

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

Humanitarian Responders

in**focus**

SHWEBO AND WETLET TOWNSHIPS,
SAGAING REGION

Sagaing Houses
Burned

W45-47 | 2025
NOVEMBER

06
19

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primary concerns

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SAGAING HOUSES BURNED

Shwebo and Wetlet Townships,
Sagaing Region

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Paletwa, Chin State

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Near Thailand-Malaysia
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in**focus**

Sagaing Houses Burned

SHWEBO AND WETLET TOWNSHIPS, SAGAING REGION

On 6 November, Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) military columns **reportedly** raided and burned several houses in Bone Bwat village in Shwebo Township and Muu Gyi village in Wetlet Township. On the same day, combined forces of the National Unity Government's People's Defence Forces (PDFs), People's Defence Teams (PDTs), and local PDFs **ambushed** MAF columns departing their base in Ywar Thar Gyi village, reportedly killing 17 soldiers. On 7 November, two MAF columns reportedly **burned** houses in Kadu and Magyitone villages in Wetlet Township, and set fire to **several houses** in Myintaw village. On 8 November, MAF columns reportedly **raided** Saing Nai Lay village, attacked a PDT outpost and killed seven PDT members before burning homes in Hnaw Pin, Zee Taw and Lone Taw villages in Shwebo Township. On 9 November, they allegedly **raided** Htone Bo village in Wetlet Township again and set fire to houses. Sources who spoke to our analytical unit estimated that between 6 and 13 November, the MAF burned approximately 900 houses across 12 villages in Wetlet Township and around 300 houses across four villages in Shwebo Township. Local media reported that approximately 25,000 people were **displaced** in Wetlet Township, primarily into forests, remote villages or monastic buildings, while sources who spoke to this analytical unit reported that an estimated further 10,000 people were displaced in Shwebo Township. These raids took place amid intensified MAF activity along the Shwebo–Mandalay road.

On 3 November, a military column reportedly **raided** Mauk Kadee village and arrested about 40 civilians, including elders and women; some were released on 5 November while others remained detained. Sources close to the PDF reported to this analytical unit that resistance forces attempted to disrupt the columns but were unable to prevent widespread destruction. A local resident from Wetlet Township told this analytical unit that the failure of resistance groups to hold the recently captured Ywar Thar Gyi camp enabled the MAF to reinforce their presence and conduct extensive “area clearance operations”, which they believed led to the burning of multiple villages. Farmers also reported to this analytical unit that ongoing raids risked disrupting the harvesting season.

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Reinforcement, escalation, and control

The current escalation by the MAF could reflect a concerted effort to reassert control over the strategically significant Shwebo–Mandalay corridor at a time of growing resistance strength across the surrounding plains. The ambush near Ywar Thar Gyi and the increasing coordination among resistance groups have elevated threats to the MAF's logistics and freedom of movement. This pattern aligns with longstanding military behaviour: when confronted with heightened resistance activity, the MAF undertakes large-scale reinforcement, punitive raids and village clearance operations designed to sever civilian support to armed opposition groups. The Shwebo–Mandalay road is a particularly critical artery, linking major bases in Sagaing and Mandalay Regions, and the MAF has sought to re-establish dominance over it since losing significant control during Operation 1027 in 2024. The timing of the current operation is likely influenced by broader national dynamics. The ceasefire agreement between the MAF and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) on 29 October enabled the redeployment of troops previously tied down in Northern Shan State, allowing the military to reinforce north-western fronts more aggressively. Earlier [airstrikes](#) in October reportedly killed two civilians and injured four others around Ywar Thar Gyi and Than Mantha villages, demonstrating the MAF's readiness to escalate the use of airpower to protect vulnerable positions along the corridor. Taken together, these developments suggest the MAF is accelerating a pre-election campaign to stabilise key supply and administrative routes, limit further resistance advances and shape the security environment before political and military timelines converge later in the year.


