

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

Humanitarian Responders

in**focus**

NATIONWIDE

SSPC Restricts
Imports, Domestic Trade

W35-37 | 2025

28
10

AUGUST
SEPTEMBER

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infocus

Nationwide
SSPC RESTRICTS IMPORTS, DOMESTIC TRADE

primary concerns

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Kyaukpyu Township, Rakhine State

2 — ROHINGYA STUDENTS STRUGGLE TO ACCESS EDUCATION

Maungdaw and Buthidaung
townships, Rakhine State

3 — NEEDS RISE AMID ESCALATING ATTACKS IN NSS

Kyaukme Township,
Northern Shan State

4 — MAF RECLAIMS ASIA HIGHWAY, DISPLACING LOCALS AGAIN

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5 — YEBYU IDPS NEED FOOD AND MEDICINE

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6 — MAF RAIDS DISPLACE OVER 20,000

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in**focus**

SSPC Restricts Imports, Domestic Trade

NATIONWIDE

On 5 September, BBC [reported](#) that businesses in Myanmar faced rising prices due to raw material shortages, and some small and medium-sized enterprises had shut down entirely, after the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) restricted the import of goods from abroad. It said that markets had seen shortages of medicine, household goods, and cosmetics. This week, residents of Yangon and Mandalay told this analytical unit that they faced difficulty buying medicines and household goods, and that they were turning to low-quality domestic substitutes for some commodities. Likewise, a senior officer from a local response organization — working in earthquake-affected communities in central Myanmar — told this analytical unit that her organisation faced significant challenges due to skyrocketing prices and shortages of NFIs in local markets, which she attributed to the SSPC's restrictions on transport of these items.

The BBC report followed on the heels of multiple SSPC efforts since mid-August, apparently to stifle trade in imported goods. On 18 August, the SSPC largely [shut down](#) border trade with Thailand by stopping importation via Friendship Bridge No. 2 between

Myawaddy and Mae Sot. On 23 August, it was [reported](#) that several international air cargo services had either suspended or reduced their services, citing increasing inspections of cargo by SSPC custom employees. Since 18 August, merchants have [reported](#) that cargo transportation services had to be suspended because of SSPC restrictions — under the pretext of fighting illegal goods — involving the inspection, seizure, and blocking of goods imported by land, sea, or air. Going a step further, the SSPC has reportedly begun more forcefully restricting domestic transportation of imported goods. On 29 August, local media [reported](#) that it had imposed new restrictions on all home delivery service providers, preventing them from transporting goods — many of them imported — including medicines and medical supplies, cosmetics, agricultural products, solar panels, and power banks. Major domestic van transport services have reportedly been [prevented](#) from transporting goods in parts of Bago Region, Karen State, Mon State, Tanintharyi Region, Nay Pyi Taw Union Territory, Sagaing Region, and [Southern Shan](#) State. As a result, many merchants have reportedly stopped trading and warehoused their products instead.


Cascading problems

The SSPC's restrictions on imported goods and domestic transportation have already impacted markets in Myanmar and are likely to impact humanitarian response as well. Prices and access to goods have already been major challenges since the coup, all the more impactful because the country's economy has been hurt in so many ways. On 5 September, the [WFP](#) said that the average cost of a basic food basket had quadrupled since 2021, making it nearly impossible for millions to afford even a basic meal, that nearly one third of Myanmar's population (16.7 million people) were acutely food insecure, a sharp increase even from the 13.3 million in 2024, and that 20.8 million people were in crisis and struggling daily to find their next meal. On top of this, the new enforcement of restrictions has already caused shortages of basic goods, with demand outpacing limited supply and prices for essentials soaring. For humanitarian organisations, this means immense challenges in delivering essential supplies to affected areas, particularly where fighting has disrupted markets and impeded accessibility; the tightening of restrictions makes it even more risky and difficult to move products across the country, and all the more so across lines of control or in contested areas. Restrictions on the flow of goods, including crucial items like fuel and medicine, are already reportedly impeding humanitarian response efforts, and the situation is expected to worsen as humanitarian organizations struggle to maintain access to markets and goods, especially in contested areas or resistance strongholds.

For humanitarian organisations, this means immense challenges in delivering essential supplies to affected areas, particularly where fighting has disrupted markets and impeded accessibility.

