended to bolster the AA’s war efforts, it carries acute implications for ethnic minorities such as the Rohingya and Mro, who are not core constituencies of the AA and do not necessarily support its political or military objectives. Unlike ethnic Rakhine people, these communities are peripheral to the AA’s vision of Rakhine self-determination and may face discriminatory treatment within its ranks. For Rohingya civilians, the risks are particularly severe. Deep-rooted hostility toward the Rohingya population among many Rakhine people, likely including those serving in the AA, raises concerns that Rohingya conscripts could face abuse, mistreatment, marginalisation, or deadly violence, once enlisted. Moreover, as the current fighting in northern Maungdaw pits the AA against Rohingya armed actors, forced recruitment of Rohingya youths could effectively compel them to fight against members of their own community, heightening the risk of intra-communal violence and ARSA attacks on these youths’ communities. This situation could

deepen mistrust between and within communities, inflame tensions, and exacerbate protection risks for already vulnerable groups. For humanitarians, the AA's conscription among non-Rakhine populations underscores the need for sustained monitoring, advocacy against forced recruitment, and support for civilians attempting to avoid conscription or flee potential persecution.

3. MAF Keeps Bombing AA Areas

RAKHINE STATE

Since 24 October, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) has reportedly [intensified](#) air and artillery attacks on civilian areas controlled by the Arakan Army (AA) between Rathedaung and Toungup townships in Rakhine State. For example, the AA [reported](#) that just on 30 October, airstrikes and shelling [killed](#) eight civilians and injured 22 across Sittwe, Rathedaung, Ponnagyun, Pauktaw, and Kyaukpyu townships. In addition:

- On 24–25 October, MAF airstrikes in Kyaukpyu Township [injured](#) three people.
- On 26 October, an MAF airstrike in Ann town [injured](#) a child.
- On 26 October, an MAF drone airstrike [killed](#) a 14-year-old boy in Ponnagyun Township.
- On 27 October, the MAF [dropped](#) a 500lb bomb on a high school in Toungup town, destroying several buildings.
- On 29 October, artillery fired from Sittwe [exploded](#) in Pauktaw Township,

killing a five-year-old child and injuring four other people.

- On 31 October, the MAF carried out another airstrike in Ponnagyun Township, [killing](#) four people and leaving ten more in critical condition.

According to the [AA](#), as the MAF loses ground in the state, it is increasingly resorting to indiscriminate bombardment of civilian areas.


Scattershot

The MAF's campaign of aerial and artillery bombardment across Rakhine State suggests a strategy to weaken the AA's control and reclaim territory through indiscriminate violence. There are several possible reasons for the recent uptick: the MAF is reported to have recently [repaired](#) the Minchaung Bridge in Sittwe Township and [may](#) intend to launch ground attacks on Ponnagyun Township, a strategically important area in light of its proximity to Sittwe and location along the Kaladan project corridor; the MAF may intend to facilitate elections in several southern townships in December or January. Local sources recently reported increased military patrols and reinforcements in southern townships such as Ann, Thandwe, and Gwa. Finally, the MAF may be looking to increase its pressure on the AA following its recent ceasefire in Shan State. In any case, the MAF's operations reflect a consistent pattern observed elsewhere: intensive bombing, whether or not preceding ground offensives, often resulting in high civilian casualties and destruction of schools, homes, and public infrastructure. However, with limited medical personnel and damaged facilities across Rakhine State, injured civilians face delayed or inaccessible treatment, and communities already displaced or sheltering in AA-controlled areas are likely to experience fear, loss, and recurring displacement. Humanitarian concerns are mounting as protection threats increase and access to health care, food, and safe shelter becomes more constrained. The situation requires close monitoring and advocacy to prevent further civilian harm and to ensure urgent medical and protection assistance for affected populations across Rakhine State.

Key Security Incidents

Kale and Tamu Townships, Sagaing Region

[August to October, 2025]



The security incidents information on this map is sourced from both traditional media and social media such as Facebook. The information should not be considered comprehensive.

Disclaimer: This product is designed for information purposes only. This map may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Administrative boundary is indicative only and is provided by MIMU (copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>).



4 MAF Raids Drive Displacement

KALE TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION

On 31 October, around 200 Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) troops reportedly **raided** Hakhalay and Than Pho villages in southern Kale Township, torching homes in both villages. A day earlier, MAF troops had **raided** Nat Myaung village and burned houses before advancing along the Kale–Gangaw road, reportedly displacing over 10,000 residents in the process, and **raided** Natchaung village, destroying houses and looting valuables. On 27 October, soldiers arriving from Hto Mar fought local People's Defence Forces (PDFs) in two more villages before **torching** houses in a third. The violence extended into nearby Tamu Township, where on 27 October, MAF troops reportedly **killed** two civilians inside a church in Na Mon Thar village. A Kale youth volunteer told this analytical unit that at least 14,500 households — over 68,000 people — had been recently displaced, with some sheltering in schools, churches, and relatives' homes, while others in the southern part of the township camped in rice fields due to military blockades. Local groups have reportedly **provided** emergency food and funds to affected families.