Humanitarian roadblocks

The intensified MAF counter-offensive has generated a substantial wave of new displacement across Wetlet and Shwebo townships, with an estimate of more than 35,000 people fleeing in a short period. As MAF columns continue to operate along and around the Shwebo–Mandalay road, long-term and repeated displacement is likely, particularly in villages situated in contested areas or close to military infrastructure. Many displaced people are currently sheltering in forests, makeshift rural sites or monastic compounds, where access to food, medical care and adequate shelter is limited. Movement restrictions introduced by the MAF—particularly those affecting travel between military-controlled and resistance-controlled zones—are increasingly disrupting the flow of goods and constraining civilian mobility. These constraints also narrow the operational space for humanitarian responders. Local aid networks, which carry the bulk of the response burden in Sagaing Region, must navigate shifting frontlines, blocked roads and unpredictable troop movements. Such conditions complicate efforts to sustain the delivery of essential supplies and life-saving assistance. On 16 November, MAF columns reportedly [raided](#) Khaw Taw village in Wetlet Township, detaining civilians and looting property, indicating that destructive raids are ongoing. If operations continue at this pace, humanitarian needs will expand further, and access for responders may deteriorate. Humanitarian actors will need flexible planning, enhanced support to local responders and sustained monitoring of evolving access restrictions to keep pace with rapidly shifting displacement patterns.

MAF Operations and Arson Attack

Shwebo and Wetlet Townships, Sagaing Region


[1 - 18 November, 2025]



Legend

- Arson Attack
- ✕ Village Raids/Pre-emptive Fleeing
- Town
- Village
- ★ Light Infantry Battalion [LIB], Infantry Battalion [IB]
Basic Military Training Depot [BMTD]
- Main road
- Secondary road
- Other minor road
- +++++ Railway
- Major river/inland water boundary
- Township boundary
- State and region boundary

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trendlines

HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK

TWO-WEEK TREND
-8.7%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER


189

NUMBER OF HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACKS (NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 18 NOVEMBER 2025


TOTAL DAMAGE
93,566

TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION

with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



trendwatch

MAF airstrikes and artillery continued to hit civilian areas.

On 7 November, five civilians were reportedly killed and seven injured by an airstrike in Yoe Ta Yoke village, Ponnagyun Township, Rakhine State; an injured woman died on 9 November, raising the death toll to six.

On 7 November, three civilians were reportedly killed and ten injured by an airstrike in Myo Thit Ward, Minbya town, Rakhine State; two more later died, bringing the total to five.

On 8 November, two civilians were reportedly killed and several injured by a jet-fighter strike on a school in Kyauk Than Chay village, Ponnagyun Township, Rakhine State.

On 15 November, five civilians were reportedly killed and six injured by airstrikes in villages in Rathedaung Township, Rakhine State.

On 10 November, at least six civilians were reportedly injured by airstrikes in villages in Tibaying Township, Sagaing Region.

On 11 November, seven patients and one medical staff member were reportedly killed by an airstrike on a sub-station hospital operated by NUG in Kani Township, Sagaing Region. ►

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND
-30.2%


TWO-WEEK NUMBER
74 NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
(NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 18 NOVEMBER 2025


TOTAL
14,203

Civilian Civilian (Alleged Informer) Civilian (Other)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON
..... [Q1 2021 – Q3 2025]



NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION



trendwatch (cont.)

On 12 November, five displaced people were reportedly killed by an airstrike on a displacement site in Marlae village, Singu Township, Sagaing Region.

MAF raids, arrests and village attacks continued.

On 10 November, around ten civilians were reportedly arrested following a PDF ambush in Kywe Sein village, Ngazun Township, Mandalay Region.

On 15 November, four men were reportedly arrested during military operations near Kyauk Nget village, Ywangan Township, Shan State.

On 11 November, one man was reportedly arrested for alleged TNLA links in Kyaukme Town, Shan State.

Resistance forces launched or announced ambushes and joint operations.

On 10 November, four MAF soldiers were reportedly killed and two injured in a PDF ambush in Ngazun Township, Mandalay Region.

On 12 November, around 50 MAF soldiers were reportedly killed and 15 captured in a PDF/PDT attack in Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region.

On 14 November, seven MAF soldiers were reportedly killed in clashes with Ye-Belu PDF in Ye Township, Mon State.

On 8 November, two Danu resistance groups active in Ywangan Township - the Joe Phyu Revolutionary Force and the Danu People's Liberation ►

CIVILIAN FACILITIES DAMAGE AND ATTACKS

TWO-WEEK TREND
+11.1%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER

10 NUMBER OF CIVILIAN FACILITIES DAMAGED
(NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 18 NOVEMBER 2025

Health Facility:
273

Education Facility:
488

Religious Facility:
711


TOTAL DAMAGE

1,472

■ Aerial ■ Shelling ■ EDA


IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGE AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGE AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



trendwatch (cont.)

