

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

Humanitarian Responders

in**focus**

NATIONWIDE

NCA 10 Year
Anniversary

W41-43 | 2025
OCTOBER 09
22

CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

CONTENT

W41-43 | 2025
OCTOBER 09
22

in**focus**

Nationwide
NCA 10 YEAR ANNIVERSARY

primary concerns

page 8-16

1 — MAF RETURNS TO HSIPAW, CONTINUES BOMBING ELSEWHERE

Hsipaw Township,
Northern Shan State

2 — ROHINGYA BOAT JOURNEYS REPORTEDLY TRIPLE

Cox's Bazar, Bangladesh

3 — IDP CHILDREN RISK LOSING EDUCATION

Ann and Kyauktaw
townships, Rakhine State

4 — IDP NEEDS GROW ACROSS KARENNI

Loikaw, Demoso, and Hpruso
townships, Karenni State

5 — MAF BOMBS SCHOOLS

Hakha Township, Chin State

6 — LARGE-SCALE MAF ADVANCE ON KALE-TAMU ROAD

Kale Township, Sagaing Region

7 — MAF DETAINS CIVILIANS IN MINBU DISTRICT

Salin and Pwintbyu townships,
Magway Region

8 — MAF RETAKES HILLTOP BASE

Myawaddy Township, Karen State

9 — MAF CONTINUES RAIDS IN DAWEI SEZ

Yebyu Township, Tanintharyi Region

in**focus**

page 3-4

trend**lines**

page 5-7

infocus

NCA 10 Year Anniversary

NATIONWIDE

On 15 October, the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) held a 10 year anniversary ceremony for the Nationwide Ceasefire Agreement (NCA) in Nay Pyi Taw. The ceremony was attended by representatives of four Ethnic Armed Organisation (EAO) signatories — the Arakan Liberation Party (ALP), Karen National Union/Karen National Liberation Army-Peace Council (KNU/KNLA-PC), Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA), and New Mon State Party (NMSP). Although the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS) sent representatives, its leader Yawd Serk later said that implementation of the NCA had not been possible since the coup in 2021 and suggested that trust-building measures would be needed to increase the group's engagement. Non-signatory EAOs the United Wa State Party (UWSP), National Democratic Alliance Army (NDAA), and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP) sent delegations to attend, and at least 30 Yangon embassies also sent representatives. However, five NCA signatory groups — the Karen National Union (KNU), Chin National Front (CNF), All Burma Students' Democratic Front (ABSDF), Pa-O National Liberation Organization (PNLO), and Lahu Democratic Union (LDU) — chose not to attend. At the ceremony, SSPC leader Min Aung Hlaing urged resistance actors to choose the “political” path and demand what is possible and practical. Chinese Special Envoy Deng

Xijun added that China was ready to provide the necessary material and technical assistance for the upcoming election in Myanmar, while ambassadors from Thailand, India, and elsewhere voiced support for the elections, as did the UWSA spokesperson.

The NCA was signed by the government and 10 EAOs in October 2015 and was intended to establish a political framework for ending hostilities and negotiating autonomy and security reforms. However, the accord has been credibly argued to have been weakened from the outset by limited participation, continued military offensives in Kachin and Shan states, and entrenched mistrust among the parties. Some political analysts argue that the NCA is a political and legal contract between EAOs and the state (i.e. not specific Myanmar governments) and is thus still valid, while six of the original signatories contend that the NCA is no longer valid since the military violated the agreement by carrying out a military coup in 2021. A day before the ceremony, the MAF conducted multiple airstrikes — including seven in Hsipaw Township (Northern Shan State), three in Thabeikkyin Township (Mandalay Region), and two in Wetlet Township (Sagaing Region), as well as in Tanintharyi and Magway regions, and Chin and Kachin states — according to monitoring by this analytical unit.

The SSPC's emphasis on elections, and Myanmar Armed Forces' (MAF) continued airstrikes, ahead of the anniversary ceremony suggests the NCA is being reframed as an instrument to justify the MAF's central role in politics, rather than a credible peace framework.

