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Scenario Plan

CHIN STATE



OCTOBER
2025

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SCENARIOS


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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Scenario Plan presents Chin State-based context projections for the purposes of response planning and strategy. At present, it appears that the most likely scenario over the next 6–12 months is a continuation of the status quo, in which needs and displacement are high but there is comparatively little new fighting. Other possible scenarios include the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) sending large armed convoys into the state and Chin actors pushing the MAF out of remaining towns, but these are of low or moderate likelihood.


While this Scenario Plan provides general guidance, responders may make adaptations to suit the needs, priorities, and strategies of their respective organisations.

SCENARIOS OVERVIEW



KEY SECURITY INCIDENTS

MARCH 2021 – JUNE 2025



Legend

Security Incidents

- Airstrike/Drone attack
- Arrest/Detention/Abduction/Kidnapping
- Targeted killing
- Clash/Shelling*
- ★ Landmine/UXO incident
- Other security incident

*including explosive device attacks. [Incidents with unidentified locations are not displayed on the map]

The information on this map is sourced from both traditional media and social media such as Facebook. The information should not be considered comprehensive.

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Since 2023, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) has been pushed out of the majority of Chin State. The Arakan Army (AA) seized the MAF's positions in Palletwa Township in December 2023, and over the following year the AA-aligned Chin Brotherhood overran the MAF's remaining positions in Mindat, Matupi, and Kanpetlet townships. Meanwhile, Chinland Council members captured greater territory in the northern part of the state, including the one formal border crossing at Rihkhawdar (in Falam Township). Consequently, as of late 2025 MAF troops remained only in Hakha town (the state capital, in Hakha Township), Tedim and Khaikam towns in Tedim Township, and Thantlang town (in Thantlang Township), which is entirely depopulated. While there has been minimal fighting on the ground in the state since mid-2025, the MAF has continued to conduct airstrikes and it may yet send reinforcements via Sagaing and Magway regions.

Relations between the Chinland Council and the Chin Brotherhood have been marked by tension and fragility. There have been several short-lived skirmishes between local actors associated with the two sides, but these appear to have calmed for the time being. Meanwhile, there has been intermittent dialogue about consolidation between the two major political blocs in the state (the Chinland Council and the Interim Chin National Consultative Council [ICNCC]), but few signs of progress in this regard, with unresolved challenges related to power-sharing, administrative structure, political representation, and the role — and presence — of the AA in the state. At the same time

as these intra-Chin struggles, the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) plans to hold elections in two of the state's townships (Hakha and Tedim) in December, and potentially three later on.

Despite a recent reduction in fighting, humanitarian needs remain high across Chin State. Even before the coup, poverty was high and the availability of services was low in this mountainous, largely isolated state. Much of the population has been displaced or otherwise affected since the coup; as of July 2025, around 150,000 state residents (out of an estimated pre-coup population of less than 500,000) were estimated to be displaced, with nearly one third of these people fleeing into India. Poor economic opportunities and limited external assistance compound the needs of people affected by fighting, which are reported to be primarily for food, household items, and shelter. Sources told this analytical unit that many people in the state have been forced to reduce their nutritional intake. On top of this, MAF airstrikes and shelling have reportedly destroyed over 400 houses and IDP shelters, and heavy rains and winds have reportedly destroyed IDP shelters as well. Services such as education and health are provided but still fall far short of covering needs. Many schools in rural areas lack the financial resources to pay teachers and function properly. Mobile clinics and local health facilities, operated by NGOs or local actors, are available in several rural areas but often lack proper equipment and struggle to source adequate medical supplies. Limited access to healthcare makes young children, pregnant women, and elderly people particularly vulnerable.

Livelihood opportunities have diminished. Many people in rural parts of the state rely on traditional shifting cultivation to grow staples such as rice, corn, or root vegetables. However, climate change and fighting have disrupted these practices, forcing people — sometimes entire villages — to abandon their land and causing food shortages. IDPs are sometimes able to cultivate land around host communities, but resources are limited. Rising inflation has also severely impacted the local economy in all parts of Chin State, limiting opportunities for traders and retailers, among others. As younger family members (often men) seek work elsewhere, remittances have taken on additional value. This is particularly so where family members live in Western countries, and this appears to benefit people in the northern part of the state more than those in the south.