Army/ Force - announced that they will now operate together, Shan State.

Movement restrictions increased.

On 14 November, MAF reportedly closed the Lashio–Hsipaw–Mong Yai highway and Hsipaw Bridge in Shan State, halting all traffic.

Since 23 October, travel on the Myitkyina–Putao road in Kachin State has reportedly been restricted to one day per week, with limits on medicine, tarpaulins and fuel.

Humanitarian pressures worsened.

By mid-November, it was reported that IDP camps in Waingmaw Township, Kachin State, had not received assistance for three months after a WFP halt.

On 10 November, bridges were reportedly destroyed in remote areas of Khaunglanphu Township, Kachin State, meaning communities have been cut off from basic services.

Governance actions by armed groups continued.

On 11 November, AHD resumed ART (antiretroviral therapy) distribution to patients in ULA-controlled areas of Rakhine State.

On 11 November, MNDAA conducted a public criminal trial in Monekoe, Shan State, issuing prison terms and death sentences.

primaryconcerns

1 Contagion in Paletwa

PALETWA, CHIN STATE

On 12 November, the Arakkha Health Department (AHD) [announced](#) that civilians in Paletwa Township, in areas controlled by the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA), had contracted severe acute diarrhoeal disease. At least 300 residents, including cross-border traders in Shin Let Wa area, were reportedly [infected](#), while 30 were in critical condition and receiving in-patient treatment under AHD care. Local media reported that nine people have [died](#) as the result of a cholera outbreak along the India–Myanmar border, first detected on 4 November in Lawngtlai District, Mizoram, and leading to a two-month ban on cross-border movement. Authorities on [both sides](#) of the border reportedly closed major trading routes connecting Rakhine and Mizoram, including access roads used by traders in Khaikhy and Tuidam, from 13 November, restricting movement and halting cross-border trade. A local source told this analytical unit that the outbreak has disrupted cross-border trade, reducing access to basic commodities and medication in ULA/AA-controlled areas. Since early November, a severe diarrhoea outbreak has allegedly been affecting civilians and Chin internally displaced persons in Khaikhy and Tuidam villages in Mizoram State, India, with six deaths [reported](#). The outbreak in Paletwa reportedly [spread](#) from the neighbouring Indian border villages of Khaikhy, Tuidam and Luntin into Shin Let Wa, a key trading point along the Kaladan River connecting Paletwa and ULA/AA-controlled areas with Mizoram. Since 4 November, AHD emergency medical teams have reportedly been working with civil society organisations, NGOs and local authorities to provide [treatment](#) and implement disease-prevention measures,

including distributing preventive medication and raising public awareness. AHD [stated](#) that transmission had declined to below five per cent as of 11 November.

Outbreaks and blocked trade

This outbreak affects public health and economic stability in northern Paletwa, where reliance on the Paletwa–Mizoram trade route has increased following disruptions to trade with Bangladesh. With around 300 infections recorded in two weeks, the spread rate is rapid and raises concerns about expansion into other parts of Paletwa and Rakhine, where health facilities may be unable to manage a sudden influx of patients. The temporary border closure also risks interrupting the import of essential medical items from India. The situation departs from earlier patterns: previous outbreaks in Mizoram earlier this year remained localised and did not spread into Myanmar. The current cross-border transmission highlights weaknesses in water quality, sanitation infrastructure and surveillance systems along the Laungtlai–Paletwa routes. Increased seasonal movement for trade further accelerated exposure, while overstretched health services on both sides of the border created conditions for faster spread. In the longer term, the outbreak underscores the vulnerability of water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) conditions in ULA/AA-administered areas. Commodity shortages and rising prices—particularly for India-imported goods—are already affecting communities, and prolonged border closures could worsen livelihoods. Without improvements to water treatment, sanitation and disease monitoring, further outbreaks remain likely. Humanitarian actors may face growing needs linked to health risks, reduced food security and limited access to medical supplies.

