

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

Humanitarian Responders

in**focus**

BANMAUK TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION


MAF Loses Banmauk Town

W37-39 | 2025
SEPTEMBER
11
24

CONFIDENTIAL - NOT FOR DISTRIBUTION

CONTENT

W37-39 | 2025
SEPTEMBER 11
24



MAF LOSES BANMAUK TOWN
Banmauk Township, Sagaing Region

primary concerns

page 9-14

1 — ULA REOPENS GRAND MOSQUE

Maungdaw Township,
Rakhine State

2 — MAF AIRSTRIKES KILL RAKHINE STUDENTS

Kyauktaw Township, Rakhine State

3 — MAF ADVANCES ON KYAINSEIKGYI ROAD

Kyaikmaraw Township, Mon State /
Kyainseikgyi Township, Karen State

4 — MAF TIGHTENS RESTRICTIONS ON WATERWAYS

Tanintharyi Township,
Tanintharyi Region

5 — FIGHTING RAMPES UP IN WAINGMAW

Waingmaw Township, Kachin State

6 — TNLA DETAINS CIVILIANS

Kyaukme Township,
Northern Shan State

7 — SOUTHERN CHIN FACES FLU OUTBREAK

Paletwa Township, Chin State

infocus

page 3-5

trendlines

page 6-8

in**focus**

MAF Loses Banmauk Town

BANMAUK TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION

On 20 September, the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) and People's Defence Forces (PDFs) reportedly **seized** Banmauk town from the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and the aligned Shanni Nationalities Army (SNA). The National Unity Government **claimed** that its Military Region No. 1 commanded the operation, which began on 15 September with resistance actors in Indaw Township (to the east) **closing** the Banmauk-Indaw road. The takeover reportedly allowed around 2,000 **residents** — who had been trapped by the fighting up to that point — to flee to nearby forests in anticipation of retaliatory MAF airstrikes on the captured town, which indeed came later that day, reportedly **destroying** several buildings in the town. Despite losing the town, the SNA reportedly still had **positions** in the western part of Banmauk Township and between 20–22 September sent around 1,000 **reinforcements** from Homalin Township, to the west. A local source told this analytical unit that around 8,000 people in the township were displaced by the recent fighting. Moreover, a PDF fighter told this analytical unit that the SNA had withdrawn from Banmauk but was regrouping northwest of the town to prepare a counteroffensive. “The battle is not over yet”, he said.

Needs anticipated

While the KIA and PDF victory in Banmauk town highlights the capacity of resistance actors in upper Sagaing Region, this shift in control could further increase humanitarian needs. Resistance actors have been able to capture

and hold towns — likely all with some degree of assistance from the KIA — in several nearby townships: Indaw (captured **April 2025**), Pinlebu (captured **October 2024**), and Maw Lu (captured **late 2023**). Indeed, the proximity to these places, along with Banmauk's **gold** production and location along supply lines connected to Kachin State, may explain the recent offensive. However, the MAF's loss of towns has often been followed by brutal campaigns to regain control of these places. Perhaps most striking was the case of **Kawlin** town, which the MAF lost in November 2023 and then largely laid to waste in February 2024, displacing nearly all of its 25,000 residents. Similarly, in Northern Shan State, the MAF conducted at least around 200 airstrikes on Nawnghkio town before recapturing it (according to internal tracking by this analytical unit) — and is now causing similar destruction and displacement in Kyaukme. Accordingly, it is likely that the MAF and SNA will mount a counteroffensive to retake Banmauk town that includes repeated airstrikes and the mobilisation of ground troops from elsewhere. Such a response would heighten risks of displacement, abuses against civilians, and other protection concerns — elevating humanitarian needs even beyond those incurred by the recent fighting. Furthermore, the MAF's recent efforts to retake territory in Mandalay Region and Kachin, Shan, Karenni, and Karen states in the lead-up to its planned elections suggest that more fighting in Banmauk Township is likely to come sooner, rather than later.