Possible rationales

The SSPC's restrictions may be based on economic or military factors, or some combination of the two. On the surface, the primary reason for the restrictions appears to be managing and controlling Myanmar's dwindling foreign currency reserves, specifically by limiting imports to reduce the outflow of US dollars and other foreign currencies that have become increasingly scarce following the coup in 2021. Enforcement of the restrictions may also be part of a broader push towards import substitution, a strategy [aimed](#) at stimulating domestic production and fostering greater national self-sufficiency. In essence, the SSPC appears to be gesturing toward Myanmar (again) being a "closed-market" economy, which experts believe would discourage foreign investment, hinder trade, and cripple Myanmar's long-term economic outlook. Crucially, these restrictions would also further harm the ability of communities and humanitarian responders to access and provide essential goods. However, another possible rationale is to undermine potential revenue for ethnic armed organisations and resistance actors that control border trade routes. From [Kachin](#) and [Shan](#) states in the northeast, to Karen State and [Tanintharyi](#) Region in the southeast, to [Chin](#) and [Rakhine](#) states in the west, various actors have administered trade to some extent since the coup, profiting and undermining potential SSPC profits through taxation. To the extent that this is a motivating factor, shifts in control may result in policy or practice changes. For example, with its newfound control over the Asia Highway through Karen State, the SSPC may have less incentive to prevent imports via that route.



Key Border Trade Stations

Myanmar

(August 2025)

Legend

Major official border trade station
(as of August 2025)

- Controlled by SSPC/MAF
- Controlled by resistance forces
- Halted border trade stations

Minor or unofficial border crossing

Major roads linking state and region capitals and border trade stations*

*The information is for indicative purposes only. The functionality, accessibility, and usage cannot be confirmed.

The locations, control status, legal status, functionality, and classifications of border trade stations shown here are approximate and may not be independently verified. The information is from various open sources including social media such as Facebook and it should not be considered comprehensive.

Disclaimer: This product is designed for information purposes only. The map may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Base map data provided by MIMU and copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>. The accuracy of specific attributes and their geo-locations are manually added and cannot be confirmed.

trendlines

HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK


TWO-WEEK TREND
1.60%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER
25 NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.


AS OF 9 SEPTEMBER 2025

TOTAL DAMAGE
92,856

TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



trendwatch

Fighting continued in many parts of the country.

On 28 August, the RCSS reportedly fought MAF troops and local militia members in Mong Yang Township (Shan East).

During 29 August-2 September, MAF troops were reportedly killed or captured amid fighting in Demoso Township (Karenni), Dawei Township (Tanintharyi), and Kyaukkyi Township (Bago East).

On 2 September, an MAF/SNA drone attack reportedly killed three KPDP members in Mogaung Township (Kachin).

MAF projectiles killed civilians and damaged property.

MAF airstrikes reportedly killed two people in Myinmu Township (Sagaing) on 30 August, five in Yesagyo Township (Magway) on 31 August, and four in Tigyaing Township (Sagaing) on 7 September.

On 4 September, an MAF drone strike reportedly injured students and a teacher in Hpa-An Township (Karen).

MAF shelling reportedly killed several people during 30 August-2 September in Madaya Township ►

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND

0.83%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER

112

NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES (NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.


AS OF 9 SEPTEMBER 2025

TOTAL
13,668


■ Civilian
 ■ Civilian (Alleged Informer)
 ■ Civilian (Other)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON

..... [Q1 2021 – Q3 2025]



NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION



trendwatch (cont.)

(Mandalay), Waingmaw Township (Kachin), and Kyaukkyi Township (Bago East).

MAF raids caused displacement, destruction, and needs.

On 29 August, local responders reported that around 20,000 IDPs in Pale Township (Sagaing) urgently needed food.

On 2 September, locals reported that MAF raids had displaced approximately 10,000 people in Nyaung-U Township (Mandalay).

MAF troops reportedly torched houses in Ngazun Township (Mandalay) on 5 September and Thayetchaung Township (Tanintharyi) on 7 September.

Fighting, and ULA policies, disrupted children's education.

On 2 September, several schools were reportedly closed amid tensions between the MAF and KIA in Hpakant Township (Kachin). Locals told this analytical unit that schools may not reopen this academic year.

