

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

# Humanitarian Responders

in**focus**

NGAPE TOWNSHIP, MAGWAY REGION

AA and PDF Approach  
Munitions Factory

W39-41 | 2025

25  
08

SEPTEMBER  
OCTOBER

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## primary concerns

page 8-16

### 1 — MAF RETURNS TO KYAUKME

Kyaukme Township,  
Northern Shan State

### 2 — AA AND ARSA FIGHT NEAR THE BORDER

Maungdaw Township,  
Rakhine State

### 3 — MAF ATTACKS SOUTH RAKHINE COAST

Thandwe Township, Rakhine State

### 4 — SADUNG TOWN BOMBED

Waingmaw Township, Kachin State

### 5 — MAF AIRSTRIKES DURING THADINGYUT

Chaung-U Township,  
Sagaing Region

### 6 — MAF RAIDS IN PAKOKKU

Pakokku Township, Magway Region

### 7 — MAF CONTINUES TO BOMB SOUTHERN CHIN

Mindat and Paletwa  
townships, Chin State

### 8 — ARSON AND AIRSTRIKES IN UPPER TANINTHARYI

Yebyu and Thayetchaung  
townships, Tanintharyi Region

### 9 — MAF LOOKS TO BAWLAKE

Hpruso and Bawlake townships,  
Karenni State

### AA AND PDF APPROACH MUNITIONS FACTORY

Ngape Township, Magway Region

infocus

infocus

page 3-4

trendlines

page 5-7

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## AA and PDF Approach Munitions Factory

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NGAPE TOWNSHIP, MAGWAY REGION

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On 28 September, the Arakan Army (AA) — supported by Peoples Defence Forces (PDFs) — reportedly [captured](#) an Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) outpost in Goke Gyi village, near Pa Dan village, and approximately eight miles from MAF munitions factory (Ka Pa Sa) 14 in Ngape Township. Sources in the township told this analytical unit that AA and PDF fighters then encircled the MAF's Nat Yae Kan MAF camp, located about two miles from Goke Gyi on a 1,587-foot hill providing strategic oversight of Pa Dan and the factory. On 29 September, the MAF reportedly [launched](#) a counter-offensive against the positions of the attackers, in the process [trapping](#) around 100 civilians in Goke Gyi. Fighting has persisted in Ngape Township [since](#) the AA seized the MAF's Western Regional Military Command (RMC), in Rakhine State's Ann Township, in December 2024; the AA has pushed eastward across the Arakan Yoma mountains since then. The MAF has reportedly [deployed](#) over 1,000 troops to defend Nat Yae Kan hill camp since September, and one source told this analytical unit that hundreds more were sent after the MAF lost Goke Gyi. MAF airstrikes on Goke Gyi and nearby villages have [reportedly](#) destroyed several buildings, and 3,000 people have reportedly [fled](#) into nearby forested areas without adequate food or medical supplies. A local responder who spoke to this analytical unit said that at least 8,500 people from 20 villages have now been displaced across Ngape Township, most of whom are assumed to be ethnic Bamar, though around one quarter of the township's population is ethnic Chin.

### MAF reinforcements, civilian displacement

Fighting near Pa Dan — marked by heavy MAF reinforcement — is likely to prolong displacement and civilian hardship, particularly if hostilities intensify. Fighting could drag out if MAF forces hold out in the Nat Yae Kan camp, or if the AA and PDF are unable to cut off supply routes and breach the base. The buildup of MAF troops in the area — and the likelihood of their using artillery — also heightens risks to civilians and civilian infrastructure. At the same time, a large MAF presence increases the risks to locals of detention and forced portering. Despite the MAF's significant troop deployment, the AA appears both capable and willing to continue its advance to the gain the hilltop's strategic oversight of Pa Dan and the factory. Control of this position would also help secure the Ann–Pa Dan road, the largest trade corridor linking Rakhine State and Magway Region, which could help the AA to loosen the MAF's blockade of goods into Rakhine State. Civilians meanwhile will likely continue to face restricted movement, disrupted internet communications, and limited access to aid. With the AA entrenched along the Arakan Yoma mountains, and MAF controlling the Magway plains, communities are effectively trapped between the mountains and intensifying hostilities.