Bombs and elections, not peace

The SSPC's emphasis on elections, and Myanmar Armed Forces' (MAF) continued airstrikes, ahead of the anniversary ceremony suggests the NCA is being reframed as an instrument to justify the MAF's central role in politics, rather than a credible peace framework. By linking the NCA's "success" to upcoming elections, the SSPC is positioning the vote as a foundation for peace and portraying actors that reject it as opposing peace, a narrative likely aimed at securing regional legitimacy from China, India, and Thailand. Meanwhile, key NCA signatory groups including the KNU and CNF remain in active hostilities and have even expanded their territorial control since the coup, further weakening the agreement's practical relevance to solve disputes through political frameworks. The SSPC's refusal to acknowledge the autonomy achieved by resistance actors — particularly in Rakhine State, where the Arakan Army has established de facto control everywhere but three towns — also underscores its unwillingness to engage in meaningful power-sharing or facilitate relief in most contested areas. As a result, the anniversary ceremony appears to be more about SSPC asserting the continued validity of its role in the 'peace process' and bolstering support for its elections among international observers. This however, remains detached from the realities of civilian suffering, increasingly driven by MAF aerial bombardments, and offensives, that are driving civilian suffering and the need for humanitarian assistance on the ground.

Humanitarian openings

If reinstated and genuinely upheld by both the MAF and EAO signatories, the NCA could still offer a narrow entry point for easing humanitarian restrictions in selected areas, even if prospects for wider peace remain remote. The agreement's original provisions were designed to reduce hostilities and ensure the basic conditions for aid delivery — stability, access, and civilian protection — that align with humanitarian needs across the country. The NCA provisions guarantee the basic conditions for aid delivery, ensuring aid workers can safely reach vulnerable populations and that civilian safety and recovery efforts can proceed. Crucially, the NCA's mechanisms (specifically Chapter 6, Article 10) require all involved actors — the Nay Pyi Taw regime, EAOs, and local organisations — to coordinate, which may be useful for negotiating delivery of aid where other channels are blocked. This coordination is likely essential for overcoming the blockades and restrictions currently preventing aid from reaching those in need. Although humanitarian access via an NCA framework would likely remain limited to areas controlled by NCA signatories — particularly in Shan State and parts of the southeast — it would not extend to western, northern, or central Myanmar, where non-signatories and post-coup resistance actors operate.

Although humanitarian access via an NCA framework would likely remain limited to areas controlled by NCA signatories — particularly in Shan State and parts of the southeast — it would not extend to western, northern, or central Myanmar, where non-signatories and post-coup resistance actors operate.

trendlines

HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK

TWO-WEEK TREND
-61.6%


TWO-WEEK NUMBER

12 NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 21 OCTOBER 2025


TOTAL DAMAGE
93,169

TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION

with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



trendwatch

The MAF continued to conduct deadly airstrikes, hitting villages and religious sites.

On 15 October, MAF airstrikes reportedly killed two people and injured at least 24, and destroyed houses and monastic buildings, in Sagaing Region's Wetlet and Myaung Townships. Two days later, MAF airstrikes reportedly killed five people and injured four in Ayadaw Township

On 17 October, MAF airstrikes in Mon State's Kyaikto Township reportedly destroyed houses. Eight days earlier, an airstrike in Bilin Township reportedly killed five children.

The MAF continued ground assaults, detaining and killing civilians.

On 9 October, MAF troops reportedly raided a village in Sagaing Region's Kanbalu Township, detaining 30 people and burning two civilians alive.

On 10 October, MAF raids in Mandalay Region's Nyaung-U Township reportedly displaced thousands of people from 14 villages. Three days later, MAF raids in nearby Natogyi Township reportedly left eight civilians dead. ►

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND

+16.0%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER

116NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
(NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.


AS OF 21 OCTOBER 2025

TOTAL
14,015


■ Civilian
 ■ Civilian (Alleged Informer)
 ■ Civilian (Other)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON

..... [Q1 2021 – Q3 2025]



NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION



trendwatch (cont.)

On 10 October, the MAF reportedly detained 100 villagers working on farms in Karen State's Kawkaireik Township, causing displacement from seven villages.

On 13 October, the MAF reportedly raided a village in Magway Region's Pauk Township, detained 100 villagers, and killed three.

Resistance actors inflicted losses on the MAF, which responded with counterattacks and drone strikes.