Relations between the MAF and MNDAA in Northern Shan State remained tense.

During 25 August–4 Sep, the MNDAA reportedly patrolled five routes along the China border in Muse Township. ►

CIVILIAN FACILITIES
DAMAGES AND ATTACKS

TWO-WEEK TREND
0.94%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER
11
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.


AS OF 9 SEPTEMBER 2025

Health Facility: 266
Education Facility: 460
Religious Facility: 665


TOTAL DAMAGE
1,391

Aerial Shelling EDA

IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES:
DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS
Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks,
and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES:
DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION
Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and
Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



trendwatch (cont.)

On 2 September, local media reported rumours that the SSPC administration would return to Hseni town in September 2025.

The AA attempted to enhance its security measures in Rakhine State.

On 2 September, the ULA's Department of Law Enforcement and Public Security reportedly detained 11 drug dealers, including DLEPS members, in Ponnagyun Township, days after raiding a KTV in Taungup Township.

On 8 September, local media reported that residents of northern Maungdaw Township had security concerns about fighting between ARSA and the AA.

Tensions remained high around Sittoung and Kyaukpadaung in Rakhine State.

On 29 August, the AA reportedly destroyed an MAF ship in Kyaukpadaung Township.

On 30 August, it was reported that over 5,000 Ponnagyun Township residents had fled due to MAF shelling from Sittoung and fears of a potential MAF offensive.

On 3 September, it was reported that the MAF had reduced flights and banned air cargo shipments from Yangon to Sittoung.

primaryconcerns

1 Kyaukpyu IDP Population Grows, Needs Assistance

KYAUKPYU TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

On 1 September, local media reported that the number of IDPs in Kyaukpyu Township had risen to over 50,000, and that these people were struggling to generate income or meet basic needs and demanding the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) to arrange their resettlement. Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) airstrikes, drone strikes, and naval artillery have also reportedly pushed residents of multiple villages to flee to AA-controlled areas recently. According to local aid workers, the number of IDPs has increased daily — up to 50,000 from 20,000 in February — and IDPs urgently need proper shelter, food, and medicine. Since 1 August, fighting has intensified across the township, especially around the Dhanyawady Naval Headquarters, Police Battalion 32 base, Gaw Tu Hill, and Chinese infrastructure. The MAF has reportedly accelerated its air and drone attacks on civilian areas along the coastal road, and local media reported that MAF naval ships in multiple nearby waterways have recently shelled coastal villages along the roads leading out of Kyaukpyu. While some residents have fled to AA controlled areas, many reportedly remain in their homes because they cannot afford to pay 100,000 Myanmar Kyat for transportation. On 2 September, the ULA's Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO) announced that it was focusing on providing more humanitarian assistance to IDPs in southern Rakhine State, but had also called for greater international aid to help it do so. On 4 September, it announced that it had

delivered thatch, mats, and tarpaulin sheets to 43 people in five villages, with support from a private donor.

Suffering by the sea

Humanitarian needs continue to grow in Kyaukpyu Township, and in townships of Rakhine State to which Kyaukpyu residents are fleeing. As needs grow in Kyaukpyu, basic necessities such as food, shelter, and health-care are becoming harder to find, and livelihood opportunities are severely limited. A recent decrease in the number of flights between Yangon and Kyaukpyu, from seven per week to two, will also likely impact movement and the transportation of goods, further driving price hikes and shortages in Kyaukpyu. Further, IDPs in the southern half of Rakhine State, including Kyaukpyu, have reportedly seen far less humanitarian assistance, due to both a lower presence of local responders and weak communication networks. This is likely to spell major challenges for many — and particularly those who cannot afford to relocate. For those who can afford to relocate to more firmly AA-controlled areas, they — and host communities where they end up — may be increasingly strained in the face of resource shortages, intermittent MAF attacks, and barriers to income generation. For example, in Ramree Township, the presence of MAF naval vessels has reportedly prevented fishing. The combination of a lack of job opportunities and economic hardships could lead to severe hunger and shortages in basic necessities, risking widespread malnutrition, particularly among children and the elderly. The potential for instability and suffering will only intensify as fighting continues in Kyaukpyu.