Finally, changes in territorial control have impacted civilian movement and humanitarian access. While travel within areas controlled by Chin actors is generally flexible, moving between areas controlled by Chin actors and those under MAF control remains challenging, with frequent checkpoints and thus longer travel times and risks of interrogation, detention, and extortion. Local fragmentation has also reportedly disrupted movement and raised prices, with different actors imposing different rules in their areas of control and all demanding tolls. Most of these challenges also apply to aid workers, many of whom operate from outside the state. ■

KEY ARMED STAKEHOLDERS

Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF)

In power since 2021 coup; gatekeeper on engagement by international stakeholders, and has capacity to stifle local organisations where it has troops

Hundreds of thousands of troops spread across Myanmar

In Chin State, the MAF's Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 266, LIB 269, and Light Infantry Division (LID) 77 are active in Hakha; LIBs 222 and 269, and LIDs 66 and 77, in Thantlang; and LIB 266 in Tedim

Chinland Council - associated groups

Formed in 2023 by armed actors, local administrative actors, and MPs

De facto leader is Chin National Front/Army (CNF/A), which is the oldest EAO in the state and comprises over 3,000 troops

Other members include 15 Chinland Defence Forces (CDFs) comprising around 1,300 forces statewide

Chin Brotherhood - associated groups

Formed in 2023, as a military coalition, by eight armed actors not aligned with Chinland Council and CNA

Largest member is the Chin Defense Force (CDF-Mindat)

Estimated total 800 fighters, but often fights alongside AA

Strong ties to alternate state political body, the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC)

Arakan Army (AA)

One of Myanmar's largest armed actors, with estimated strength of 30,000 fighters

Mainly operates in Rakhine State, but estimated to have over 1,000 troops in adjacent parts of Chin State

Active relationships with Chin Brotherhood members; tensions with Chinland Council


Zomi Revolutionary Army-Eastern Command

Eastern faction of a group formed in India; Chin State formation 2013

Estimated troop size of nearly 100 fighters in Chin State

Not aligned with any side, but has been alleged to fight alongside MAF against other Chin actors

AA and Chin actors



ARMED ACTOR PRESENCE

OCTOBER 2025

Disclaimer: in many areas across Myanmar, control is contested or mixed. However, for simplicity of viewing, this map does not show gradations of control or break down control by type. As well, due to the complex and shifting areas of control of specific armed actors associated with the Chinland Council and Chin Brotherhood, their respective presence and control vis-a-vis one another are not shown here.

The information on this graphic is from various open sources including open sources from social media. The information should not be considered comprehensive. This product is designed for information purposes only, and may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Administrative boundaries are indicative only and provided by MIMU (copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>).

SSPC Elections

- Increased fighting
- Restrictions on movement
- Further political division between Chin stakeholders participating in and opposing the elections

Continued MAF airstrikes

- Displacement
- Civilian casualties
- Disruption to agriculture and livelihoods

MAF reinforcement

- Increased fighting and displacement
- Restrictions on movement of people and goods
- Rising prices due to fighting and roadblocks

Deeper ULA/AA ties with groups in southern Chin State

- Further political division among Chin stakeholders, potentially increased inter-Chin fighting
- Increased Chin-Rakhine tensions
- Movement restrictions, displacement

Increased forced recruitment by Chin actors

- Increased displacement and thinning of population
- Dissatisfaction from Chin community

Increased ULA/AA presence in Paletwa

- Inter-communal disputes
- Increased displacement due to forced recruitment and discriminatory treatment of locals

Increased India involvement

- Restrictive measures on cross border access
- Restrictions on movement
- Increased pressure on Chin stakeholders

Negative sentiment from Mizoram community

- Political pressure on Chin stakeholders
- Deportation risks for refugees in Mizoram
- Further restrictions for refugees

Chin groups' merger

- Decreased political tension, likelihood of fighting
- Greater coordination of aid delivery

Status Quo

In this scenario, conditions in Chin State remain much the same, despite the SSPC's planned elections. MAF positions and troops are attacked, voting itself is vulnerable to isolated attacks on polling places and people involved in the process, and the MAF may send additional troops to make voting places more 'secure'. However, there is not a major influx of MAF troops fighting to recapture parts of Chin State, and MAF troops largely remain confined to Hakha and Tedim townships. Elsewhere in the state, conditions remain poor amid barriers to the inflow of goods, the constant threat of MAF airstrikes, and local-level quarrels between Chin armed actors. Both the Chinland Council and groups affiliated with the Chin Brotherhood attempt to build out their governance structures but struggle to do so amid resource constraints and threats to their territorial claims. As well, in southern Chin State, the AA increases its presence and seeks to improve infrastructure between there and India's Mizoram state. Chin actors aligned with it benefit in the form of arms and defense capabilities, but this does little to benefit civilians living in areas where they operate. ■