On 9 October, Karenni forces reportedly fought MAF troops in Karenni State's Loikaw Township, killing ten.

On 9 October, the KIA reported that it had recaptured outposts from the MAF in Bhamo town, days later KIA-led forces captured territory in Puta-O Township, Kachin State.

On 10 October, resistance actors reportedly attacked an MAF convoy in Chaung-U town, Sagaing Region, killing four soldiers.

On 17 October, MAF drone bombings on Laiza town reportedly injured two Chinese nationals. ▶

CIVILIAN FACILITIES DAMAGE AND ATTACKS

TWO-WEEK TREND
+16.7%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER

16 NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 21 OCTOBER 2025

Health Facility:
271

Education Facility:
478

Religious Facility:
701


TOTAL DAMAGE

1,450

■ Aerial ■ Shelling ■ EDA


IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGE AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGE AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



trendwatch (cont.)

Worsening humanitarian conditions amid fighting, displacement, and aid restrictions

On 10 October, the UN announced that over 10,000 children in Rakhine State were suffering from severe hunger. A week later, it was reported that IDPs in Rathedaung Township faced food shortages.

UXO and shelling continue to kill and injure civilians, including children, in Rakhine State.

On 12 October, MAF artillery reportedly injured a 3-year-old in Kyaukpyu Township.

On 16 October, two young men were reportedly killed, and two others injured, by a UXO explosion in Minbya town.

On 20 October, two Rohingya boys in Buthidaung Township were reportedly killed by an unexploded shell.

The MAF restored or restricted communication and movement in Rakhine State.

On 15 October, the MAF reportedly restored MPT phone services in parts of Munaung Township, though access remained limited.

On 15 October, around 500 travelers from Yangon were reportedly stranded in Kyaukpyu town after the MAF tightened travel restrictions and denied permits.

primaryconcerns

1 MAF Returns to Hsipaw, Continues Bombing Elsewhere

HSIPAW TOWNSHIP, NORTHERN SHAN STATE

On the evening of 16 October, Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) troops reportedly entered Hsipaw town, after Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) troops withdrew from the area. Media reported that several buildings — including the police station and offices of the General Administration, Land Records, and Agriculture departments — were set ablaze, though this was not attributed to a specific perpetrator.

On 17 October, MAF airstrikes on TNLA-held Namtu and Namhsan townships reportedly killed three civilians and injured at least three others. On 20 October, TNLA affiliated media said that the MAF had deployed over 28 airstrikes on TNLA controlled parts of Northern Shan State in the first half of October, killing 41 people and injuring over 40 others. On 13 October, local media reported that thousands of people had fled MAF bombing in Namtu and Hsipaw townships and arrived in Lashio, where they joined around 2,000 IDPs from Kyaukme Township who had been stranded in Lashio since late August. Thus, even as fighting along the highway between Kyaukme and Lashio towns died down, allowing some IDPs to return home on 20 October, new rounds of displacement were expected in Manton, Mongngawt, Namtu and Namhsan townships due to fighting and MAF airstrikes.

TNLA struggle in Namtu and Mogoke

While Hsipaw residents may gradually return home, civilians in other TNLA-held areas of Northern Shan State remain at acute risk. Continued MAF airstrikes also suggest steady MAF aims at reclaiming these towns through offensives. The MAF has fought its way up the highway through three TNLA-held towns now, with troops engaged in ground-level fighting and assisted by repeated airstrikes. This contrasts with the MAF's relatively restrained approach — though still involving airstrikes — to retaking Hseni town from the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), which has allegedly involved Chinese economic and political pressure on the group and negotiations. The MAF's approach to TNLA-held positions thus far suggests that displacement and humanitarian needs are likely to grow in areas still under that group's control. Mogoke is expected to be among the MAF's immediate targets because of its economic significance to the TNLA — which taxes its lucrative ruby and other precious metal mines — and its location, which could allow it to serve as a launching pad for attacks on Mongmit to the north and enable greater MAF control over routes through Shan State. While a cessation in hostilities in Hsipaw town may offer a window for IDPs to return, with local media reporting that the Lashio-Mandalay road had re-opened for civilian travel on 22 October. Ongoing airstrikes and fighting on roads toward Namtu and Mogoke are however likely to trap or displace civilians, prolonging needs in the region and straining already over-extended local response networks.