2 Rohingya Students Struggle to Access Education

MAUNGDAW AND BUTHIDAUNG TOWNSHIPS, RAKHINE STATE

On 1 September, local media [reported](#) that Rohingya students in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships were facing severe educational barriers under the United League of Arakan (ULA). It said that the ULA had denied permission to open schools in smaller Rohingya villages, and that, even where schools were allowed, only three to four Rohingya teachers — who reportedly receive [no salary](#) — were appointed, while principal positions were reserved exclusively for ethnic Rakhine people. In addition, school materials have reportedly [become](#) rare and unaffordable, with a single [textbook](#) costing up to 40,000 Myanmar Kyat, and local charitable organisations reportedly [have not](#) given educational assistance in Rohingya villages. The ULA's township-level education department [collects](#) application fees: 5,000 Myanmar Kyat for primary school, 10,000 for middle school, and 20,000 for high school. Parents and education committees have [voiced](#) frustration over forced teacher replacements and financial burdens. Sources from local Rohingya education committees told local media that the ULA — unlike the State Administration Council before it — forced committees to pay a monthly salary of 500,000 Myanmar Kyat to each Rakhine teacher and also cover their food and travel costs. A Rohingya parent, whose daughter is currently enrolled in a school opened under the ULA administration, told this analytical unit, “My daughter doesn't understand what the Rakhine teachers are teaching because of the language barrier. I have to send her to tuition where Rohingya teachers teach and that costs 30,000 Myanmar Kyat per month. If this continues, I may have to take her out of school.”

Children left behind

The lack of educational opportunities for Rohingya children in Rakhine State threatens the short- and long-term future of these children and threatens to worsen interethnic tensions within the state. For Rohingya children in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, barriers

to participation in educational spaces — whether due to language barriers, a lack of Rohingya teachers, or financial constraints — is likely to harm social development, increase exposure to dangerous situations, and lead to greater difficulty finding work in the longer term. Moreover, a lack of education within Rohingya communities is likely to stifle intercommunal peacebuilding efforts — as is the exclusion of Rohingya people in teaching or other roles in education settings. Inequality in access to work — for Rohingya adults now and Rohingya children later — will likely further patterns of poverty and marginalisation and hurt the ability of Rohingya community members to build up resources, and to strengthen and lead their communities. In turn, this exclusion and inability to thrive may engender resentment against the ULA, and potentially even against communities that have had greater opportunities. It is worth noting that Rohingya people's exclusion from education spaces fits a long-standing pattern of institutional discrimination against Rohingya people in Myanmar, which the ULA is perpetuating — even if unintentionally. The consolidation of its authority in northern Rakhine has led to the establishment of localised administrative systems, including in the education sector, and given limited resources (including donor assistance) and ongoing conflict, its emerging structures appear to reflect the priorities of the ethnic Rakhine population, which has resulted in limited inclusion of Rohingya communities.

Barriers to participation in educational spaces — whether due to language barriers, a lack of Rohingya teachers, or financial constraints — is likely to harm social development, increase exposure to dangerous situations, and lead to greater difficulty finding work in the longer term.

3 Needs Rise Amid Escalating Attacks in NSS

KYAUKME TOWNSHIP, NORTHERN SHAN STATE

Intense fighting reportedly [continued](#) in Kyaukme Township, as the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) prosecuted its offensive along the Union Highway in Northern Shan State. Since [retaking](#) Nawnghkio town in mid-July, the MAF has [launched](#) attacks farther up the road in Kyaukme Township while launching airstrikes on multiple areas. Notably, the most recent attacks [follow](#) a [failure](#) of the MAF and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) to reach terms at peace talks on 27 August, and an [announce-ment](#) from the powerful United Wa State Army (UWSA) that it would [halt](#) the provision of weapons, equipment, and other support to armed actors in the state. Several analysts have [noted](#) that reduced support from the UWSA [may force](#) the TNLA into a more defensive posture, potentially intensifying clashes and heightening risks to civilians. Nonetheless, the TNLA [con- tinues](#) to defend the territory that it captured during Operation 1027, with the current front-line around [Pin Tein](#) village.