IMPACT:

KEY TAKEAWAY: IN THIS SCENARIO, HUMANITARIAN NEEDS ARE LIKELY TO REMAIN HIGH AND HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT IS LIKELY TO REMAIN INADEQUATE. THE IMPACTS OF FIGHTING OVER THE PAST FOUR YEARS, LARGE-SCALE DISPLACEMENT, DISRUPTION OF AGRICULTURE, AND ELEVATED PRICES MEAN THAT MANY NEEDS ARE LIKELY TO GO UNFULFILLED. AT THE SAME TIME, ACCESS IS LIKELY TO REMAIN A CHALLENGE BECAUSE OF THE STATE'S TERRAIN AND THE NEED TO COORDINATE WITH MANY ACTORS.

LIKELIHOOD: ■■■■□

The MAF has struggled to retain its presence in Chin State, where various armed actors have been successful in attacking MAF convoys and dislodging its troops from stationary positions. As well, large-scale reinforcement of troops in the state would require the MAF to pass through parts of Sagaing and Magway regions that have high People's Defense Force (PDF) activity, making it harder to reach Chin State. Finally, the impetus to recapture areas of the state as a conduit to trade with India is made weaker by the fact that the MAF still controls the border farther north, in Tamu (for now).

On the other hand, the MAF has never taken lightly to losing territory and may seek to recapture parts of Chin State (at least in the north), particularly in the run up to its planned elections. It has conducted offensives elsewhere in the country with some success in recent months, and it may feel emboldened to open up a new front in Chin State. Particularly as the SSPC has suggested that voting will take place in several townships of Chin State not currently under MAF control, it is possible that the next phase of the election could be preceded by such an offensive.

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

In this scenario, while new **DISPLACEMENT** may be limited, overall displacement in Chin State would likely remain high as a result of past violence and barriers to return or resettlement (including the difficulty of rebuilding).

FOOD SECURITY would likely remain poor in this scenario, as a result of livelihood challenges, rising prices, and the difficulty of sourcing goods (including food) from either India or neighbouring parts of Myanmar.

PROTECTION would likely remain a challenge in this scenario, even if highly varied from location to location. The ever-present threat of MAF airstrikes would create a lack of security, while the potential for local inter-group quarrels means that civilians remain at risk. ►

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS (cont.)

LIVELIHOODS would also likely remain a challenge in this scenario. Crop cultivation, the main source of income for people in the state, is hampered by displacement, insecurity, and the difficulty of sourcing input materials. Other livelihoods would continue to be undermined for similar reasons.

Access to **HEALTHCARE** would likely remain tenuous in this scenario, because of both resource shortages and the spread of populations across terrain that is difficult to traverse. Particularly for IDPs, it will likely remain difficult to access even mobile clinics outside urban areas.

HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT

Formal **PERMISSIONS** from the SSPC are highly unlikely to change in this scenario, and are therefore likely to remain extremely rare and constrained. At this point, the majority of response activities in the state must be carried out without SSPC approval, though approval may still be needed from local actors, area depending.

ADMINISTRATIVE RISK is likely to go unchanged in this scenario, but also to be fairly low, given the limited MAF access to many parts of the state. Nonetheless, humanitarian responders operating with SSPC approval elsewhere may find it challenging to carry out programming in Chin State because of the necessity of going around the SSPC — and the risks that this presents.

PHYSICAL ACCESS is likely to remain a major challenge. In addition to the difficulties of travelling far

over roads in the state that may have been destroyed by rains or otherwise, the fragmentation of actors means that accessing many areas requires moving through checkpoints associated with many different parties.

MARKETS are likely to remain functional, if impoverished, in this scenario. While markets are likely to continue functioning in areas without active fighting, extremely elevated prices mean that there is a limited number of buyers for what had previously been regular purchases.

IN THIS SCENARIO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONDERS IN CHIN STATE SHOULD:

- Prepare to respond to sporadic and cyclical displacement due to airstrikes and local tensions, with the understanding that durable solutions remain out of reach;
- Scale up funding in order to maximise the impact of existing access, and increase cash-based assistance to offset the rising costs of goods and destruction of livelihoods;
- Be aware that transportation of relief supplies and other goods will remain challenging;
- Plan to source supplies from local markets, but be aware that budgets and/or targets may need to be adjusted to respond to high and increasing cost of goods;
- Continue to work with local civil society to the greatest extent possible in order to mitigate access challenges, including interruptions to travel and transportation related to restrictions, armed violence, poor infrastructure, and weather;
- Support local partners and other civil society actors in navigating the security concerns and pressures that arise from shifting areas of control; and
- Closely monitor contextual developments and consult frequently with local staff and partners to ensure conflict sensitivity best practices are adapted to shifting realities on the ground.