### AA–NUG future

The escalation of AA–PDF operations in Ngape Township poses a direct threat to the MAF's arms production capacity and may suggest expanding geographic reach of coordinated resistance

offensives. Continued AA–PDF advances toward this munitions factory — one of several in Magway Region [that supply](#) ammunition, artillery shells, and small arms for the MAF’s nationwide campaigns — could severely disrupt the MAF’s logistical network. The potential fall of Nat Yae Kan hill camp would expose the factory to direct attack, a development that could trigger further attacks against other munitions facilities along the Arakan Yoma. According to a source close to the National Unity Government (NUG) Ministry of Defense, NUG representatives and AA commanders met in June and agreed to increase coordination on joint operations in Magway and beyond. The durability of this coordination remains uncertain, given underlying tensions — including AA sensitivities over the NUG’s international engagement on Rohingya issues. However, if it is sustained, such cooperation would likely mark a significant escalation in hostilities (and rising humanitarian needs) in the foothills of the Arakan Yoma mountains, and could impact the MAF’s nationwide capabilities.

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The escalation of AA–PDF operations in Ngape Township poses a direct threat to the MAF’s arms production capacity and may suggest expanding geographic reach of coordinated resistance offensives.



# trendlines

## HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK

TWO-WEEK TREND  
**0.12%**


## TWO-WEEK NUMBER

**15** NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)  
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 7 OCTOBER 2025


TOTAL DAMAGE  
**93,111**

### TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



### ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION

with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



### trendwatch

The SSPC took more measures to prepare for elections in December.

On 29 September, the UEC announced that voter lists in SSPC-controlled townships would be accessible to the public until 13 October, urging voters to check the lists and submit requests to correct personal information.

On 2 October, local media reported that SSPC personnel were forcing IDPs in Sagaing town to fill out forms related to voter lists, in exchange for 60,000 Myanmar Kyat per household.

On 3 October, the SSPC's Deputy Minister of Home Affairs said 64 people had been prosecuted under the new Election Protection Law since July.

On 5 October, USDP member Hla Swe said that the draft voter lists compiled by UEC contained hundreds of errors in every township.

MAF shelling and raids killed and displaced civilians.

On 26 September, MAF raids in Budalin Township, Sagaing Region, reportedly displaced 5,000 people from five villages. ▶

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND  
0.68%


TWO-WEEK NUMBER  
94  
NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES  
(NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 7 OCTOBER 2025

TOTAL  
13,893

Civilian Civilian (Alleged Informer) Civilian (Other)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON  
..... [Q1 2021 – Q3 2025]



trendwatch (cont.)


On 29 September, MAF shelling from Sittwe reportedly killed one civilian and injured two others in Rathedaung Township, Rakhine State.

PDF and MAF troops fought in Mandalay Region's Myingyan District.

On 28 September, local media reported that fighting between the MAF and PDFs, during 25-27 September, displaced 3,000 people in Myingyan Township.

On 30 September, the MAF reportedly killed 10 civilians during fighting in Natogyi Township, according to resistance actors.

NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION



Fighting continued in eastern Kachin State.

On 2 October, fighting between the MAF and KIA reportedly resumed near La Myan village in Waingmaw Township, with MAF artillery fired from Myitkyina.

On 3 October, local media reported that the KIA had regained control of several outposts in Bhamo town, as intense fighting continued in other parts of the town.