The MAF offensive has reportedly [displaced](#) over 10,000 people in Kyaukme Township, just since the failed dialogue on 27 August, mainly to towns and smaller villages farther up the highway. As of 8 September, at least 2,000 IDPs had reportedly arrived in [Hsipaw](#) town and 500 in [Lashio](#) town. Much of this displacement was caused by [airstrikes](#) and [shelling](#), which reportedly [killed](#) 50 civilians in August and hit houses, schools, and monasteries. There is reportedly displacement in Kyaukme Township daily, and displacement sites fielding these people are said to be overcrowded and under-resourced. Local response groups told this analytical unit that they are struggling to meet urgent humanitarian needs, which continue to grow as displacement increases. There are critical [shortages](#) of medical supplies, and other needs reportedly include food, clean water, blankets, tarpaulins, and hygiene items. Observers [warn](#) that further displacement and shortages are likely as attacks [continue](#).

The failure of the 27 August talks, the lack of a scheduled next round, and potentially the looming election increase the risk that fighting will be prolonged, leading to more displacement, an increased demand for aid, and further challenges to humanitarian access.

Running out of space

The MAF offensive is resulting in large-scale displacement and escalating humanitarian needs. Repeated airstrikes in Kyaukme and elsewhere have forced thousands of civilians to flee to nearby towns, including MAF-controlled Lashio, creating urgent needs and causing significant additional suffering. Furthermore, the failure of the 27 August talks, the lack of a scheduled next round, and potentially the looming election increase the risk that fighting will be prolonged, leading to more displacement, an increased demand for aid, and further challenges to humanitarian access. In particular, immediate impacts are most likely to be felt near the highway in Kyaukme Township — and potentially in towns where the TNLA still has control but is now in a weakened position — while humanitarian needs are likely to be highest where IDPs are congregating farther up the highway. With local relief groups already struggling to meet urgent needs and reporting critical shortages, the situation underscores the immediate need for continuous monitoring, protection, and a significant increase in the provision of humanitarian support, including essential items like medicine, medical support, food, water, and hygiene supplies — all while preparing for considerable access challenges. Assistance should be prioritised in towns such as Lashio and Hsipaw, where strong coordination with local responders is essential for effective aid delivery.

4 MAF Reclaims Asia Highway, Displacing Locals Again

MYAWADDY TOWNSHIP, KAREN STATE

On 5 September, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) **claimed** to have regained control of the Asia Highway between Myawaddy, on the Thai border, and Mon State after its Aung Zeya Column overran two bases it had earlier lost in Thingannyinaung, on the outskirts of Myawaddy town. Its attempt to regain control reportedly involved ground troops **pushing** through – and firing **artillery** in – villages along the highway and dropping bombs from **jets and drones**. This sent hundreds of **villagers fleeing** to IDP camps along the Thai border and into Thailand. MAF columns are now **stationed** in four places around Thingannyinaung, and a local source told this analytical unit that after regaining control of the road, MAF troops also pushed into the area around Law Kay Kaw town, south of Myawaddy. People in villages near Myawaddy and Thingyannyinaung have expressed **concerns** about further military tensions, conscription, and forced portering.


Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA)-led forces **seized** control of the Asia Highway between Kawkareik and Myawaddy in December 2023. The MAF's Aung Zeya Column has been fighting to retake the road since April 2024, and its breakthrough this week appears to have involved attacks from both directions on the road, as well as support from the Karen Border Guard Force (BGF) and possibly the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA). Local sources **reported** that the BGF **helped** to transport MAF troops to Myawaddy just before 5 September, and both the **BGF** and **DKBA** said this month that they would support elections in Myawaddy town planned for **December**. On 7 September, the MAF **stated** that, by regaining control of the road, it had finally and totally broken the Karen National Union's dream of 'Kawthoolei', a Karen homeland.

No welcome mat for MAF

As the increased MAF presence around Myawaddy drives humanitarian needs upward, humanitarian responders may struggle to meet

GNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unit typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms "Karen State" and "Karenni State" preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at <https://tinyurl.com/4dtnfdak>. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at <https://www.khrgh.org/maps>.