MAF Sends Troops to Retake Territory

In this scenario, the MAF makes a more concerted effort to re-establish its presence in Chin State. It sends troops overland in large convoys via the Kale-Tedim, Gangaw-Hakha, Saw-Kanpetlet, and/or Swelawy Gyin-Gyi Dwe roads, and provides air and drone cover to these convoys as they proceed through Sagaing and Magway regions and then Chin State. It prioritises efforts in the northern part of the state, where larger roads and less well-armed adversaries may make this easier; fighting through southern Chin State would require it to at least indirectly confront the AA, which has greater capacity to repel such attacks. As convoys try to proceed through Chin State, communities living along major roadways (including at displacement sites) bear the primary brunt of airstrikes and ground fighting, but airstrikes also impact more rural communities and disrupt the transportation of goods and people, with effects on the entire state. Civilians are pushed, to an even greater extent, farther west, including into India. ■

LIKELIHOOD: ■ ■ ■ ■ ■

The MAF has never taken lightly to losing territory; it has often been unwilling to permanently cede territory to other actors, and the way that it typically seeks to maintain control is through troop presence and the use of force. It has conducted offensives elsewhere in the country with some success in recent months, likely benefitting from increased drone capacity and the benefits this brings to other military operations. Accordingly, it may feel emboldened — and have greater ability — to reopen larger-scale operations in Chin State, particularly as it tries to facilitate elections there.

On the other hand, the SSPC/MAF may have less incentive to spread itself thin by concentrating resources in Chin State. The state holds less economic and strategic value than Kachin State, for example, which connects to markets in China and holds lucrative natural resources; while Chin State forms much of Myanmar's border with India, there is far less trade flowing through this border, and far less in the way of (discovered) natural resources. Intelligence sharing from Indian armed forces, including the Assam Rifles, may also help the MAF to feel secure that Chin actors do not become too powerful to dislodge at a later date.

TRIGGERS AND INDICATORS

CHANGES THAT WOULD LIKELY DRIVE OR LEAD TO THIS SCENARIO INCLUDE:

- SSPC intentions to control greater territory before or during the elections process
- Improved MAF capacity to move troops overland through northwest Myanmar, including with the assistance of drones

ACCORDINGLY, KEY INDICATORS FOR THE ONSET OF THIS SCENARIO INCLUDE:

- Success of similar MAF efforts to retake territory elsewhere
- Movement of MAF troops westward through Sagaing and Magway regions

IMPACT:

HIGH AND NEGATIVE

KEY TAKEAWAY: THE CHANGES IN THIS SCENARIO WOULD LIKELY HAVE A HIGH IMPACT, RESULTING IN MAJOR WORSENING OF DISPLACEMENT, FOOD SECURITY, MARKET FUNCTIONALITY, AND HUMANITARIAN ACCESS.

As fighting impacts communities along roadways and disperses civilian populations, and as this same fighting disrupts the flow of food and other goods from elsewhere in Myanmar, it can be expected that needs will rise across the board. At the same time, population dispersal and more insecure conditions would likely make it more challenging for humanitarian responders to navigate physical hurdles and the administrative challenges of a fragmented landscape.

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

DISPLACEMENT would likely rise in this scenario, as fighting along major roadways brings violence to more densely populated areas of the state. It is also likely that communities, seeing the MAF's movement westward, anticipate violence and flee preemptively.

FOOD SECURITY would likely suffer in this scenario as a result of disruption to both food production and transportation. As more troops fight and more bombs fall, more communities will likely be forced to stop working to produce food. At the same time, major disruption of roadways means that the transportation of food becomes far more difficult, making food scarcer and more expensive.

PROTECTION would likely get worse in this scenario, as fighting and mobilisation of troops expose more people to danger. Increased air and drone strikes raise the dangers for people statewide, while people living along the roads taken by MAF troops would also be vulnerable to gunfire, explosive ordnance, and abuses by troops. This scenario would also raise the likelihood of conscription by Chin actors.

LIVELIHOODS would likely worsen in this scenario, for the same reasons as food security. The close proximity of fighting – and fears that it could spread – would likely push more farmers to stop working their fields. Meanwhile, disruption of roads would impact all livelihoods and make it harder to source inputs for agricultural and other work.