2. Rohingya Boat Journeys Reportedly Triple

COX'S BAZAR, BANGLADESH

On 15 October, a prominent INGO released a [statement](#) saying that the number of Rohingya refugees leaving Bangladesh by sea — typically heading for Thailand, Malaysia, or Indonesia — had tripled in the first half of 2025 compared to the same period last year. The statement cited [data](#) from an intergovernmental organisation in saying that at least 1,088 Rohingya — including around 87 children — embarked on maritime journeys between January and June, a sharp increase from 364 people recorded in the same six-month period in 2024. The statement [warned](#) that, with the rainy season ending and conditions in the Cox's Bazar camps worsening due to rising crime and diminishing services, more families are likely to attempt dangerous crossings in search of safety and work. Rohingya maritime migration first [surged](#) in 2012 following violence in Rakhine State, and in 2015 regional [pushbacks](#) left some 8,000 people stranded at sea, sparking international outcry over trafficking practices and hundreds of deaths. A young man in Cox's Bazar suggested that similar desperation is again driving departures, [saying](#): "Life in the camp is getting harder every day. If I could cross the sea and go abroad, I could support my family financially".

The surge in people attempting sea journeys — nearly triple last year's total — may also signal a new phase in the maritime escape routes not seen since 2015, when thousands were stranded and many died at sea.

Population left adrift

The sharp rise in Rohingya boat departures from Bangladesh in 2025 reflects deepening despair and collapsing living conditions in the Cox's Bazar refugee camps. The surge in people attempting sea journeys — nearly triple last year's total — may also signal a new phase in the maritime escape routes not seen since 2015, when thousands were stranded and many died at sea. Unlike past years, this increase has come earlier (during the monsoon season's hazardous weather), and amid unprecedented [funding cuts](#), suggesting a growing sense of desperation among refugees. That such a large number of Rohingya people have attempted these journeys from Cox's Bazar during the challenging monsoon season also suggests that there could be even larger numbers when weather conditions improve, typically from November. Beyond the perils and often brutal conditions of such journeys, however, this data is a testament to the ways that prolonged displacement, insecurity, and shrinking humanitarian support have eroded hope for over one million Rohingya refugees — particularly for children, who reportedly face hunger, trafficking, and abuse both in the camps and during crossings. For humanitarian actors navigating funding shortages, protection systems and education initiatives for vulnerable groups may serve as key risk reduction measures.

3. IDP Children Risk Losing Education

ANN AND KYAUKTAW TOWNSHIPS, RAKHINE STATE

On 9 October, local media reported that five community [schools](#) — three in Ann Township and two in Kyauktaw Township — providing free education for displaced students faced possible imminent closure due to funding shortages. A local organisation running these schools and eight [others](#) had been providing free education

for [over 1,000 IDP](#) students in the two townships. Its schools reportedly [require](#) a total of approximately 200 million Myanmar Kyat (approximately 48,780 USD at the informal market rate) per month to cover stationery, teacher stipends, and other associated costs. While it had been relying on personal contributions and diaspora donations to fund its schools, this support has reportedly [diminished](#) in recent months, after security concerns led the organisation to stop sharing its activities on social media. The organisation's founder said in an interview, "If the five schools are closed, the students will definitely suffer educational losses. Parents and community members are worried that the children's learning will be severely disrupted, especially since many of them have already faced interruptions in their education due to conflict."

The threat of closure for community-run schools for displaced students in Ann and Kyauktaw townships will hit poorer households the hardest, and could herald further loss of education opportunities for children in Rakhine State.