the needs of IDPs and other people in need. The MAF may want improved access to the Thai border at Myawaddy to facilitate elections there and control trade along the Asia Highway more closely; resistance actors are likely to [keep fighting](#) to oppose these goals. The MAF is also likely to try to leverage its newfound logistical access to retake [other border positions](#) previously captured by KNLA-led forces in southern Myawaddy Township, and its efforts to do so will likely involve repeated air attacks. Consequently, the cycle of fighting and displacement continues, with villagers displaced multiple times, either because fighting reaches their village or because they fear that it will soon. This means that needs increase, often at the same displacement sites, though there may not be resources available to new arrivals. For example, as of 8 September, the Plaw Ta Po IDP camp (along the border) had [received](#) 140 new households from Lay Kay Kaw town and Mae Wah Khee village. After resistance forces captured the MAF's Swe Taw Gone Base in Law Kay Kaw in October 2024, IDP camps along the border (populated during 2021–2024) shrank as people returned to their villages. Tents in the camps have now deteriorated, and IDPs are in urgent need of shelters, toilet facilities, and food. Assistance preparations also appear to be lacking; village heads are reportedly now left with [self-help](#) measures to respond to urgent needs.

**IDP camps along the border
(populated during 2021–2024)
shrank as people returned to
their villages. Tents in the camps
have now deteriorated, and IDPs
are in urgent need of shelters,
toilet facilities, and food.**

5 Yebyu IDPs Need Food and Medicine

YEBYU TOWNSHIP, TANINTHARYI REGION

On 28 August, over 700 people displaced from at least five villages in Yebyu Township reportedly [made a plea](#) for humanitarian assistance. Also, on 2 September it was [reported](#) that over 500 IDPs from the township's Hpar Chaung village tract were in urgent need of food supplies. Thousands of people have reportedly [fled](#) since fighting intensified in Yebyu Township starting 15 August. Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) troops reportedly [fought](#) resistance actors forces around the Kanbaurk Oil Palm Plantation and Se Ein Su village in Hpar Chaung village tract during August 25–28, and remain stationed there, leading to concerns that fighting could resume at any time. The National Unity Government's (NUG) Tanintharyi Region Military Command [stated](#) that the MAF had stationed troops east of Dawei and was conducting military operations in villages there, and it cautioned locals to be careful. Many people from Yebyu and Dawei townships have reportedly [fled](#) to Ye Township in Mon State; the Mon Humanitarian Support Alliance ([MHSA](#)) said that as of 26 August, more than 700 residents of Yebyu Township were in areas controlled by the New Mon State Party (NMSP). These IDPs are reportedly in [dire](#) need of food and medicine, and they also need shelter and other necessities. Fighting has also [disrupted](#) transport along the main north–south artery through the state, Union Highway No. 8, stopping traffic along at least one stretch of this road for at least nine days. On 27 August, a person trapped along the road [told](#) local media, “We’re in a lot of trouble. There’s nothing to eat on this road, so we have to go into the villages and beg for food. There are hundreds of vehicles here, both big and small, and some people are not in good health. We don’t know when the road will open, so we can’t decide whether to turn back or not.”

Problems down the road

Needs have continued to rise in northern Tanintharyi Region and across the border in southern Mon State amid fighting and barriers

to transportation. The MAF appears to be trying to expand its control along the Union Highway and sections of the Thai border in northern Tanintharyi Region, and as it fights to do so, it has both displaced thousands of people and disrupted the movement of people and goods. According to research group FE5 Tanintharyi, in [July](#), there were approximately 7,000 people displaced in Yebyu Township; aid workers assisting the displaced people report that the number of IDPs increased in August, as a result of fighting along the highway, a spur toward the Thai border, and around the Dawei [Special Economic Zone](#). In addition to displacing people, fighting along the highway has severely disrupted the transport of goods, affecting prices and access across multiple parts of the region. In Dawei town, the price of chilies reportedly [shot up](#) from 1,500–2,000 Myanmar Kyat (per can) before the road was blocked to 5,000 afterward, and the price of an egg [rose](#) from 500–600 to 1,200 Myanmar Kyat. This has affected both businesses and IDPs — particularly because many of the latter have fled to rural areas and areas controlled by the NMSP, where they have greater difficulty accessing food, medicine, and other essentials due to limited availability in local markets. Amid disruptions to transportation and local markets, as well as ongoing barriers to internet connectivity, local responders are likely to face major challenges in assisting newly displaced people here.

Amid disruptions to transportation and local markets, as well as ongoing barriers to internet connectivity, local responders are likely to face major challenges in assisting newly displaced people here.