Possible ethnic tensions


The removal of the SNA from Banmauk town could amplify ethnic tensions between Shanni and other groups and heighten the risk of reprisals against Shanni civilians by the ethnic Kachin KIA or predominantly Bamar PDFs. Shifting power dynamics after intense fighting may encourage armed actors to target communities seen as aligned with opposing sides, with Kachin and Bamar actors possibly confronting Shanni communities, and vice versa, in Banmauk Township and beyond. Risks are acute for Shanni civilians, who constitute an estimated [two-thirds](#) of the township's population, as the SNA — the largest Shanni armed actor — has been prominently aligned with the MAF since the coup. Pro-SNA media has [accused](#) the KIA of undermining Shanni-Kachin relations by attacking Banmauk, potentially further stoking tensions. The likelihood of further fighting involving the SNA is high given the township's importance to the group for gold mining revenues and as one of the few majority-Shanni areas in Myanmar. This could drive forced recruitment and restricted civilian movement, particularly on roads under SNA control. Movements of the [three SNA brigades](#) in the upper Sagaing Region and lower Kachin State should therefore be followed closely. As seen in other parts of Myanmar, a breakdown in social cohesion along ethnic lines could complicate humanitarian response, with risks including access denial or even violence against aid workers if local actors are perceived as favouring one group over another.

Shifting power dynamics after intense fighting may encourage armed actors to target communities seen as aligned with opposing sides, with Kachin and Bamar actors possibly confronting Shanni communities, and vice versa, in Banmauk Township and beyond.

Control Status in Upper Sagaing Region

Sagaing Region, Myanmar

(24 September, 2025)



Legend

Estimated Status of Administrative and/or Military Control (As of September 2025)

- SSPC (Myanmar Armed Forces, Border Guard Force, Pyu Saw Htee, Local militias)
- PDFs (People's Defence Forces)
- KIA (Kachin Independence Army)

Administrative or Military Control

- | | | |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Town | Base | |
| ■ | ★ | Controlled by SSPC (MAF) |
| ■ | ★ | Controlled by resistance forces |
| | | Armed Groups' Headquarters |

- Main road
- Secondary road
- Other minor road
- + + + + + Railway
- Major river/inland water boundary



The term "control" in this infographic refers to either administrative, military domains, or both, with varying degrees of control, ranging from partial to complete.

The information on this graphic is from various open sources including social media such as Facebook. The information should not be considered comprehensive.

Disclaimer: This product is designed for information purposes only. This map may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Base map data provided by MIMU and copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>. The accuracy of specific attributes and their geo-locations are manually added and cannot be confirmed.

trendlines

HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK

TWO-WEEK TREND
0.03%


TWO-WEEK NUMBER

10 NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 23 SEPTEMBER 2025


TOTAL DAMAGE
92,986

TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION

with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



trendwatch

Further measures were taken in advance of the elections planned for December.

On 14 September, the SSPC cancelled voting for 121 seats in the Pyithu, Amyotha, and state/region Hluttaws. This came a week after the UEC cancelled the registration of four parties, leaving only six competing for seats in the national-level (Amyotha and Pyithu) Hluttaws.

On 21 September, the NDSC announced that the Political Party Registration Law had been amended, reducing the requirement that national-level parties must run for seats in half of the country's constituencies (now one quarter).

MAF airstrikes and paramotor bombers affected civilians and KIA trainees.

On 21 September, MAF airstrikes reportedly killed four people and injured ten others in Thabeikkyin Township, Mandalay Region.

On 16 September, MAF airstrikes in Madaya Township, Mandalay Region, reportedly killed six people and injured ten others. ►

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND

0.79%


TWO-WEEK NUMBER

108 NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES (NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.


AS OF 23 SEPTEMBER 2025

TOTAL
13,787

■ Civilian
 ■ Civilian (Alleged Informer)
 ■ Civilian (Other)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON
 [Q1 2021 – Q2 2025]


NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION



trendwatch (cont.)