School's out

The threat of closure for community-run schools for displaced students in Ann and Kyauktaw townships will hit poorer households the hardest, and could herald further loss of education opportunities for children in Rakhine State. Although education has been disrupted in central Rakhine State [since 2018](#), the disruption has been particularly acute since 2023, and the possible further closure of schools in Ann and Kyauktaw townships represents a significant setback, specifically for children who are displaced. This pattern reflects broader national trends in which fighting and economic collapse have eroded education opportunities, leading children into seeking employment, or home-based or fee-dependent education. While the United League of Arakan (ULA) — through its Arakha National Department of Education (ANDE) — has administered its own [school system](#) since September 2024, local responders and student parents told this analytical unit that ANDE does not have adequate funding, requiring students to pay monthly tuition fees. The monthly fees per student range from 20,000 Myanmar Kyat (approximately 4.88 USD) for primary schools to 30,000 for lower secondary schools and 50,000 for upper secondary schools. Thus, the closure of community schools may force the over 1,000 displaced students to either pay tuition under the ANDE fee-based system (if available in their areas) or withdraw from school altogether. Furthermore, if funding cuts affect additional free schools in Rakhine State (beyond those run by the organisation discussed above), dropout among poor children will likely rise disproportionately in other households, pushing many of them to seek employment. This could heighten child-protection risks and create additional challenges for local responders already struggling to sustain education support in blockade-affected Rakhine State.

Karenni State Displacement

Karenni State, Myanmar

(October, 2025)



Legend

Displaced population by township

- 1 - 5,000
- 5,000 - 10,000
- 10,000 - 15,000
- 15,000 - 30,000
- 30,000 - 100,000

- Major town
- Minor town
- Camp in Thailand
- Main road
- Secondary road
- Other minor road

- Railway
- Major river/inland water boundary



The displacement information on this map is sourced from the Karenni Civil Society Network - KCSN (October 2025). The information should not be considered comprehensive.

Disclaimer: This product is designed for information purposes only. This map may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Base map data provided by MIMU and copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>. The accuracy of specific attributes and their geo-locations are manually added and cannot be confirmed.

4 IDP Needs Grow Across Karenni

LOIKAW, DEMOSO, AND HPRUSO TOWNSHIPS, KARENNI STATE

In mid-October, IDPs across Loikaw, Demoso, and Hpruso townships were reported to be facing severe food shortages. On 10 October, local media reported that over 100 IDPs hiding in forested areas of [Hpruso](#) Township were running out of food, having fled their homes with minimal supplies. On 13 October, 12 IDP camps in [western Demoso](#) Township were reported to be in urgent need of food assistance due to severe rice shortages. On 14 October, local media reported that an IDP camp in [eastern Loikaw](#) Township was facing food shortages after the arrival of around 100 newly displaced households. Many households were reportedly surviving on [two meals](#) a day, while larger families were prioritising their youngest children with three meals. On 8 October, local media reported that recent Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) offensives in the state had caused the further displacement of [250,000](#) people into over 470 IDP camps. On 13 October, 1,600 newly displaced people from [western Pekon](#) Township (Southern Shan State) reportedly joined IDPs in Loikaw and Demoso townships, further straining limited resources. On 15 October, a local humanitarian [responder](#) made a public call for emergency rice and cooking oil to support IDPs in the state.

Empty plates

Food insecurity in Karenni State has reached new levels, reflecting rising prices and collapsing livelihoods amid prolonged fighting and displacement. The price of rice has surged, with transport disruptions a significant driver as the MAF attempts to regain control of the main highway in the state, as reported in a previous [Fortnightly Update](#). Fighting has also displaced many farming communities and restricted their ability to tend to crops near active frontlines, and reduced harvest output, in the state. Prolonged displacement across Loikaw, Demoso, and Hpruso townships has further eroded household incomes, forcing many families to borrow

food or rely on small-scale community donations. Many households are reportedly still able to borrow food for urgent needs, but ongoing fighting has also likely disrupted trade for farmers who were able to harvest their crops. In many IDP sites, rice reserves are nearly depleted, putting vulnerable people at risk (for example, those with pre-existing health conditions may be at higher risk of contracting ailments). Private and faith-based networks remain the primary food suppliers, but their capacity is also likely overstretched after over four years of fighting. The combined effects of restricted movement, reduced crop output, and repeated displacement leave IDPs increasingly dependent on emergency assistance — even as humanitarian responders themselves face resource shortfalls amid global funding cuts.

Private and faith-based networks remain the primary food suppliers, but their capacity is also likely overstretched after over four years of fighting.