6 MAF Raids Displace Over 20,000

PWINTBYU TOWNSHIP, MAGWAY REGION

On 3 September, around 150 Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) troops and allied Pyu Saw Htee militia members based around Pwintbyu and Saku towns raided villages along the Mone River in western Pwintbyu Township. On 3 September, these forces reportedly [detained](#) two people in Magyee Su village, killed them, put their bodies in a house and set the house on fire. On the same day, the forces also raided Lay Eain Su village and beheaded one person. On 6 September, they [raided](#) Nyaung Pin Wine, Htoo Pauk, Htan Taw, and Ma De villages and detained 12 residents. They reportedly tied up and [shot](#) one and [forced](#) the other 11 to walk through a minefield — killing five and injuring the other six. The series of raids reportedly displaced about 20,000 people from 15 villages in western Pwintbyu Township, most to forested areas and some to villages far afield. Resistance actors reportedly [ambushed](#) these troops twice on 3 September, near Phalan Kyin village and then in Magyisu village, and [attacked](#) them again the next day near Nyaung Kaing village, in total reportedly [killing](#) at least 20 MAF troops. The Pwintbyu People's Defence Team (PDT) said that after 6 September, the MAF troops and Pyu Saw Htee members returned to their bases, but it [warned](#) villagers to heed further alerts.

In a recent announcement, the State Security and Peace Commission's (SSPC) Union Election Commission (UEC) [listed](#) Pwintbyu and nine other townships in Magway Region as locations for the first phase of its election, scheduled for 28 December.

Pre-election violence

Violence has intensified in new parts of Magway Region since late 2024, and the MAF appears to be further dialing up its attacks amid SSPC efforts to begin elections in December. Whereas most fighting in the region since 2021 has taken place farther north in Gangaw, Pakokku, and Magway districts, in 2025, there have been frequent fighting, airstrikes, and MAF attacks farther south in Minbu District — and particularly

in Pwintbyu, Minbu, Salin, and Ngape townships. For example, a series of MAF raids in January reportedly [displaced](#) about 20,000 people from ten villages in Pwintbyu Township. Minbu District has become a contested area as resistance actors try to expand their control in rural areas, particularly west of the Pathein–Monywa road, with some degree of support from the Arakan Army (AA). This resistance activity potentially threatens the MAF’s military production facilities and its control of this section of the Pathein–Monywa road, which — along with greater AA [involvement](#) in fighting — may explain the MAF’s heavy-handed tactics in attacking civilian communities. Violence has also increased in parts of the region where resistance actors have little or no control, such as Thayet Township: on 6 September, a convoy of MAF vehicles — possibly heading to reinforce the MAF’s Defense Equipment Factory No. 12 — was [attacked](#) by resistance actors, reportedly leaving 16 MAF soldiers dead and eight injured. This raises concerns that further violence could accompany the SSPC’s efforts to stage a first round of elections in Pwintbyu, Pakokku, Chauk, Yenangyaung, Taungdwingyi, Magway, Minbu, Thayet, Salin, and Aungmye townships. A combination of attacks in a larger geographical range and the brutality alleged in Pwintbyu last week would likely spell massive further displacement and accompanying increases in humanitarian needs.

7 More MAF Airstrikes in Northern Mandalay

THABEIKKYIN TOWNSHIP, MANDALAY REGION

On 7 September, a Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) [airstrike](#) reportedly struck a house where children were studying in Kyaukphyu village, Thabeikkyin Township, [killing](#) a 10-year-old child and injuring seven people, including five children. This came amid continued fighting in the township, particularly near the Mandalay–Mogoke road and the spur that leads to Thabeikkyin town. While most rural parts of

the township are reportedly under the control of resistance actors, there are still said to be MAF troops positioned at its No. 2 Basic Military Training base, Kyaukgyi Technical Regiment base, and No. 13 Officer Training School. Ongoing fighting around these bases has forced thousands of villagers to remain displaced for over a year. On 4 September, the MAF also [shelled](#) IDP camps just miles from Kyaukphyu village, using heavy artillery from its No. 2 Basic Military Training base, killing two IDPs and wounding many others. The Mandalay People’s Defence Force released a [statement](#) saying that the MAF carried out an unprovoked airstrike on Kyaukphyu village, located on the Thabeikkyin road, where there were no ongoing battles. It said that the attack specifically targeted a house where children were studying, and it condemned the MAF’s frequent attacks on civilian sites such as homes, hospitals, and schools.