HEALTH outcomes would likely suffer in this scenario. First, fighting would increase the overall load on health resources and further disperse the population, including to areas without strong health resources. Second, the disruption of roadways would likely hurt the ability of healthcare settings to find even basic medicines and equipment.

SCENARIO 2 – MAF SENDS TROOPS TO RETAKE TERRITORY

HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT

In this scenario, the **PERMISSIONS** regime would not change but both the MAF and Chin actors — particularly in the south of the state — would be less likely to grant access. The SSPC/MAF, already very hesitant to grant formal permissions to humanitarian responders, may be even more so amid hostilities in Chin State. Meanwhile, some Chin actors may also be more hesitant to allow activities.

ADMINISTRATIVE RISK is unlikely to change in this scenario. Risk is already high in Chin State and elsewhere, and much of the programming here takes place without the consent (or knowledge) of the SSPC/MAF. However, were the MAF to be successful in retaking areas of Chin State, this could elevate administrative risk of operations in the state.

PHYSICAL ACCESS would likely suffer in this scenario as well, if slightly. While much of the access to Chin State is either local or coming from India, the increased dispersal of people through displacement, caused by fighting, would likely make it more challenging to reach people in need of assistance.

MARKET FUNCTIONALITY would likely suffer in this scenario because of the difficulty of sourcing goods. As more roads from elsewhere in Myanmar are disrupted (or disrupted to a greater extent), this would have significant effects on the ability of traders to get goods to markets and allow them to function. As well, strain on household resources would likely drive down purchasing power further.

IN THIS SCENARIO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONDERS IN CHIN STATE SHOULD:

- Plan for prolonged displacement from both rural and urban areas, pre-positioning aid to the greatest degree possible;
- Increase assistance to reach an ever-growing number of people displaced or otherwise in need, including potentially those in India;
- Consider shifting operations to India where this is not already the case;
- Increase cash-based programmes to offset rising costs and destruction of livelihoods, as well as to maintain efficiency and flexibility in a context that may change rapidly;
- Strengthen relationships with local partners that have greater ability to reach populations in affected areas, and support these partners in managing security risks;
- Shift to remote, zero-visibility modalities where not already existing; and
- Closely monitor contextual developments and consult frequently with local staff and partners to ensure that best practices are continuously adapted to the shifting situation.

Chin Actors Push MAF Out of Towns

In this scenario, Chin armed actors make a concerted push to dislodge the MAF from positions in Hakha and Tedim towns, possibly in the lead-up to the SSPC's planned elections there on 28 December. While this push would most likely be led by actors affiliated with the Chinland Council, it could — in one or both places — also involve actors affiliated with the Chin Brotherhood. These actors lay siege to remaining military outposts in Thantlang town, before proceeding to Hakha and Tedim. This leads to heavy fighting in and around these towns, and MAF airstrikes in these areas as well, causing widespread damage to houses and public infrastructure. This impacts civilians, including significant IDP populations, in the few places that have not yet been devastated by fighting.

To the extent that Chin actors are successful in dislodging the MAF from specific areas, this leads to contention between these actors in terms of control and governance of civilian populations in these areas. Past small-scale tensions and inability to find common ground give way to open fighting, starting with isolated fights but quickly escalating to involve more groups aligned with the two sides. Fighting between armed actors ostensibly tied to the same ethnic sub-group both increases civilians' vulnerability and splits communities by perceived allegiances. This increased hostility also further complicates humanitarian response activities.■

LIKELIHOOD: ■■■■■

Chin armed actors, and particularly those associated with the Chinland Council, have long tried to take control of the areas still remaining under MAF control in northern Chin State — including Operation Jericho to take control of the road between Thantlang and Hakha. As the elections draw nearer, the impetus to do so may be stronger, with Chin political actors seeking to definitively establish governance not linked to the MAF and fears that the elections could further entrench the SSPC or whatever follows it after the elections. With so few towns remaining under MAF control, a military victory here would be a significant win for those trying to free the state entirely of MAF presence.

At the same time, these actors have long struggled to take Hakha and Tedim, and Thantlang has passed back and forth. The significant mismatch between the military capacities of the MAF and those of even well-coordinated Chin armed actors means that this would be very challenging, and continued tensions may hinder coordination. Furthermore, efforts to overrun the remaining MAF positions in the state could backfire, triggering new waves of MAF airstrikes and reinforcements, and resulting in an even greater MAF presence. The possibility of this outcome could dissuade Chin actors from trying, or it could split actors between those supporting such an effort and those opposing it.