## CIVILIAN FACILITIES DAMAGE AND ATTACKS

### TWO-WEEK TREND

# 1.28%

### TWO-WEEK NUMBER

# 16

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)  
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

### AS OF 7 OCTOBER 2025

Health Facility:  
270

Education Facility:  
470

Religious Facility:  
689


### TOTAL DAMAGE

# 1,429

■ Aerial ■ Shelling ■ EDA


### IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGE AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



### IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGE AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



### trendwatch (cont.)

MAF airstrikes and drone strikes heightened protection-related concerns.

On 26 September, MAF airstrikes on a fuel station in Sagaing Region's Taze Township reportedly killed eight 11 civilians and severely injured ten.

On 2 October, local media reported that MAF drone strikes destroyed a health clinic and injured two civilians in Myawaddy Township, Karen State. Around 3,000 IDPs sheltering near Lay Kay Kaw are reportedly concerned about further airstrikes.

Flooding in Karenni State and Magway Region increased humanitarian needs.

On 28 September, local media reported that flash flooding in Magway Region's Natmauk Township had killed four people and several others remained missing.

On 30 September, local media reported that heavy rain in Karenni State's Demoso Township had submerged two IDP camps.

On 4 October, local media reported that flooding in Loikaw Township had submerged a village and destroyed paddy fields in 15 villages near the Shan-Karenni state border.

# primaryconcerns

## 1 MAF Returns to Kyaukme

### KYAUKME TOWNSHIP, NORTHERN SHAN STATE

On 1 October, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) reportedly regained control of Kyaukme town from the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA). Locals reported that State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) officials returned and began re-establishing government functions, despite the damage to offices and compounds from recent fighting. According to media sources, markets reopened, schools are being readied to resume classes, and hospitals are operating from temporary sites — as several main buildings are still unusable. Mobile (MyTel) internet connection has also resumed, a local resident told this analytical unit, but only in parts of Kyaukme town and not the wider township. Following hostilities that caused the displacement of around 10,000 people in August, many IDPs near Kyaukme are reported to be gradually returning home. Others who fled further, including to Lashio, remain unable to return due to ongoing TNLA–MAF fighting along the Hsipaw–Kyaukme corridor, though some are using alternative routes via Namlan Township. A local responder noted that many IDPs fled without adequate supplies and are eager to return despite their homes being damaged, with most temporarily staying with relatives or neighbours. They added that around 80–90 per cent of those displaced are expected to return in the coming days. Security risks remain high due to unexploded ordinances (UXO), which killed two people in Kyaukme town on 29 September.

### Hsipaw in the crosshairs

The MAF's recapture of Kyaukme town may be a tentative step toward stability for some town residents, but continued MAF air and ground operations are highly likely to endanger civilians in other parts of Northern Shan State. For town residents who do return, there may be a sense of stability with the belief that the MAF will not continue to attack. However, there may also be continued risk of detention if accused of supporting resistance groups, as has reportedly occurred upon the MAF's return to Nawnghkio (seized from TNLA) and Lashio (ceded by the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army). While some Kyaukme Township residents may begin to rebuild livelihoods, those still displaced face mounting losses and likely restricted access to aid. Meanwhile, the MAF's continued deadly airstrikes on Namtu town and Hsipaw Township in early October suggest that civilians in Northern Shan State will continue to be at risk. Hsipaw is a likely target because it is on the Mandalay–Muse highway, while Namtu is not on the highway but is a key junction for routes into Namsan and Manton and is known for its mining sites. The continued MAF campaigns will likely also drive heightened humanitarian needs, as civilians increasingly flee from TNLA-held territory due to fear of MAF targeting these areas with ground assaults next. Continued MAF airstrikes, threat of UXO, and ongoing TNLA–MAF fighting along key transport routes ensure that the aid landscape, particularly in TNLA-held areas of northern Shan State, remains highly insecure.



FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE for HUMANITARIAN RESPONDERS 25 SEPTEMBER – 08 OCTOBER 2025




## Estimated Status of Control by Key Armed Stakeholders

### Northern Shan State

As of October 2025

#### Legend



The term "control" in this infographic refers to either administrative, military domains, or both, with varying degrees of control, ranging from partial to complete. The information on this graphic is from various open sources including social media such as Facebook. The information should not be considered comprehensive.

Disclaimer: This product is designed for information purposes only. This map may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Base map data provided by MIMU and copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>. The accuracy of specific attributes and their geo-locations are manually added and cannot be confirmed.

## 2. AA and ARSA Fight Near the Border

### MAUNGDAW TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

In early October, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) reportedly **fought** for several days near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border in northern Maungdaw Township. On 1 October, the AA **claimed** that ARSA fighters had advanced from Bangladesh to attack the AA's Point 601 and Done Nyo camps, and on 3 October, Maungdaw Township locals reportedly **heard** gunfire from the Bangladesh side of the Naf River. Two days later, ARSA **released** a statement suggesting it gained territory in the **ongoing** fighting. In a media interview, AA leader Twan Myat Naing **alleged** that some Bangladeshi authorities were supporting Rohingya armed actors, an accusation the Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB) **rejected** as “propaganda”. The fighting has also impacted civilians: on 5 October, ARSA members reportedly **ambushed** three traders traveling from Taung Phyto to Aung Tharya village, injuring one. The AA has **urged** residents near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border to avoid traveling alone through forested or isolated areas and to inform nearby ULA/AA authorities prior to making any essential (e.g. medical) trips. An ethnic Rakhine observer **noted** that ARSA may be exploiting the AA's focus on fronts farther south in Rakhine State, such as Kyaukpyu and Sittwe, to expand its foothold from the Bangladesh side.

### Fighting returns to border

Renewed hostilities between ARSA and the AA near the Bangladesh border highlight mounting threats to civilian safety, with Rohingya communities at greatest risk. The newly-reported cross-border attacks mark a significant shift after nearly a year of limited Rohingya armed actor attacks in Rakhine State. This development has the potential to affect civilians across northern Maungdaw Township (and possibly beyond), but it is particularly concerning for Rohingya communities, whom both ARSA attacks and AA countermeasures have historically exposed to violence, displacement, and restrictive measures. The new round of hostilities, as well

as ARSA social **media** footage showing dead AA soldiers and captured AA positions, similarly **risks** triggering new AA restrictions on Rohingya civilian movement and trade, further constraining access to health care, markets, and humanitarian support for Rohingya residents in Maungdaw Township. At the same time, AA accusations against Bangladeshi authorities could heighten bilateral tensions, complicate refugee management across the border, and undermine trade of goods such as fuel, medicine and fertiliser from Bangladesh to Rakhine State. For humanitarian responders, the evolving situation underscores the potential for further cross-border spillovers of violence that could exacerbate existing humanitarian needs in Rakhine State and impact AA's willingness to facilitate (even some) repatriation of Rohingya from Cox's Bazar.

## 3. MAF Attacks South Rakhine Coast

### THANDWE TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

On 2 October, local media **reported** that three Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) navy vessels — positioned about a 30 minute boat ride from Ngapali beach in Thandwe Township — had detained civilian fishing boats and fired artillery shells toward the coastline. This followed MAF airstrikes in late September that reportedly hit areas in and around **Thandwe town** and nearby **Pa De Kaw village**, killing one civilian and injuring several others. Thandwe town is approximately four miles from Ngapali beach. These air and navy attacks prompted some residents of Thandwe town and nearby coastal villages to flee **their homes**, fearing further MAF aerial and **naval** assaults. On 29 September, the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) issued an “**Emergency Statement**”, saying that MAF losses along the Arakan Yoma frontier (see In Focus: “AA and PDF Approach Munitions Factory”) had prompted intensified MAF attacks on civilians in ULA/AA-controlled areas of southern Rakhine State. On 3 October,

local media [reported](#) that the ULA/AA had instructed residents in its 15 controlled townships to avoid gatherings and report visitors to local administrators during the Thadingyut festival period (5–7 October). A Ngapali local told this analytical unit that the AA has allowed residents from Thandwe and Ngapali towns to return since April, but that access to Ngapali beach and resort zones remains restricted.