2. Rohingya Boat Capsizes

NEAR THAILAND-MALAYSIA MARITIME BORDER

On 9 November, three boats carrying about 300 Rohingya from refugee camps in Bangladesh and from Buthidaung Township, Myanmar, reportedly set out towards Malaysia, and one of the vessels [sank](#) near the Thailand–Malaysia maritime border. The boat, which reportedly [carried](#) around 70 people, went down off Thailand’s Ko Tarutao island, north of Malaysia’s Langkawi Island. Authorities noted that the three boats had broken away from a larger “mothership” that had [departed](#) from Rakhine State with around 300 people on board. The [death toll](#) reportedly reached 27 by 11 November, while 13 survivors were found in Malaysian waters on 8 November. Malaysian and Thai authorities continue [search](#) operations for dozens still missing. The remaining two boats, carrying roughly 230 people, are still reportedly unaccounted for. Rescue teams are [searching](#) an area of approximately 583 square kilometres near Langkawi. The UN Refugee Agency and the International Organization for Migration released a [joint statement](#) expressing concern over this situation and reporting that more than 5,300 Rohingya have attempted similar dangerous sea journeys from Bangladesh and Myanmar this year, with over 600 people missing or presumed dead. Kedah State police chief Adzli Abu Shah [said](#) authorities had launched extensive search-and-rescue operations. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency [warned](#) that cross-border syndicates were increasingly exploiting migrants using high-risk sea routes. One survivor, Iman Sharif, [described](#) floating for days in the Andaman Sea after the boat sank, saying he witnessed people drowning before eventually washing ashore on a Malaysian island.

Lost at sea

This incident reflects the deepening consequences of displacement, persecution and the absence of protection mechanisms for the Rohingya. Reports claim that many Rohingya people [undertake](#) such journeys due to ongoing conflict and insecurity in Myanmar, shrinking humanitarian support in Bangladesh’s refugee camps and the lack of any legal or safe pathways to seek protection. These factors are

likely to increasingly compel Rohingya families to rely on dangerous maritime routes controlled by trafficking networks. The tragedy also fits within broader regional patterns: while the Thailand–Malaysia route is widely used, this is the first incident along it involving such a high number of confirmed deaths. With more than [600 Rohingya](#) already dead or missing at sea in 2025, the sinking underscores the worsening risks associated with irregular maritime migration. Limited opportunities for safe movement, combined with the protracted nature of the crisis, create persistent incentives for further departures. The event also exposes long-standing weaknesses in regional coordination. Malaysia and Thailand face growing pressure to manage arrivals and provide immediate humanitarian assistance, while ASEAN and the wider international community have not established effective protection frameworks. Without a political solution in Myanmar and sustained support for refugees in Bangladesh, similar journeys are highly likely to continue, requiring humanitarian responders to be prepared for ongoing maritime arrivals.

3. MAF Retake Control of Kalay–Tedim Road

TAINGEN VILLAGE, TEDIM TOWNSHIP, CHIN STATE

On 7 November, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) reportedly [seized](#) the Chinland Council Forces’ base in Taingen village, a strategic tri-junction linking Kalay, Tedim and Falam townships, following ten days of heavy fighting launched from two military columns [advancing](#) from Kalay and Tedim since 27 October. On 6 November, the MAF reportedly also [seized](#) the People’s Defence Force Zoland (PDF–Zoland) camp at Mount Kennedy on the Taingen–Tedim road. The capture of both Taingen and Mount Kennedy signifies that the MAF has retaken control of the Kalay–Tedim Road, which it had previously lost in November 2024. Several villagers

along the Kalay–Tedim road [fled](#) due to intensified fighting, and urgent needs for shelter, food and medicine are mounting; reports [estimate](#) 2,000–3,000 displaced people. Displaced families reportedly lack blankets as temperatures fall and seasonal influenza spreads in highland areas. Transport prices have also [risen](#) sharply as vehicle owners resort to remote village routes to avoid MAF positions. Minivan fares increased from MMK 150,000 to MMK 200,000 per person within two weeks, while private motorbike rentals now cost at least MMK 350,000 per person. Local media also [reported](#) that MAF columns from Kalay and Tedim met in Taingen on 8 November and continued marching towards Falam, a town under Chin Brotherhood control since April, with clashes reported along the Taingen–Falam road. MAF advances from the Kalay–Waibula Road—after capturing Waibula Town on 10 November—are reportedly supported by daily [airstrikes](#) launched from Naypyidaw airbase. The Chin National Army (CNA) and Chin National Defence Force (CNDP), who clashed over territorial issues in July, are now reportedly [jointly resisting](#) MAF attacks in Falam Township. Local sources also told this analytical unit that there is increased cooperation among Chinland Council forces and PDF–Zoland.