On 22 September, MAF paramotor bombers reportedly killed four civilians in Kani Township, Sagaing Region.

On 18 September, MAF airstrikes on a KIA Battalion 12 training facility in Shwegu Township, Kachin State, reportedly killed at least 17 people.

Fighting continued in Bhamo town and restarted farther north.

On 12 September, local media reported that the MAF had reoccupied two positions in Bhamo town, while some other positions remained under KIA control, and that fighting continued in other parts of the town.

On 21 September, local media reported that fighting had resumed in Lanse, on the China-Myanmar border in Tsawlaw Township, with the MAF supported by the Khaunglanhpu militia.

The MAF imposed tighter restrictions on the transportation of people and goods.

In mid-September, the MAF reportedly tightened checks at its inspection gates between Namlan and Mongkaing, in Southern Shan State.

CIVILIAN FACILITIES DAMAGE AND ATTACKS

TWO-WEEK TREND

1.29%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER

15

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 23 SEPTEMBER 2025

Health Facility:
268

Education Facility:
466

Religious Facility:
675


TOTAL DAMAGE

1,409

■ Aerial ■ Shelling ■ EDA


IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGE AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGE AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



trendwatch (cont.)

IDPs were reported to be in increasing need of support.

On 15 September, local media reported that over 200 IDPs in Ponnagyun Township, Rakhine State, were in urgent need of food, shelter, and medical support, and that IDPs in Gwa Township, Rakhine State, were struggling with access to food and medicine.

On 19 September, local media reported that over 6,000 IDPs in Pinlaung Township, Southern Shan State, could not return home due to ongoing fighting.

MAF troops raided villages, detained civilians, and looted private property.

On 18 September, MAF troops reportedly raided a village in Yinmarbin Township, Sagaing Region, where they detained 10 people and looted property.

On 19 September, MAF troops reportedly raided villages in Ywangan Township, Southern Shan State, where they detained 10 people and looted vehicles.

On 20 September, MAF troops reportedly raided and torched parts of a village in Kanbalu Township, Sagaing Region, following PDF attacks on a police station days earlier.

primaryconcerns

1 ULA Reopens Grand Mosque

MAUNGDAW TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

On 12 September, the Grand Mosque of Maungdaw Township — also known as Monshi Masjid — was reportedly [reopened](#) by the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) in collaboration with a newly formed mosque committee. The re-opening reportedly followed a direct appeal by Rohingya leaders to AA leader Twan Mrat Naing during his [visit](#) to Maungdaw on 30 August. The ceremony was [attended](#) by ULA/AA officials, village administrators, religious leaders, and approximately 300 town residents. The over 200-year-old mosque had been closed since communal violence in 2012, with successive administrations maintaining the ban. Although the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) briefly reopened it in April 2024, renewed MAF-AA hostilities led to its closure again. According to one [source](#) close to the AA, the group re-opened the mosque “as part of efforts to promote religious freedom, encourage interfaith harmony, and foster peaceful coexistence in Maungdaw.” While many Rohingya residents reportedly welcomed the reopening, a Rohingya political observer [noted](#) that it seemed like a public relations campaign to cover up AA abuses against civilians, saying “It’s too early to view this positively. Just opening a mosque doesn’t equate to granting full religious freedom, as some Rakhine media outlets are portraying”. The chairman of the Maungdaw District Muslim Affairs Committee expressed his [praise](#) for the decision to re-open the mosque, which other community members reportedly [said](#) carried symbolic weight.