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Unable to launch a sustained ground offensive, the MAF appears to be relying on airstrikes and naval artillery to project power and disrupt AA governance and local economies.

### Punitive measures

The MAF's continued use of air and naval bombardment against civilian areas in Thandwe Township is likely to prolong displacement and disrupt local economic recovery. The AA ousted MAF forces from Thandwe Township in late August 2024, including from [Ngapali beach](#) — home to luxury resorts linked to the MAF, including the Russia–Myanmar Ngapali housing scheme, and projects such as the Thahtay Hydropower plant. Despite past economic investment in Thandwe, the MAF's ability to re-enter southern Rakhine remains constrained by extensive AA territorial control that now stretches across the Arakan Yoma into Ayeyarwady, Bago, and Magway regions. Unable to launch a sustained ground offensive, the MAF appears to be relying on airstrikes and naval artillery to project power and disrupt AA governance and local economies. The timing of the Thandwe strikes — coinciding with AA and allied People's Defence Force advances in nearby Ngape Township (see In Focus: "AA and PDF Approach Munitions Factory") — suggests a retaliatory pattern that may persist if AA offensive operations continue in Ayeyarwady, Bago, and Magway regions. For civilians, repeated

MAF attacks and AA-imposed restrictions undermine the ability of displaced persons to return, and stall livelihoods linked to local economies, including fishing. Local responders in southern Rakhine face limited access to medical supplies, and growing exposure to air and naval attacks, further complicating support for those enduring protracted displacement.

## 4 Sadung Town Bombed

### WAINGMAW TOWNSHIP, KACHIN STATE

On 29 September, Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) [airstrikes](#) reportedly struck the central market of Sadung town, along the Waingmaw–Kan Paik Ti road in Waingmaw Township, [killing](#) 11 civilians. The airstrikes on Sadung also reportedly damaged over a [dozen](#) buildings, including shops and houses. Sadung town, home to approximately 10,500 people (according to the 2014 census), is a market hub for surrounding communities and a key node on the Waingmaw–Kan Paik Ti road. The Kachin Independence Organization/Army (KIO/A) seized the town from the New Democratic Army–Kachin (NDA–K) in June 2024, and KIO administrators subsequently established local administrative mechanisms in the town. Since August 2025, the MAF — with aligned militias — has launched operations from La Myan (near Myitkyina town) to retake the Waingmaw–Sadung–Kan Paik Ti road. On 30 September, local media reported that Sadung schools and local governance buildings had begun to [close](#) following the airstrikes, residents with vehicles had begun to flee, and a local resident described the situation as "chaotic", despite ground fighting not having [reached there](#) yet.

### Recovery derailed

The latest MAF airstrikes on Sadung town have eroded civilian safety and local economic activity along this part of the Waingmaw–Kan Paik Ti road, and these may deteriorate further. Continued targeting of Sadung town via airstrikes, and possible MAF attempts to advance east along the road from Waingmaw, are likely

due to the importance of the route in connecting state capital Myitkyina with the Myanmar-China border. Kan Paik Ti also links via road to the former Kachin Special Region 1, where rare earth mines remain a key source of revenue for whoever can tax them, increasing the likelihood of further hostilities in order to secure its economic gains. The Sadung airstrikes prompted renewed displacement and destroyed homes and infrastructure, likely affecting many people trying to recover from hostilities in 2024. The airstrikes also likely halted commerce for the town, which could impact the ability of traders and farmers to sell and buy goods at Sadung markets, and therefore could also impact residents of rural villages who depend on access to Sadung commerce. Given the area's mountainous terrain and remoteness, humanitarian access was likely already limited, and local responders — already stretched by rising needs elsewhere in the state — may struggle to provide timely assistance.