5 MAF Bombs Schools

HAKHA TOWNSHIP, CHIN STATE

On 21 October, Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) airstrikes reportedly [destroyed](#) a school in Zathal village in Hakha Township. This followed a [similar](#) MAF airstrike in the township a week earlier, on a middle school in Vanha village, that killed two children and injured 21 other people, including five teachers. While Vanha village lies within the administrative area of the Chinland Defense Force-Hakha (CDF-Hakha), local sources told this analytical unit that there were no resistance troops or active positions in the village. Zathal village,

meanwhile, is administered by the Senthang Central Council/CDF-Senthang, which oversees its own territory and education system. While the MAF controls Hakha town, the CDF-Hakha and CDF-Senthang remain the dominant actors across most of the township, including the three main roads linking Hakha to Kale, Gangaw, and Falam townships. Following the 13 October airstrike on Vanha, the CDF-Hakha Central Education Department [instructed](#) all schools under its administration in Hakha Township to close until further notice. Local sources told this analytical unit that most Vanha residents also fled after the attack there.

Displacement woes

MAF airstrikes on school infrastructure in central Chin State have disrupted children's access to education and underscore escalating protection risks for civilians in the township, away from fighting frontlines. The airstrikes, which killed and injured students and teachers, have forced township-wide school closures and displacement, and may trigger further shutdowns as fear spreads among households and education sector. As highlighted in a previous [Fortnightly Update](#), poverty-stricken parts of Chin State lack basic early-warning systems such as loudspeakers or walkie-talkies, leaving residents with little time to react to incoming airstrikes. The rugged terrain and poor road networks in Chin State further impede escape and emergency assistance, with vulnerable populations such as those with disabilities and the elderly most affected by sudden upticks in displacement. Displaced populations are in a bind, as flight to the Indian border is increasingly complicated by the restrictive measures taken by the Indian federal Government and Mizoram State Government. Meanwhile, fleeing to MAF-controlled Hakha town is possible but likely highly undesirable for people displaced by MAF violence. Similar fear-driven displacement from airstrikes has been reported in [Matupi](#) town on 20 October, signalling growing fears over MAF targeted airstrikes targeting civilian infrastructure in resistance-held areas of the state. Ultimately, closure of schools and loss of safe learning spaces will significantly impact the educational development of children, but they also signal a wider disruption to

civilian lives — a disruption that may increase if Chin resistance actors intent on opposing the upcoming election spark further escalation in MAF airstrikes.

6 Large-Scale MAF Advance on Kale-Tamu Road

KALE TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION

On 20 October, [local media](#) quoted a “military source” as saying that the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) had recently recaptured positions in Kale Township, such as the [Let Pan Chaung](#) police station, that had previously been controlled by resistance forces. The MAF's renewed push followed a three-month battle near Kan Thar Yar village, which local resistance actors [lost](#) on 12 October, after which the MAF sent additional reinforcements to secure the Kale-Tamu road. The MAF has deployed [around 1,000](#) troops to regain control of this trade route, half of whom are on the road, while the other half enter villages outside Kale town. As of 21 October, MAF soldiers had not [reached](#) Tamu, but had reached approximately 60 miles north of Kale town. Local sources told this analytical unit that the MAF columns stationed in villages along the road had shelled nearby areas, and the recent MAF operation has reportedly displaced [residents](#) from 15 villages along the Kale-Tamu road — though [other sources](#) allege as many as 50 villages. The MAF troops advancing north along the road have also reportedly [detained and killed](#) civilians and torched houses. On 19 October, 38 locals were reportedly detained, of whom eight were killed and 30 others were [taken](#) with the advancing MAF units. A woman speaking to local media described worsening conditions this month, [saying](#) that “churches and pagodas are full too, no one knows where to stay”, and “some families haven't eaten for days because they are worried if they make a fire to cook rice MAF troops will see the smoke and shell the area”.

MAF turns road into highway to hell

The MAF's current campaign to reassert control over the Kale–Tamu section of the Asia Highway — a vital corridor linking India's Manipur State with lower Sagaing and upper Magway — has put civilians directly in harm's way. Similar offensives (to reclaim road networks) in upper Magway Region since mid-2025 have featured large-scale troop deployments and indiscriminate tactics that have devastated nearby communities. The extent of violence committed against civilians may owe partly to the large numbers of the MAF troops trying to push out resistance influence in the economically important corridor. Tamu is a key border crossing (and lacks a strong resistance presence), and Kale town hosts the MAF's Kale Regional Operations Command and Military Operations Command (MOC) 10, suggesting that the MAF is both intent on retaking the route and well-positioned to do so. Yet, as the MAF likely consolidates control along the highway, further displacement, restricted humanitarian access, and worsening protection risks are likely.