Firing Kale

The MAF's repeated raids and arson attacks in Kale Township reflects its ongoing effort to expand control over the Tamu–Kale–Gangaw corridor, a key route for troop movement into the Chin Hills, ahead of planned elections in December and January. A local youth volunteer told this analytical unit that MAF troops had forcibly evicted village residents to secure these areas. Other locals reported that churches and volunteers in Kale were providing shelter and food to displaced families, but that humanitarian access remained severely restricted as MAF checkpoints blocked aid convoys from reaching affected villages. Those trapped in rural areas face worsening conditions, lacking shelter materials, warm clothing, and essential food supplies. Although some civil society and faith-based groups have delivered small-scale assistance, it remains insufficient compared to the

scope of needs. The raids have also reportedly fuelled widespread fear, with reports of arbitrary killings and extreme brutality against civilians. Displaced families living in temporary camps and open fields are exposed to cold weather, poor sanitation, and illness. The humanitarian situation is expected to deteriorate further if civilians cannot safely return or if access restrictions persist. Immediate humanitarian support and advocacy for safe passage are crucial to prevent further loss of life and to ensure protection for tens of thousands displaced by the MAF's recent operations in Kale Township.

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5 MAF Pushes to Retake Towns

TEDIM TOWNSHIP, CHIN STATE

Heavy fighting has continued in northern Chin State as the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) attempts to retake territory held by Chin resistance groups. The most recent bout began on 28 October near Taingenvillage in Tedim Township, where the MAF **launched** an offensive from two fronts — one column advancing from Kale, and another from Tedim town. According to the same source, fighting has since spread towards nearby Mualpi village, where — a source told this analytical unit — Chinland Council forces are

intercepting advancing MAF units. Local groups report that the MAF's renewed operations have restricted access and movement throughout northern Chin State, disrupting travel along the economically vital Kale–Taingen road, which links to the Rihkhawdar–Zokhawthar border crossing with India. Additionally, the MAF reportedly **supplied** arms and ammunition to the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA) — including 50 rifles, 15,000 bullets, and five drones — at its Light Infantry Battalion 269 base in Tedim Town between 27–29 October to assist in retaking Tonzang town. The MAF currently holds Hakha, Tedim, and Thantlang towns in northern Chin State, while Chin actors control Falam and Tonzang towns.

The closure of the Kale–Tedim–Falam corridor, a vital artery for trade and the delivery of goods and relief, has severely disrupted the flow of food, fuel, and medicines.

Tedim bare

The MAF's renewed offensives in northern Chin State appear aimed at regaining key towns such as Falam and Tonzang to consolidate control ahead of elections. Multiple sources suggested to this analytical unit that the MAF intends to secure the Kale–Tedim–Falam corridor to ensure supply routes and extend State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) administration over areas slated for polling. Notably, the SSPC's election-related announcements have suggested that voting will take place in Hakha and Tedim in December, and in Thantlang, Falam, and Tonzang in January — while excluding southern Chin State. However, Chin resistance actors — including the Chin Brotherhood and Chinland Council — have vowed to boycott and resist the elections, suggesting continued fighting through year's end. Meanwhile, the fighting is aggravating both humanitarian and economic conditions. The closure of the

Kale–Tedim–Falam corridor, a vital artery for trade and the delivery of goods and relief, has severely disrupted the flow of food, fuel, and medicines. Prices of essential commodities have reportedly risen as local markets depend increasingly on imported Indian goods, which are more expensive and irregularly supplied. In remote townships, civilians face growing shortages of rice, fuel, and medical supplies, while displacement is mounting. Humanitarian organisations face restricted access and limited communications, hampering the delivery of life-saving aid. Economic livelihoods — already fragile from years of fighting — are deteriorating further as transport blockages prevent farmers from selling produce and traders from moving goods across the India–Myanmar border. If the fighting continues through the election period, northern Chin State may see further decline in household incomes, increased food insecurity, and heightened dependency on informal cross-border trade and humanitarian relief.

6 Thousands Displaced in Northern Kawkareik

KAWKAREIK TOWNSHIP, KAREN STATE

On 31 October, fighting **broke out** between Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)-led forces and Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF)-allied troops near Htee Poe San village in Kawkareik Township, Karen State, **resulting** in the deaths of eight MAF troops, injuries to 30 others, and the capture of several. Later that day, MAF fighter jets **bombed** the village and nearby areas six times, destroying a village clinic — though no civilian casualties were reported as staff and residents had already fled — and continued shelling civilian areas with artillery.