## 5 MAF Airstrikes during Thadingyut

### CHAUNG-U TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION

On 6 October, Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) [paramotors](#) reportedly bombed a crowd gathered to celebrate Thadingyut (a holiday marking the end of Buddhist lent) in Bone To village, in Sagaing Region's Chaung-U Township. The initial paramotor attack was reportedly followed by artillery (fired by MAF units stationed in nearby villages) and then airstrikes. At least 24 civilians are reported to have been [killed](#), and more than 40 injured, in the attacks. Chaung-U Township hosts both an MAF presence, in Chaung-U town, and extensive People's Defence Forces (PDF) influence across rural areas. According to monitoring by this analytical unit, there have been at least 30 MAF airstrikes and at least 50 incidents of fighting and shelling in the township so far in 2025. According to another source, the MAF has [conducted](#) at least 807 aerial attacks across Myanmar between May and August, with 68 per

cent targeting civilian infrastructure, damaging 46 schools and 11 health clinics. Following the 6 October airstrike, local [responders told](#) a media outlet that "blood and medicine are urgently needed; the demand for blood is particularly high and unknown blood types of the victims made the situation worse". They [added](#) that they are currently providing emergency medical treatment to the injured, with at least 10 people in critical condition and many having sustained severe head and abdominal injuries.

### Deepening civil peril

The airstrike in Chaung-U underscores the persistent danger facing civilians amid the MAF's intensified use of airpower in central Myanmar. Striking a large public gathering during a religious festival highlights the MAF's disregard for avoiding non-combatant deaths. While the township's strong PDF presence has made it a recurring target, the high civilian death toll and injury rate will likely deepen fear and further strain already overstretched local responders. Ongoing aerial surveillance and bombardment have hindered rescue efforts, as responders face security risks and severe shortages of blood, medicine, and equipment. The frequency of such strikes in the township in 2025 — including paramotor and drone attacks — highlights the sustained insecurity to communities even within close proximity to Mandalay city. For local responders, the Chaung-U attack again signals escalating operational constraints and the urgent need for adequate medical supplies and evacuations.

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Ongoing aerial surveillance and bombardment have hindered rescue efforts, as responders face security risks and severe shortages of blood, medicine, and equipment.

## 6. MAF Raids in Pakokku

### PAKOKKU TOWNSHIP, MAGWAY REGION

On 28 September, around 100 Myanmar Armed Force (MAF) troops reportedly raided and looted homes, and [detained](#) residents, in Yay Myet and Pyie Aing villages in Pakokku Township. Following the raids and continued [troop](#) movements, approximately 1,000 people from these two and nearby villages reportedly fled to surrounding forest areas, where a local resistance actor [said](#) that many lacked adequate shelter amid heavy rains. According to local media, these troops later retreated to Kamma town, but not before transferring food supplies from the villages to Pyu Saw Htee militiamen and MAF units stationed in the town. Despite the MAF troops' withdrawal, those displaced had reportedly [not returned](#) to their homes as of 2 October, instead continuing to take shelter in the forested areas. Local Parahita groups have sought to provide supplies to the IDPs, according to a source who spoke to this analytical unit, but had their movement restricted by road-blocks and heavy rainfall.

These MAF operations have driven repeated civilian displacement and widespread property damage, while looting by MAF troops has reportedly emptied people's homes of food items.