TRIGGERS AND INDICATORS

CHANGES THAT WOULD LIKELY DRIVE OR LEAD TO THIS SCENARIO INCLUDE:

- Planned armed opposition to elections in the state
- Improved cooperation between Chin armed actors (either within or between the two major blocs)
- Increased resources for Chin armed actors, likely from India

ACCORDINGLY, KEY INDICATORS FOR THE ONSET OF THIS SCENARIO INCLUDE:

- Renewed efforts to remove the MAF from Thantlang
- Statements or other indication that Chin actors will not tolerate the elections
- Increased trade at Rihkhawdar/Zokhawthar

IMPACT:

HIGH AND NEGATIVE*

KEY TAKEAWAY: THE CHANGES IN THIS SCENARIO WOULD LIKELY HAVE A HIGH IMPACT, RESULTING IN MAJOR WORSENING OF HUMANITARIAN NEEDS AND ACCESS IN THE MOST DENSELY-POPULATED AREAS OF THE STATE, AND HAVING KNOCK-ON EFFECTS ELSEWHERE.

Livelihoods, access to healthcare, and food security would likely be significantly impacted by fighting around these more densely-populated areas, as would protection and the ability of people and goods to move easily. While many people would likely be displaced to remote areas of the state or into India, access to populations remaining in Hakha and Tedim would be a major challenge.

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS

In this scenario, **DISPLACEMENT** would likely rise significantly around the towns where fighting takes place. While localised, this would affect a large population because these areas have been perceived as safer up until now and therefore host relatively large populations, including IDPs.

FOOD SECURITY would likely worsen in this scenario, particularly in areas with fighting but also by extension in surrounding areas. Because these towns serve as market hubs and also have more concentrated resources, displacement and disruption here could have wide-ranging impacts.

PROTECTION would likely worsen significantly in and around these towns, as attacks by Chin armed actors give way to massively destructive MAF airstrikes and drawn out fighting on the ground around MAF positions. There is also a high likelihood of conscription by Chin armed actors in this scenario.

LIVELIHOODS would likely worsen significantly in urban parts of the state in this scenario, and they may suffer in surrounding rural areas as well. As fighting creates physical and other insecurity, urban populations are likely to flee, disrupting commerce.

HEALTH is likely to suffer in this scenario. Fighting would increase the load on existing healthcare resources. As well, these urban areas host some of the only permanent healthcare settings in the state, and the disruption (or destruction) of these facilities would force state residents to seek more intensive healthcare elsewhere.

SCENARIO 3 – CHIN ACTORS PUSH MAF OUT OF TOWNS

HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT

PERMISSIONS would likely be even harder to come by in this scenario. Particularly for an organisation operating from Hakha or Tedim, SSPC/MAF permissions would be nearly impossible to get. In-fighting between Chin armed actors would further complicate non-SSPC permissions.

ADMINISTRATIVE RISK would likely remain unchanged in this scenario, at least until there is a definitive change in control. Were the MAF to increase its presence in the state, this could increase risk. Conversely, the removal of MAF troops could decrease risk.

PHYSICAL ACCESS to much of the state would likely stay the same, but the dispersal of urban populations could make it harder to reach people in need, and physical access to those remaining in towns with fighting would become far more difficult.

MARKET FUNCTIONALITY would likely suffer in this scenario, as market hubs in Hakha and Tedim are affected (physically) by fighting, people are displaced, and fighting disrupts the movement of goods. With markets in these hubs affected, market functionality in surrounding areas would also likely be impacted.

IN THIS SCENARIO, INTERNATIONAL RESPONDERS IN CHIN STATE SHOULD:

- Be prepared to respond to displacement from urban areas, resulting in relocation to dispersed informal displacement sites;
- Support local partners in conducting localised needs assessments with IDP populations and other communities, in order to gauge the scope of needs and respond accordingly;
- Anticipate the need to increase engagement with non-MAF-linked actors and develop strategies to navigate tensions that may arise as multiple actors compete for control;
- Invest in strengthening lines of communication between CSOs, HRDs, and armed actors so that community voices may be better represented and considered by armed actors;
- Closely examine all programmes, and monitor local partner interactions and affiliations, to understand the socio-political context of partner portfolios; and
- Support civilian protection actors to increase capacity to successfully engage and build relationships with armed and other actors.

Scenario Plan

CHIN STATE

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Contact: analyst.myanmar2020@gmail.com