Escalating needs

The escalation of fighting along the Kalay–Tedim and Taingen–Falam corridors signals a major MAF effort to secure key towns in northern Chin State ahead of the upcoming election. Continued clashes in Falam and Tedim Townships are likely as the MAF attempts to regain control of remaining Chin Brotherhood strongholds. Sustained airstrikes, shifting frontlines and disrupted road networks could worsen humanitarian conditions, particularly for civilians already displaced by earlier phases of conflict. Should the MAF succeed in retaking Falam, it may next attempt to capture Tonzang Town, which has been held by Chinland Council Forces since November 2024. Such advances would likely trigger further displacement across northern Chin State and place additional pressure on strained local support systems. Restricted mobility along key roads may also limit access to food, fuel and medical supplies for both host communities and internally displaced

people. The current trajectory suggests a growing protection crisis, characterised by heightened risks from airstrikes, ground assaults and forced displacement. For humanitarians, escalating conflict will constrain access, complicate overland movement and increase reliance on local networks to reach affected communities. Needs relating to shelter, winterisation items, food, medicine and protection services are expected to rise as fighting continues and frontlines shift closer to populated areas.

The Chin National Army (CNA) and Chin National Defence Force (CNDP), who clashed over territorial issues in July, are now reportedly jointly resisting MAF attacks in Falam Township.

4 MAF Raids Villages

KANBALU, KHIN-U, AND YE-U TOWNSHIPS, SAGAING REGION

On 16 November, around 300 Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) soldiers reached Kyauk Taing village in Kanbalu Township, where they reportedly [burned](#) two houses in the morning before continuing to torch civilian homes at midday. More than ten villages [fled](#) on 16 November due to MAF reinforcements advancing along the Kanbalu–Khin-U border. Reports estimate that over 10,000 people from Kanbalu, Khin-U and Ye-U Townships have now been [displaced](#). Earlier, on 12 November, combined People's Defence Forces (PDFs) reportedly launched an intercept [attack](#) on MAF Battalion 33 and the aligned Pyu Saw Htee. According to local [reporting](#), MAF units were defeated, suffering around 50 deaths—including a platoon commander—while at least 15 soldiers were captured

along with weapons. Following the clash, the MAF reportedly [launched](#) two gyrocopter airstrikes near the Kanbalu–Khin-U boundary, causing no civilian casualties. On 15 November, about 300 Pyu Saw Htee militia members and MAF troops from Light Infantry Battalion 33 [raided](#) villages across the border areas of Kanbalu, Ye-U and Khin-U Townships, staying overnight in Aing Paung Chaung village, leading residents from seven surrounding villages to [flee](#). Local reporting indicates that the offensive follows earlier [reinforcement](#) efforts, including combined MAF–Pyu Saw Htee columns establishing positions in Aing Paung Chaung and a series of airstrikes across affected township borders. The operation is occurring in a district that has seen 218 [armed clashes](#) between PDFs and MAF-aligned SSPC forces in six months. A local resident [described](#) the destruction: “They burn down every place they reach... as soon as they enter a place, they set it on fire”.

Strategic routes

The escalation along the Kanbalu–Khin-U–Ye-U corridor reflects a sustained attempt by the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) to consolidate territorial control in northern Sagaing Region, an area where People’s Defence Forces maintain strong rural influence. By pushing deep into border villages and reinforcing Pyu Saw Htee militia positions, the MAF appears intent on dismantling resistance-held zones and securing movement along strategic routes linking Kanbalu to Ye-U and Khin-U. This trajectory aligns with broader patterns of MAF operations in Sagaing, where heavy ground assaults and aircraft support—including gyrocopters, transport helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft—have accompanied efforts to regain territory. Kanbalu is a stronghold of the Pyu Saw Htee militia, led by the influential monk Wasawa, while surrounding rural areas feature entrenched [PDF presence](#). The current offensive suggests an effort to expand Pyu Saw Htee–MAF influence outward from Kanbalu into adjacent townships where resistance forces remain active. Humanitarian needs are likely to rise sharply as approximately 10,000 people from over twenty villages have fled. Displaced families face immediate shortages of food, shelter and winter clothing, with increased sickness [reported](#) among children,

pregnant women and older people. Continued MAF advances and airstrikes could trigger further displacement, restrict access routes and complicate the delivery of essential assistance, placing additional strain on already limited local support networks.