### Harsh conditions for the displaced

The latest MAF raids in Pakokku have newly displaced people and compounded humanitarian needs, with immediate concerns for civilian safety, shelter, and access to food. The attacks — part of a renewed MAF campaign in central Magway since mid-2025 — most likely reflect mounting pressure on Kamma town

and Pyu Saw Htee-aligned villages in Pakokku Township that have become increasingly isolated by local resistance actors' influence over key roads. These MAF operations have driven repeated civilian displacement and widespread property damage, while looting by MAF troops has reportedly emptied people's homes of food items. Road restrictions in the township had previously disrupted the flow of goods, while the MAF looting of property may drive further spikes in demand at local markets and prevent IDPs from consuming this food, even if they remain displaced. If the heavy rains continue, IDPs sheltering in forested areas and exposed to rain may experience increasing cases of water-borne disease, even as local responders struggle to reach them amid security restrictions and blocked routes. Without improved access, IDPs may struggle to secure adequate food and shelter for the last weeks of the monsoon season.

## 7. MAF Continues to Bomb Southern Chin

### MINDAT AND PALETWA TOWNSHIPS, CHIN STATE

On 29 September, Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) airstrikes reportedly struck one health clinic in Paletwa town and another on the [outskirts](#) of the town, [killing](#) two civilians and injuring 19 others. Then, on 31 September and 4 October, MAF [airstrikes on](#) Mindat town reportedly injured three civilians and destroyed or [damaged](#) several buildings, including houses and administrative offices. Local sources in Mindat and Paletwa townships told this analytical unit that residents are concerned about further airstrikes, particularly because there are no formal early warning systems or equipment such as loudspeakers or walkie talkies in many areas. Many communities in southern Chin State — one of Myanmar's poorest areas — also lack the resources or space to construct bomb shelters. Local sources who spoke to this analytical unit estimated that Paletwa, Mindat, and other southern Chin urban areas are now only half as populated as before the coup, with the lingering



fear of airstrikes one of the primary reasons for residents' reluctance to return. Although no major ground fighting has occurred since late 2024, MAF air operations continue to disrupt daily life and deter recovery. Local responders told this analytical unit that airstrikes have impeded access and aid delivery, as Chin resistance actors and the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) cite security concerns as bases for imposing restrictions on communication and movement within their areas.

Without formal early warning systems and bomb shelters, or adequate medical infrastructure, southern Chin communities remain highly vulnerable to future MAF airstrikes.

### More punitive attacks

MAF airstrikes on Paletwa and Mindat underscore the persistent threat of aerial attacks in southern Chin State and the broad impact on IDPs' ability to return home. Despite the absence of active ground fighting since late 2024, continued air operations have deepened insecurity and prolonged displacement across the region. The MAF's reliance on airstrikes rather reflects a wider trend observed in areas where it has lost territorial control — using airpower to project force rather than retake ground (see In Focus: "AA and PDF Approach Munitions Factory"); it has not been able to respond and penetrate the Chin hills via Magway Region or from northern bases in Hakwa town since 2024. Without formal early warning systems and bomb shelters, or adequate medical infrastructure, southern Chin communities remain highly vulnerable to future MAF airstrikes. Prolonged fear of air attacks could lead IDPs from southern Chin State to continue stalling returns to urban areas such as Paletwa and Mindat, possibly entrenching long-term displacement across these areas.

## 8 Arson and Airstrikes in Upper Tanintharyi

### YEBYU AND THAYETCHAUNG TOWNSHIPS, TANINTHARYI REGION

Upticks in Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) arson attacks and airstrikes in Yebyu and Thayetchaung townships were reported through early October. From 30 September to 1 October, the MAF reportedly fought the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and Peoples Defence Forces (PDFs) troops in the Dawei Special Economic Zone area of Yebyu Township and [set 12](#) houses ablaze there. The fighting reportedly started when an MAF column advanced, on 27 September, along village roads through four villages, and the fighting reportedly [displaced](#) many of the people in these villages. Further south, in Thayetchaung Township, MAF troops reportedly raided and [torched](#) 73 houses in a village on 30 September, following fighting with KNLA and PDF fighters two days prior, [causing](#) residents from at least eight nearby villages to flee their homes. On 5 October, MAF airstrikes on [another village](#) in the same township reportedly killed four civilians, injured several other people, and destroyed two houses. Karen National Union Brigade 4 [said](#) that arson attacks, as well as MAF airstrikes, increased significantly in August and September. KNLA Brigade 4 operates in the Karen National Union's (KNU) Mergui-Tavoy Division, which covers most of Tanintharyi Region.