School daze

As the MAF continues its efforts to retake territory in northern Mandalay Region, its frequent use of airstrikes and artillery make conditions insecure for civilians. In 2025, the MAF has sought to retake territory it lost during Operation 1027, including in northern Mandalay. Besides [recapturing](#) Thabeikkyin town in July, it has launched frequent airstrikes, drone strikes, and artillery fire in rural areas beyond the few positions it still controls, affecting parts of [Mogoke](#), Thabeikkyin, and [Madaya](#) townships. In multiple locations, it has allegedly [targeted](#) monasteries or other locations [housing IDPs](#). As the MAF continues fighting to retake territory in the area, it is likely to have its eyes set on Mogoke, a valuable possession famed for its lucrative ruby mines — which are likely to be currently providing the Ta’ang National Liberation Army with revenue, and which could be providing the MAF with revenue if it were to retake the area. In any case, with many areas of northern Mandalay Region still under resistance control, and with MAF attacks continuing in neighbouring Northern Shan State, the death and destruction caused by the recent MAF airstrikes may only be a precursor to heavier violence that drives displacement and needs, and leaves civilians without safe places to go. Indeed, the strike on a makeshift school this week underscores the lack of safe spaces for children, among other civilians.

8

ULA/AA Instates Border Pass Regime

PALETWA TOWNSHIP, CHIN STATE

On 3 September, local media [reported](#) that the United League of Arakan/Arakan Army (ULA/AA) had imposed a temporary border pass requirement for people crossing the Indian border from Paletwa to Mizoram through its check-point in [Shinletwa](#) village. Since the ULA/AA took control of the border here in early 2024, Shinletwa has been the main trade and transit point between Mizoram's Lawngtlai District and Paletwa Township. Another source [posted](#) a photo of the temporary pass, which requires personal details including ethnicity, address, and purpose of visit to India. The passes [appear](#) to be single use and valid up to seven days — requiring an explanation in the case of late return. The [pass](#) says that anyone who exits from Shinletwa must return from the same point. Local media [said](#) that this requirement became effective in late August, and that the ULA/AA had also imposed driver's license and vehicle registration requirements in Paletwa Township. The ULA/AA spokesperson [told](#) local media that the purpose of introducing the pass is to monitor the mobility of people and goods along the border for security reasons, and that it is aimed at supporting humanitarian operations rather than trade. He said it is not reciprocal with Indian authorities. On account of this last point, local sources [said](#) that the pass is not useful when they are in Mizoram.

While oversight of cross-border movement is a logical step as the ULA seeks to improve its governance and administration, the introduction of the new border pass raises questions about how much will be regulated and with what implications.

Trade and trade-offs

As trade and movement increase at Shinletwa, the ULA/AA largely has the power to dictate how it operates, potentially to the detriment of humanitarian responders. Before January 2024, trade here was limited — with most goods ending up in Paletwa Township. By contrast, since the ULA/AA took control in January 2024, Paletwa has become a new trade hub; several sources told this analytical unit that a variety of goods are imported from Mizoram and onward to central Rakhine, and that demand is high because of the MAF's effective cutting of trade links between Rakhine State and central Myanmar. While oversight of cross-border movement is a logical step as the ULA seeks to improve its governance and administration, the introduction of the new border pass raises questions about how much will be regulated and with what implications. To start, neither Indian authorities nor civil society groups appear to have responded to the border pass rule, and it remains unclear what would be required of refugees returning home or Indians who trade into or visit Paletwa. Second, the border pass regime could discourage humanitarian operations where responders seek to keep a low profile in the absence of Indian formal collaboration (e.g. where they are based in India); some may be reluctant to provide personal details. Third, though there are several informal border crossings between Rakhine State and Lawngtlai District, the introduction of the border pass at Shinletwa only raises concerns that the ULA/AA may seek to route all cross-border movement through this single point. This could potentially make it harder, and more expensive, for humanitarian assistance to reach other parts of the township (or beyond). Finally, there may be concerns among Chin stakeholders — amid lingering tensions with the ULA/AA otherwise — that the ULA/AA is seeking to control trade and movement between Chin State and Mizoram.

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*
**Humanitarian
Responders**

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