The tension followed the MAF's **retaking** control of the Kawkareik–Nabu Road on 6 October, with **support** from the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF), Democratic Karen Buddhist Army


(DKBA), and KNU/KNLA–Peace Council (PC). Following this, MAF-allied groups reportedly entered nearby villages, **looting** houses, **detaining and torturing** civilians, and causing **extensive destruction**. During 10–23 October they fought KNLA-led forces multiple times in northern Kawkaireik Township, **leaving** approximately 30 MAF troops dead. The fighting, including MAF air and drone strikes, reportedly **displaced** around 30,000 civilians from 20 villages, with many seeking refuge in jungles or farms without adequate shelter, food, or security. Civilians **expressed** fear over nightly troop advances, and local media **reported** that MAF forces were abusing residents in retaliation for battlefield losses.

Dawna to the east

Fighting between the KNLA-led resistance and MAF-aligned forces in northern Kawkaireik is likely to intensify. According to resistance sources, the MAF and its allies — DKBA, BGF, and PC — are **fighting** daily and **employing** heavier weaponry and advanced technology, increasing civilian insecurity. Controlling the old Daw Na road and northern Kawkaireik is strategically important for the MAF because it provides better and more secure access to border areas of Myawaddy Township. There are **five** routes between Kawkaireik and Myawaddy: the Asia Highway (**MAF-controlled**), the old Daw Na Mountain Road (KNLA-controlled), and three smaller routes controlled by the BGF or PC. Particularly given its apparently favourable relationship with the BGF, PC, and DKBA, if the MAF were to regain control of the old road, this could provide it more secure access and defence of border areas, including positions that the KNLA has taken since 2021. Consequently, displacement is expected to grow, alongside constrained access to markets and healthcare due to roadblocks and security threats. The MAF has reportedly blocked access to urban areas and the resources there, leaving many displaced people in precarious conditions without food, shelter, or medical assistance. Should the MAF continue its advance, further violence and displacement are expected, posing heightened risks for civilians and complicating humanitarian response in this part of Karen State.

KNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unity typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms “Karen State” and “Karenni State” preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at <https://tinyurl.com/4dtnfdak>. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at <https://www.khrg.org/maps>.

7 Worsening Conditions in Tanintharyi

TANINTHARYI TOWNSHIP, TANINTHARYI REGION

Since 27 October, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) has [escalated](#) air and artillery strikes in Tanintharyi Township, amid heavy fighting with resistance actors along the Tanintharyi–Mawtaung trade route. On 27–29 October, both MAF fighter jets and MAF artillery [fired](#) on 4–Mile village, [killing](#) at least one villager and injuring others, before MAF ground troops torched houses and killed a returnee in the village. Elsewhere, an airstrike [narrowly missed](#) killing civilians at a monastery in Koe Iin village. The attacks reportedly displaced residents of at least four villages in Za Wea village tract, with thousands now [sheltering](#) in forests with little access to food or medicine. In response to the fighting, a People’s Defence Force (PDF) under the National Unity Government’s Tanintharyi Region Military Command [announced](#) the closure of the Myeik–Tanintharyi–Bokpyin Union Road from 28 October.

A local source told this analytical unit that IDPs are suffering from malaria, hypertension, and chronic illnesses while lacking essential medical supplies. On 30 October, a local aid worker described the situation in Tanintharyi Township as “the worst displacement wave in months,” with shelters overcrowded and medicines nearly depleted.

Southern suffering

The recent escalation in Tanintharyi Township coincides with the State Security and Peace Commission’s (SSPC) announcement of Tanintharyi, Yebyu, and Kyunsu Townships as electoral areas for the [second](#) phase of elections (slated for January). Analysts and local actors suggest that the MAF’s operations here are aimed at securing the Tanintharyi–Mawtaung trade corridor to reinforce control before the polls. According to local media, nearly 500 MAF troops advanced elsewhere along this route in mid–October, possibly as part of a broader [campaign](#) to retake territory and suppress resistance structures. The humanitarian situation has deteriorated sharply. According to research group [FE5 Tanintharyi](#), there are at least 80,800 IDPs across Myeik District, including over 21,000 from Tanintharyi Township. Local aid groups and NUG-linked health teams are attempting to provide medicine and food, but movement restrictions and airstrikes have reportedly made access very challenging. A local source told this analytical unit that IDPs are suffering from malaria, hypertension, and chronic illnesses while lacking essential medical supplies. On 30 October, a local aid worker described the situation in Tanintharyi Township as “the worst displacement wave in months,” with shelters overcrowded and medicines nearly depleted. With road and waterway closures, trade flows and access to markets have also suffered, worsening food shortages and driving up prices. Farmers have been unable to harvest or sell crops, and fishermen report being targeted by MAF naval patrols. The cumulative effect of these disruptions is eroding livelihoods and deepening dependence on scarce humanitarian aid.

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*
**Humanitarian
Responders**

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