5. KNU Captures Border Town

MAW TAUNG TOWN, TANINTHARYI REGION

On 14 November, the Karen National Union (KNU) Brigade 4 and joint resistance forces reportedly [captured](#) Maw Taung Town, located along the Thailand–Myanmar border, according to Pa Doh Eh Na, General Secretary of KNU Brigade 4. The takeover followed an earlier Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) airstrike on 12 November in which jet fighter attacks [ignited](#) Maw Taung’s local market and clock tower, prompting thousands of residents to flee. During the second day of fighting, the MAF reportedly [launched](#) heavy artillery and conducted repeated airstrikes on the border town. Until 12 November, the MAF reportedly carried out at least eight [airstrikes](#) using both a jet fighter and a Y-12 military aircraft. Local news agencies reported that more than 3,000 residents [fled](#) to border areas or safer villages, with some civilians still trapped inside the town as clashes continued. One civilian was [injured](#) during the battle, and several Facebook users [reported](#) the loss of relatives. According to local [reporting](#), the resistance operation lasted four days. Maw Taung hosts a base of Light Infantry Battalion 224, an artillery hill, a police station and two military checkpoints. Resistance groups began their assault by [attacking](#) the MAF checkpoint at the town’s entrance on 11 November, before advancing to seize control. The KNU Brigade 4 later [issued](#) a congratulatory message to allied groups—including the Force for Federal Democracy (FFD), Bamar People’s Liberation Army (BPLA), and Tanintharyi PDFs—while KNU Central [emphasised](#) the symbolic significance of recapturing its former township office. The BPLA [stated](#) that more than 40 MAF prisoners and significant weaponry were captured during the operation.

Trading problems

The capture of Maw Taung Town represents the loss of another key border trade post for the SSPC in Tanintharyi Region. Local reporting states that the MAF [counteroffensive](#) began with airstrikes on 15 November. According to figures from the Department of Border Trade, the Maw Taung post handled over USD 0.83 million in [trade](#) between 5 and 8 June 2024. Its fall means that the SSPC now holds only one operational border trade post in the region (Kawthaung) after resistance forces previously [seized](#) the Htee Khee post in May 2025. This shift undermines the SAC's access to customs revenue and cross-border logistics while strengthening resistance forces' control of inland supply routes. Maw Taung also holds strategic value due to its position linking Tanintharyi Township with Prachuap Khiri Khan Province in Thailand. Control of the town may ease longstanding restrictions imposed by the MAF on the movement of food, medicine and essential supplies in rural areas, while providing resistance groups with a critical outlet for cross-border resupply. The town is also a key route for [exporting](#) lead ore to Thailand, making its capture an economic as well as military gain for anti-junta forces. If resistance forces can hold Maw Taung, local communities may experience short-term relief from MAF-imposed blockades. However, sustained airstrikes, as seen in other recaptured border towns, pose ongoing risks to civilian safety and are likely to delay returns and prolong humanitarian needs.

eastern Loikaw Township. Also on 11 November, artillery shells [landed](#) near OK Village on the western side of Demoso Township, damaging multiple civilian homes. On 12 November, [gunfire](#) was reported near villages in Hpruso Township. On 13 November, artillery shells [fired](#) by the MAF struck farmlands in Nam San Khan village, damaging houses and a monastery; and on 17 November, continuous drone bombings and artillery shelling were [reported](#) in four Hpruso villages. The attacks have severely disrupted the harvest season. November is normally the period for collecting paddy and groundnuts, yet residents of four villages in Hpruso Township report being [unable](#) to harvest due to active clashes, artillery shells landing in fields, and drone strikes. Villagers [warn](#) that this disruption could lead to widespread famine across the region. According to [earlier reporting](#) on 9 October, the MAF has been conducting “Yan Naing Min” operations in Karenni since May 2024, and is believed to be preparing advances toward Bawlahe Township, where elections are planned. The junta has launched five concurrent [military columns](#) in townships where elections were announced. According to a trusted local source, the [Karenni IEC](#) is arranging assistance for repeatedly displaced households in eastern Loikaw, while IEC Secretary (2) U Banya [stated](#) that contingency measures were being implemented to address rising food insecurity.