Symbolic move

The reopening of the Monshi Masjid in Maungdaw is a symbolically important moment, but it may be viewed by Rohingya communities as a mere

public relations exercise as long as structural issues — such as freedom of movement and property rights — remain unaddressed. The visit of AA leader Twan Mrat Naing — coinciding with the reopening of the mosque — marks one of the most significant public engagements between the ULA/AA administration and Rohingya civil society in northern Rakhine State, and it may help to reduce intercommunal tensions and build trust between Rohingya and Rakhine communities. However, it has also brought immediate concerns and renewed attention to the need for longer-term measures. In the immediate term, the visit reportedly raised concerns among Rohingya communities about MAF violence, which might target the AA leader — including at the mosque. According to [local sources](#), on 18–19 September, the MAF was spotted conducting aerial surveillance over Maungdaw town and villages to the north and south, heightening anxiety about airstrikes among local residents. In the longer term, while communal trust-building is vital, the AA may not extend such good will and engagement toward Rohingya armed actors, leaving a major source of civilian grievances unaddressed; ongoing fighting between the AA and these actors has frequently impacted Rohingya communities. Rohingya communities still reportedly face [restrictions](#), including on movement, communication, and access to information, which the AA leader has [said](#) are due to security concerns while operations against ARSA are underway. For humanitarian responders, the development may create opportunities for smoother access negotiations with ULA/AA administrators and more inclusive aid delivery in northern Rakhine State. Nonetheless, it will be important to track whether broader religious and civic freedoms follow and whether security risks escalate — through either AA operations against Rohingya armed actors or MAF retaliatory airstrikes on AA-administered areas.

2. MAF Airstrikes Kill Rakhine Students

KYAUKTAW TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

In the early morning of 12 September, Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) [airstrikes](#) on two boarding schools in Tha Yet Ta Pin village, Kyauktaw Township, reportedly killed 19 students and injured [at least](#) 22 others, including children and nearby residents. Seven buildings, including classrooms, dormitories, and houses, were reportedly destroyed. Many of the victims were reportedly minors [displaced](#) from other parts of the state, who had sought refuge in the boarding schools. Kyauktaw Township has faced [repeated](#) MAF airstrikes since the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) seized the area in February 2024, with 73 airstrikes and drone incidents — killing dozens of civilians and damaging infrastructure — documented by this analytical unit. The recent bombing has already triggered closures of community schools across AA-held areas, with parents reportedly [evacuating](#) students. A local told this analytical unit that schools established by the ULA in residential homes have closed since the 12 September airstrike due to security concerns. The ULA/AA [condemned](#) the airstrike in a statement and pledged to collaborate with individuals and organisations investigating the case. UNICEF expressed [concern](#), calling for schools to be protected, while ASEAN Parliamentarians for Human Rights [demanded](#) action and the Independent Investigative Mechanism for Myanmar (IIMM) [called for](#) witnesses and evidence related to this attack to aid its investigations.

Education under fire

The Kyauktaw airstrike underscores the continued threat to the safety and education of children, even when they are far from active frontlines, as well as limits on access to adequate healthcare. While this was one of the deadliest incidents involving children in the state since AA–MAF hostilities resumed in November 2023, children here have been continuously affected by fighting, resource shortages, and insecurity. With the ULA struggling to maintain educational services, children face both immediate

risks from violence and prolonged disruption to their learning. These disruptions may also risk widening existing educational gaps in Rakhine State if students miss critical stages of learning or lack access to alternative education programs. Such gaps could deepen disparities between displaced and non-displaced children, reduce future livelihood opportunities, and possibly heighten vulnerability to exploitation. Meanwhile, although Kyauktaw has become a trading hub, linking the Indian border to the rest of Rakhine State, the MAF blockade of goods into the state has restricted access to medicine. Casualty numbers reportedly rose after the strike because of both the severity of injuries and shortages of required medicines, and the latter is likely to keep affecting victims of the recent strikes and future cases. The humanitarian response will likely have to navigate heightened safety risks, disrupted schooling, and deepened fear among displaced people in Kyauktaw Township.