On 3 October, local media reported that some of those who had been detained were [IDPs](#) fleeing fighting between the Arakan Army and MAF near the Nat Yay Kan camp in Ngape Township (covered in the last [Fortnightly Update](#)), to the west of Salin and Pwintbyu townships, in the foothills of the Arakan Yoma mountains.

Since the MAF began its conscription drive in February 2024, youths across Myanmar have fled their homes, with many attempting to leave the country through irregular border crossings after being denied or unable to afford official travel documents, risking arrest, deportation, and abuse.

MAF Detains Civilians in Minbu District

**SALIN AND PWINTBYU TOWNSHIPS,
MAGWAY REGION**

Since 10 October, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) has reportedly increased its detentions of male youths in Salin and Pwintbyu townships, allegedly for forced recruitment. These efforts are reportedly being jointly [led by](#) MAF troops and State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC)-appointed administrators. Some detainees have been released after paying bribes, while those unable to pay have reportedly been [transferred](#) to MAF military training centers. The detentions have reportedly taken place at passenger vehicle checkpoints near the [Kapyay junction](#) in Pwintbyu Township on the Magway–Salin–Sinphyukyun route, on the [northern side](#) of Salin town, and in [Salin](#) and Pwintbyu towns, including at people's homes.

Fear and loathing the MAF

The expanding MAF detentions highlight growing protection risks for youths in Salin and Pwintbyu townships, and highlight threats that could emerge in other parts of central Myanmar. Such forced conscription efforts raise numerous challenges for youths and families. Since the MAF began its conscription drive in [February 2024](#), youths across Myanmar have fled their homes, with many [attempting](#) to leave the country through irregular border crossings after being denied or unable to afford official travel documents, risking arrest, deportation, and abuse. Earlier this year, local media reported that the MAF was sending newly conscripted soldiers to [the frontlines](#), and that some recruits' families had not been informed of their death or injury or offered compensation or support. Furthermore, the [high cost](#) of bribes to avoid conscription, up to 5–8 million Myanmar Kyat (approximately 1,219–1,951 US dollar at the informal market rate), is likely to drain household savings and push more households into debt, with poorer households and those with medical conditions or disabilities most at risk. The detentions this month suggest that the

MAF is seeking to replenish ranks amid intensified fighting on nationwide fronts, with hostilities — and MAF efforts to fill personnel shortages — highly likely to continue. The combination of forced recruitment and economic strain in Magway Region could accelerate youth flight, reducing local labor capacity while heightening the vulnerability of those who remain behind.


8. MAF Retakes Hilltop Base

MYAWADDY TOWNSHIP, KAREN STATE

On 19 October, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and Karen National Army (KNA) — formerly the Karen Border Guard Force — recaptured the Swe Taw Gone base from the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA), according to a source who spoke to this analytical unit (though [media](#) reported this as taking place a day earlier). The base was [established](#) by the MAF in 2003 on a hilltop overlooking Lay Kay Kaw, Hpa Lu village, and the Myawaddy-Waw Lay road. KNLA-led forces [captured](#) the base in October 2024 and reportedly [cleared](#) the area of UXO and structures left by retreating MAF troops, but one source told this analytical unit that MAF forces were able to refortify the base upon retaking it this month. Since early October, [around 500](#) MAF troops have advanced along the Myawaddy-Waw Lay road, backed by drones and heavy artillery fire, and fought with KNLA troops around Lay Kay Kaw to reclaim bases in southern Myawaddy Township lost in the last year. Amid fighting along the Moei River — which separates Myawaddy Township from Thailand — south of Myawaddy town, some [Thai villages](#) were reportedly damaged by shelling on 18 October. MAF aerial attacks and shelling, and fighting near Lay Kay Kaw and along the Myawaddy-Waw Lay road, had reportedly [displaced](#) at least [3,400 people](#) as of 5 October, with displaced persons being [supported](#) with food and shelter by local volunteers. The new rounds of displacement has also [disrupted](#) children's access to education with their curricula beginning four months ago in June.

KNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unit typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms “Karen State” and “Karenni State” preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at <https://tinyurl.com/4dtnfdak>. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at <https://www.khrg.org/maps>.

Civilians in the crosshairs

The MAF's recapture of the Swe Taw Gone base is likely to heighten risks for civilians in southern Myawaddy Township, and particularly for movement along the Myawaddy–Waw Lay corridor. Control of the Swe Taw Gone hilltop camp gives the MAF a commanding view over surrounding villages and transport routes, enabling it to monitor movement and launch strikes against both suspected resistance actors and civilians. From 2021 up until October 2024, the Swe Taw Gone base was used to threaten civilian movement around Lay Kay Kaw and along the Myawaddy–Waw Lay road, and locals are now likely to experience renewed insecurity with the MAF back at the camp. The seizure of the Swe Taw Gone base marks the latest reversal of gains made by KNLA forces in late 2024, likely enabled by the MAF having [secured](#) movement on the Asia Highway to Myawaddy town. Swe Taw Gone's capture mirrors broader trends seen in other parts of southeast Myanmar, where the MAF has regained control of key trade routes previously lost to resistance actors, but through heavy aerial and artillery bombardment on civilian areas. The presence of several KNLA camps in this part of Myawaddy Township — many of which the MAF lost over the past year — also suggests that fighting along the Myawaddy–Waw Lay corridor is likely to persist as the MAF seeks to recover territory. Ongoing hostilities will likely further restrict movement on this key route, disrupting trade and daily travel for rural communities dependent on it for access to markets. It will also likely trigger new displacement, and further disrupt education as self-help groups and local responders struggle to provide relief to thousands of newly displaced people.

Economic Zone (SEZ) area of Yebyu Township. On 10 October, MAF troops arrived in Muu Du village, [camped](#) in the village monastery, and reportedly raided homes and looted supplies. On 11 October, MAF troops based in Kaleinaung town [advanced](#) via boat towards Hpaung Taw and Zar Di village tracts, displacing residents of several villages. On the evening of 14 October, MAF [units](#) also entered Ya Laing village tract, firing weaponry and causing residents to flee. Since December 2024, residents from Zar Di village have faced repeated [displacement](#), and only a small number are reported to have returned, while those still displaced struggled with inadequate shelter during the late monsoon rains. A Dawei District local responder told this analytical unit that many displaced families from Yebyu, Thayetchaung, and Launglon townships are increasingly moving toward urban areas, as long-term fighting leaves rural return untenable. The same source noted that about one-third of displaced populations in this part of Tanintharyi Region are sheltering in mountainous or hilly areas.

No development in SEZ

Renewed MAF operations in and around the Dawei SEZ are compounding humanitarian and protection risks for civilians already living under prolonged displacement. Villagers in Yebyu Township and surrounding areas face urgent needs for shelter, food, medicine, and essential supplies, according to multiple local sources. These operations mirror earlier MAF “clearance” campaigns along the SEZ perimeter — combining troop reinforcements, artillery fire, and house raids — that have driven cyclical displacement and eroded livelihoods. Many families have relied on pre-packed rations hidden in remote forest areas, but prolonged hostilities have depleted these resources and heightened dependency on local relief networks. For those relocating to MAF-controlled towns, safety remains uncertain; as seen in other parts of Myanmar (see [“MAF Detains Civilians in Minbu District”](#)), civilians in MAF-held areas face intrusive household inspections and forced recruitment drives targeting young men. These pressures are prompting secondary migration among displaced youth seeking to avoid conscription or arbitrary detention.

9

MAF Continues Raids in Dawei SEZ

YEBYU TOWNSHIP, TANINTHARYI REGION

On 16 October, local media reported that [more than](#) 300 Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) troops had recently been deployed in the Dawei Special

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*
**Humanitarian
Responders**

Contributing information sources to this document include public and non-public humanitarian information. The content compiled is by no means exhaustive and does not necessarily reflect the position of its authors or funders. The provided information, assessment, and analysis are designated for humanitarian purposes only and as such should not be cited.

Contact: analyst.myanmar2020@gmail.com