Food insecurity and illness

Escalating MAF ground and aerial attacks are severely constraining humanitarian access while heightening risks of famine across Loikaw, Demoso and Hpruso. According to the Karenni Human Rights Group (KnHRG), junta attacks on farmers and agricultural zones have [reduced](#) cultivable land and lowered crop yields. On 16 November, a woman harvesting groundnuts was seriously [injured](#) by a drone strike in Hpruso Township, illustrating the dangers civilians face when attempting to continue essential agricultural work. KnHRG [warned](#) on 10 November that continued assaults on farmland and farmers—including shelling active fields and targeting harvesters—could spark a regional famine. Increased military presence and ongoing clashes have also disrupted internal trade routes, limiting the flow of food and

6 Humanitarian Needs Escalate in the East

PEKHON, MOEBYE, LOIKAW, DEMOSO, AND HPRUSO TOWNSHIPS, KARENNI STATE

The Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) have reportedly launched simultaneous column operations in Pekhon, Moebye, Loikaw, Demoso, and Hpruso Townships in Karenni State. On 11 November, local media reported that MAF troops [carried out](#) integrated ground and aerial attacks in

essential supplies. Road closures caused by military activity have further restricted the availability of medicines, winter clothing and blankets needed during the cold season. As a result, internally displaced people (IDPs) in Demoso, Shardaw and Hpruso townships are experiencing increased cases of [diarrhoea](#), [seasonal colds](#), [malaria](#) and [mumps](#). In eastern Loikaw, around 1,000 displaced households were forced to [flee](#) again due to intensified attacks. According to a member of the IDP committee, two-thirds of roughly [1,500 families](#) have now been displaced multiple times, leaving them in severe hardship and requiring urgent humanitarian assistance. Continued military offensives will likely deepen needs and further disrupt aid delivery.

Tension Between MNDA and MAF

LASHIO-HSIPAW-MONG YAI HIGHWAY, SHAN STATE

On 14 November, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) temporarily [closed](#) the Lashio–Hsipaw–Mong Yai highway, including the Hsipaw Bridge, which is jointly controlled by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDA) and the MAF. Local reporting states that the closure [began](#) that morning, blocking passenger and cargo vehicles. Locals reported that soldiers placed barricades at the bridge and [halted](#) all movement, a move widely viewed as an attempt to pressure MNDA troops to withdraw from areas between Lashio and Hsipaw so that the MAF could regain full control of the strategic highway. Amid rising tensions, MNDA forces [released](#) more than 200 captured MAF personnel and their families near Kachin Gone village on the Lashio–Hseni road. The released group—including police and soldiers of multiple ranks—was taken to the northeastern Lashio military headquarters. Elderly and unwell detainees were prioritised for release, while younger and higher-ranking personnel remained in custody. Both sides have recently [reinforced](#) positions along the Lashio–Mong Yai and Hsipaw–Lashio

roads following failed negotiations earlier in November. The closure has caused immediate disruption. One driver travelling from Hseni to Hsipaw found the Hsipaw Dokhtawady Bridge [closed](#) at 8 a.m. on 14 November. After helping passengers cross on foot, he attempted to move his vehicle across but was blocked, forcing him to return to Lashio, where he spent the night. He later continued on a motorbike via an alternative route. He [stated](#) that the situation created severe delays and anxiety for the elderly, pregnant women and patients who rely on this route. A local observer said the Hsipaw Bridge remained [closed](#) on 15 November but described the situation as calm, adding that Chinese mediation made renewed fighting unlikely.

A blocked artery

The temporary closure of the Lashio–Hsipaw–Mong Yai highway underscores how fragile security remains in Northern Shan State. The road is one of the region's most important transport and commercial corridors, linking towns and border points with China. Any disruption constrains the movement of goods, humanitarian supplies and civilians, particularly those needing medical care. The closure also reflects a broader contest for control of this corridor: the MAF is seeking to pressure the MNDA to withdraw from positions gained during previous offensives, while the MNDA aims to maintain influence over routes central to trade and taxation. Despite China's ongoing mediation efforts, both sides have reinforced positions along key roads, suggesting continued uncertainty. This dynamic fits a wider pattern in Northern Shan State, where cycles of tension, negotiation and occasional ceasefires coexist with sporadic clashes and tactical road closures. For humanitarians, the implications are considerable. Road closures leave people stranded, delay distribution and disrupt access to essential services. Detained cargo trucks and military checkpoints hinder the flow of food, medicine and trade goods. Rumours spreading online—such as warnings of imminent gunfire or explosions—add psychosocial stress. Continued volatility may constrain humanitarian access and could worsen conditions for vulnerable communities dependent on reliable transport routes.

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*
**Humanitarian
Responders**

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