3. MAF Advances on Kyainseikgyi Road

KYAIKMARAW TOWNSHIP, MON STATE / KYAINSEIKGYI TOWNSHIP, KAREN STATE

On 17 September, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) reportedly launched [operations](#) to retake the Chaung Hnit Khwa (Kyaikmaraw Township, Mon State)–Kyainseikgyi road (Karen State), with about 150 MAF [troops](#) advancing southeast from Chaung Hnit Khwa village, and around 100 MAF troops advancing northwest from Kyainseikgyi town. Threats to civilian safety on the road began in early September, when MAF troops in Chaung Hnit Khwa reportedly [shelled](#) Than Pu Yar village, [killing](#) one local and displacing people from at least six villages. On 16 September, MAF troops reportedly [detained](#) five fishermen working on the Zami River near Than Pu Yar. Since 17 September, MAF troops have reportedly [torched](#) parts of Hta Kanain village near Chaung Hnit Khwa.


On 19 September, a Kyainseikgyi Township local told this analytical unit that they cannot travel to Kyainseikgyi town due to the intensity of fighting between the MAF and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Brigade 6-led forces, which had displaced additional villagers living near the road. Moreover, a source told this analytical unit that the internet had been inaccessible in many parts of Kyainseikgyi Township since early September, and that IDPs in the township were also concerned that they would be displaced again if MAF-KNLA fighting spreads.

New displacement

MAF advances converging on the Chaung Hnit Khwa–Kyainseikgyi road, and resistance ambushes on these troops, are likely to sharply increase risks to civilian safety in Kyainseikgyi Township. Armed hostilities along this road follow broader MAF patterns of massing ground forces, in tandem with air power, to retake contested transport routes in Karen State, such as the [Myawaddy–Kawkareik road](#) and the [Thanbyuzayat–Payathonzu](#) road. In these cases, large-scale troop deployments, artillery, and airstrikes have severely heightened humanitarian needs. It is highly likely that MAF will continue its advances on the Chaung Hnit Khwa–Kyainseikgyi road, given its economic and strategic importance in linking Union Highway 8 with the Thai–Myanmar border through Kyainseikgyi town. In the coming weeks, renewed MAF advances are likely to heighten protection concerns for the ethnic Mon and Karen communities living near the road, and to send them fleeing into forests, possibly without adequate shelter, food, or medical supplies. Meanwhile, the dispersal of these people and ongoing resource challenges are likely to make response activities more difficult. Past displacement patterns in Karen State suggest that the monsoon season will compound food insecurity, worsen living conditions, and increase the risks of malaria, dengue, and waterborne diseases, particularly for vulnerable groups, including children and the elderly.

KNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unit typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms “Karen State” and “Karenni State” preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at <https://tinyurl.com/4dtnfdak>. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at <https://www.khrg.org/maps>.

4 MAF Tightens Restrictions on Waterways

TANINTHARYI TOWNSHIP, TANINTHARYI REGION

On 17 September, local media reported that the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) had [tightened](#) waterway gate inspections at the Tanintharyi Bridge, Baw Di Kan Bridge, Ban Thea ferry terminal, and Ma Ma Thaung village, all in or around Tanintharyi town. Residents reported that MAF inspections on the waterways had included its forces tearing open packages and cross-checking quantities against receipts. Such inspections slow or block civilian movement, by turning routine travel into lengthy waits, and likely discourage people from making trips at all due to the risk of detention or extortion. The increased MAF restrictions followed fighting with resistance actors on major road routes in Tanintharyi Township: on 11 September, local media reported that MAF troops and resistance actors had [fought](#) for four consecutive days near Thein Khun village, along the Tanintharyi–Maw Taung road. The MAF has sought to retake the Maw Taung border trade route, partly controlled by resistance forces, for over eight months but reportedly remains [stalled](#) in Thein Khun village. On 9 September, resistance actors reportedly ambushed an MAF supply [convoy](#) on the Myeik–Tanintharyi road. Since most villages in Tanintharyi Township depend on transportation via rivers and streams of goods purchased in town, the delays and restrictions associated with these inspections have reportedly [disrupted](#) food supplies and limited civilian mobility.