### Gimme shelter (and healthcare)

The escalation of arson attacks by the MAF in Yebyu and Thayetchaung townships has increased humanitarian needs and intensified livelihood challenges for local communities. The recent wave of village burnings has exceeded recent levels of violence in the area and may also echo broader trends of arson incidents seen in parts of Sagaing and Magway regions since the coup. With homes destroyed, displaced people may face heightened exposure to malaria, diarrhea, and other communicable diseases as they shelter in cramped camps in temporary or remote forest locations. In [Launglon Township](#) — which neighbours Thayetchaung Township — IDPs have contracted skin conditions since June due to staying in unsanitary

displacement shelters following MAF violence. The expansion of arson attacks into the upper Tanintharyi Region is also significant because it compounds the vulnerabilities of communities already displaced multiple times and strains the few remaining local support mechanisms. For humanitarian responders, these developments indicate a growing need for adaptable assistance models — possibly mobile health and shelter interventions — as access to affected populations becomes increasingly restricted by insecurity and mountainous terrain.


## 9. MAF Looks to Bawlake

### HPRUSO AND BAWLAKE TOWNSHIPS, KARENNI STATE

On 28 September, the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) said that the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF), joined by Pa-O National Army (PNA), was continuing its three-pronged offensive in Karenni state as part of its statewide “Operation Yan Naing Min”. This campaign has entailed hostilities along the Loikaw-Bawlake road, decreasing civilian safety, and disrupting the flow of goods on Karenni State's main road. The area near Demoso town has become the focal point of the MAF's operations, with fierce fighting between MAF troops and resistance forces reportedly breaking out on the town's outskirts. On 23 September, the KNDF urged civilians to avoid using the Loikaw-Bawlake road — considered essential by local responders, traders, and those seeking medical care — due to the ongoing fighting. On 30 September, local media reported that farmers were increasingly concerned about harvesting their crops due to the risks of MAF drone bombing, shelling, and detention. On 27 September, local media reported that rice supplies were running low in many IDP camps in the area, including eight in western Demoso where most IDPs consumed only porridge for over a week. On 27 September, a local responder reportedly distributed rice to two IDP camps that had been suffering from shortages, and on 3 October, the Karenni IEC reportedly provided 200 temporary shelters for new IDPs in Pekon and Demoso townships.

### KNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unity typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms “Karen State” and “Karenni State” preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at <https://tinyurl.com/4dtndak>. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at <https://www.khrg.org/maps>.

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Local responders have attempted to fill gaps by distributing food and providing temporary shelters along the main road, but persistent insecurity and dwindling aid supplies continue to threaten already vulnerable populations.

### Strain in Karenni

The MAF's "Operation Yan Naing Min" has sharply worsened civilian protection risks, and is likely to continue straining humanitarian response activities along the Demoso–Bawlake road. Recent weeks have seen escalating air, artillery, and ground assaults along this road, resulting in civilian [casualties](#), [detentions](#), and [property](#) destruction. Since August 2025, when the MAF reportedly regained control of the Demoso–Hpruso part of the road, MAF units have reportedly been making preparations to push onward to the Hpruso–Bawlake section of the road, including by [shelling](#) villages between Demoso and Bawlake. Despite warnings, some civilians continue to use these routes out of necessity, often risking detention or death. The violence may also disrupt harvests if farmers are unable to collect crops amid threat of detentions and MAF ground raids. Local responders have [attempted](#) to fill gaps by distributing food and providing temporary shelters along the main road, but persistent insecurity and dwindling aid supplies continue to threaten already vulnerable populations, including IDPs, across Karenni State.

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**FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE** *for*  
**Humanitarian  
Responders**

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