Waterways now serve both as lifelines for civilians and as key supply routes for IDPs concentrated in the eastern part of the township, where resistance actors are also based and which the MAF is seeking to cut off.

Waterway trade limited

MAF restrictions on the movement of goods and people along waterways are likely to further erode civilian and IDP livelihoods in Tanintharyi Township, already strained by harsh monsoon weather and prolonged displacement. Current MAF operations to reassert control of road networks in Tanintharyi Township mirror similar efforts across southeast Myanmar, many apparently aimed at reinforcing border camps and securing revenue flows. In Tanintharyi Township, transportation often involves multiple stages, with goods off-loaded between waterways and secondary roads due to primary roads being disrupted by fighting. Thus, waterways now serve both as lifelines for civilians and as key supply routes for IDPs concentrated in the eastern part of the township, where resistance actors are also based and which the MAF is seeking to cut off. The result is that restrictions disproportionately harm displaced populations. Prices for essential goods such as fertiliser and sanitary products are expected to [climb further](#), and soaring [fertiliser](#) costs could reduce food access and household income during the next harvest. For humanitarian actors responding to the [estimated](#) 21,000 IDPs in the township, concerns also include heightened risk of malaria, dengue, and other waterborne illnesses at the end of the monsoon season.

5 Fighting Ramps Up in Waingmaw

WAINGMAW TOWNSHIP, KACHIN STATE

On 11 September, Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) [airstrikes](#) reportedly hit the 13-mile mark on the Waingmaw–Kan Paik Ti road, destroying several buildings. This came amid fighting in Waingmaw Township between the MAF and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), which began in August and has [continued](#) through mid-September, with MAF troops pushing eastward from Waingmaw town toward Kain Paik Ti, on the Chinese border. This fighting has

reportedly displaced around 30 villages along the road. Raising concerns about further intensification of violence, local media [reported](#) on 16 September that the MAF had been training and arming ethnic Lhaovo, Lachid, and Lisu militias from the former Kachin Special Region 1 [territory](#), which the KIA seized in 2024 and which comprises parts of Waingmaw and all of Tsawlaw and Chipwi townships. The militias reportedly received weapons at MAF Infantry Battalion 58 base in Waingmaw Township and joined in subsequent MAF attacks to the east.

Renewed fighting on the Waingmaw–Kan Paik Ti road is likely to continue due to the economic significance of the route for both the KIA and MAF, with civilians bearing the brunt of hostilities.

Trade route battles

Renewed fighting on the Waingmaw–Kan Paik Ti road is likely to continue due to the economic significance of the route for both the KIA and MAF, with civilians bearing the brunt of hostilities. It is possible that the MAF launched operations against the KIA on the Waingmaw–Kan Paik Ti road due to the importance of Kan Paik Ti border trade and its links to state capital Myitkyina. Control over this road may also enable better access to Chipwi and Pang War, which sit along the border and host lucrative rare earth mining zones. The reported arming of ethnic militias in the township underscores MAF efforts to recapture Kachin Special Region 1, and it has the potential to increase ethnic divisions and heighten insecurity for civilians in contested areas. The MAF’s reliance on sustained air and artillery strikes may reflect both the difficulty of dislodging entrenched KIA

positions and the intent to regain control over key trade corridors. Meanwhile, fighting is likely to further strain humanitarian response activities in Kachin State, alongside intense fighting in Bhamo and Hpakant townships.

6 TNLA Detains Civilians

KYAUKME TOWNSHIP, NORTHERN SHAN STATE

On 21 September, it was reported that the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) had [detained](#) at least 50 civilians in Kyaukme Township since the start of the month, accusing them of being informants for the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF). Local residents stated that those detained included market vendors and elderly people. It was also [reported](#) on 13 September that the TNLA had detained civilians not holding Shan State–issued identification cards (starting with “13”), at checkpoints and farmlands near Pying Nin Loi village. The detention of even long-term Kyaukme Township residents without Shan State IDs has reportedly [prompted](#) some families to flee their homes. A Kyaukme Township resident told this analytical unit that when she appealed to the TNLA for the release of her detained relatives, TNLA spokesperson Lway Yay Oo requested she not speak to the media. She also said that when her relatives were released on 20 September, the TNLA kept their ID cards and phones, limiting their ability to temporarily relocate because ID cards are needed to pass checkpoints. Another source told this analytical unit that the majority of the people who were detained were sent to Namhsan Township, a TNLA stronghold to the north of Kyaukme.

Mobility constraints and fear

The TNLA’s detention of civilians in Kyaukme Township appears to be deepening local fear and uncertainty, even as fighting and high transport costs are impacting communities across the wider region. Families of the detained have struggled to obtain information about their relatives, and locals who spoke to this unit said the detentions are perceived as arbitrary (rather

than linked to ongoing investigations into networks of MAF affiliation). Beyond the people already detained, other vendors and households may also avoid markets out of fear of arrest, disrupting livelihoods and economic activity. This could add to hardship in a township where access to fuel, food, and medicine is already constrained by tightened checkpoints and armed hostilities. Even as conditions deteriorate in Kyaukme Township, ongoing TNLA–MAF fighting around key transport routes will likely complicate civilians' ability to travel on main roads to the west of Kyaukme, while the TNLA still controls areas to the north and east of Kyaukme. Humanitarian responders in the township are likely to face difficulties supporting newly displaced people, and aid workers themselves may face restrictions on movement.

7 Southern Chin Faces Flu Outbreak

PALETWA TOWNSHIP, CHIN STATE

On 15 September, local media reported that a seasonal [flu outbreak](#) in Paletwa Township had killed four people. The outbreak, which began in [late August](#), was reported to be particularly severe in a pocket in southeast Paletwa Township administered by the Daai Regional Council, with nearly all households reported to have been affected. Children have reportedly been disproportionately [affected](#), leading most schools in Daai Regional Council areas to close. A local aid worker told this analytical unit that lack of adequate water sanitation equipment in the area is likely one factor impacting the prevalence and severity of cases, and that the flu outbreak was also likely underreported in Daai Regional Council-administered areas due the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF)-imposed internet blackout.

Paletwa Township locals told this analytical unit that each actor has imposed its own regulations, creating coordination barriers for aid delivery.

Isolation in Paletwa

The flu outbreak highlights how Paletwa's isolating terrain and fragmented administration complicate health interventions. Since the ULA/AA ousted the MAF from Paletwa Township in January 2024, rural parts of the township have been divided among multiple Chin actors. One such actor is the Daai Regional Council, the administrative wing of the Chinland Defense Force (CDF)–Daai and an ally of the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA). Paletwa Township locals told this analytical unit that each actor has imposed its own regulations, creating coordination barriers for aid delivery, and they said that restrictive requirements and discriminatory treatment under the ULA/AA discouraged humanitarian access. Local responders have thus been forced to navigate access across multiple, sometimes rival, administrative zones. In Daai Regional Council areas, terrain poses further obstacles, with patients likely facing high transport costs and fragmented authority requiring approvals at checkpoints managed by multiple authorities. Successful interventions in these areas may depend on improving coordination and on water purification support, as the lack of clean water has likely compounded poor health conditions and contributed to the outbreak's spread. Although the outbreak may subside after the rainy season, long-term health consequences could persist, such as respiratory problems or child mortality, posing significant challenges for humanitarian response.

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*
**Humanitarian
Responders**

Contributing information sources to this document include public and non-public humanitarian information. The content compiled is by no means exhaustive and does not necessarily reflect the position of its authors or funders. The provided information, assessment, and analysis are designated for humanitarian purposes only and as such should not be cited.

Contact: analyst.myanmar2020@gmail.com