

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

Humanitarian Responders

in**focus**

PANG HKAM TOWNSHIP,
NORTHERN SHAN STATE

UWSA Cuts Ties with Resistance

W33-35 | 2025
AUGUST 14
27

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in**focus**

UWSA Cuts Ties with Resistance

PANG HKAM TOWNSHIP, NORTHERN SHAN STATE

On 21 August, the United Wa State Army (UWSA) reportedly [held](#) an in-person meeting in Pang Hkam — in the Wa Self-Administered Division — with the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA), Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA), and Shan State Progress Party (SSPP). The UWSA reportedly [stated](#) in the meeting that it would no longer provide weapons, equipment, or other assistance to armed actors, citing pressure from Chinese authorities who blamed it for providing the material support that contributed to the success of Operation 1027. The [Voice of Wa State](#) — a UWSA-linked media outlet — said that economic pressure from Chinese authorities to cease support to resistance actors had “escalated to an existential crisis for Wa State”, adding that the UWSA was not changing its principles and that its allies “are now capable of self-reliance”. According to one local [media outlet](#), the UWSA decision to cease support to other armed groups will have the greatest impact on the TNLA, which remains engaged in intense fighting with the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF). However, a TNLA [spokesperson](#) said recently — though before the meeting — that the group would stand firm against the MAF and not cede territory.

Nationwide implications

The UWSA decision to cease support to all armed actors could impact groups across Myanmar that oppose the MAF. The UWSA is commonly understood to be a major source of arms used

by actors other than the MAF, with even smaller and farther-away groups likely receiving weapons through secondary transfers and downstream trade. This is particularly so for PDFs; while some EAOs may be capable of [producing](#) arms or [sourcing](#) them from across Myanmar's porous borders, and have larger caches of weapons, PDFs appear to be more often reliant on sales or support from domestic groups (and therefore are more likely to be reliant on weapons made by or flowing through the UWSA). PDFs in northern Mandalay Region and Shan State are likely to have particularly benefited from UWSA-supplied weapons and raw materials that first went to the TNLA and MNDAA — groups which forged close ties with PDFs following the coup. In general, the extent to which this development impacts PDFs is unclear; this is likely to be a function of both the length of the supply chain from the UWSA and the extent to which they have other weapons sources (or already sizable weapons inventories). However, this development comes at a critical time for PDFs in northern Mandalay Region, which continue to face large-scale (and well resourced) MAF operations. Though already expected to remain high as fighting continues in northern Mandalay Region and Shan State, humanitarian needs could increase further if MAF increases its attacks — potentially leveraging others' supply gaps — or re-captures territory and imposes punitive measures on civilian populations there.

TNLA supply lines

A complete halt to the flow of arms and material supplies from the UWSA to the TNLA would likely have a significant impact on the TNLA's ability to sustain operations against the MAF. While the TNLA — and closely aligned groups such as the MNDAA — may have access to black markets or munitions captured during Operation 1027, it is unclear whether these supplies are sufficient to maintain operations along the Mandalay–Muse Highway in northern Shan State and parts of Mandalay Region. The UWSA has long been one of the TNLA's primary suppliers of weapons and ammunition, including before the coup, and these supplies likely contributed to the TNLA's success in capturing a large swathes of territory in Northern Shan State during Operation 1027. However, the momentum has now shifted: the MAF re-captured Nawnghkio town in July, its forces have continued to advance on TNLA positions in Kyaukme Township, and MAF [airstrikes](#) reportedly continued to pound Kyaukme town as recently as 25 August. During 20–22 August, MAF troops reportedly [attacked](#) Nawnng Ping village in Kyaukme Township with heavy weapons, drones, and airstrikes. A Kyaukme local told this analytical unit that some MAF troops had advanced up to Kyaukme town, and that most of the town's residents had already relocated. Additional MAF reinforcement convoys reportedly advanced from Pyin Oo Lwin towards Nawnghkio in early August, raising concerns over further civilian displacement and restricted movement for local responders. If the TNLA loses additional territory to the MAF, humanitarian operating space in Northern Shan State is likely to shrink further — at a time when needs are escalating.

trendlines

HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK


TWO-WEEK TREND
0.24%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER
38 NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 26 AUGUST 2025


TOTAL DAMAGE
90,897

TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION

with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



trendwatch

MAF and aligned forces raided and torched villages, destroying homes and displacing locals.

On 15 August, MAF troops reportedly raided Taso village in Natogyi Township, Mandalay Region, and killed five people there.

On 16 August, MAF troops reportedly torched Tha Pyu Taung village in Kyaukpyu Township, Rakhine State.

On 17 August, MAF troops reportedly torched parts of Oe Mae Pyin village in Minbu Township, Magway Region.

From 9–17 August, MAF and PNA troops reportedly torched parts of Naung Htao Kayan and Naung Bo villages in Hsihseng Township, Southern Shan State.

On 22 August, MAF troops reportedly raided Moe Shwe Gu village in Thayetchaung Township, Tanintharyi Region, displacing hundreds of people.

MAF airstrikes and drone attacks on resistance strongholds killed scores of civilians.

On 18 August, MAF airstrikes on Mu Kan Gyi village in Tabayin Township, Sagaing Region, reportedly killed five people. ►

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND

1.52%



TWO-WEEK NUMBER

203 NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES (NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 26 AUGUST 2025

TOTAL
13,544

■ Civilian
 ■ Civilian (Alleged Informer)
 ■ Civilian (Other)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON
 [Q1 2021 – Q2 2025]

NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION


trendwatch (cont.)

On 19 August, MAF airstrikes on Shoutpin Yoe village in Singu Township, Mandalay Region, reportedly killed at least six people and injured several others.

On 19 August, MAF airstrikes on Sharla and Kyuntaw villages in Seikphyu Township, Magway Region, reportedly killed seven people.

On 23 August MAF airstrikes on IDP sites in Madaya Township, Mandalay Region, reportedly killed several people.

On 24 August, MAF airstrikes on Nga Pyaw Daw village tract in Kyaikto Township, Mon State, reportedly killed two monks and injured five more.

On 25 August, MAF airstrikes on Mrauk-U town, in Rakhine State, reportedly killed 11 civilians and injured 21 others.

PDFs captured MAF camps and ambushed MAF convoys.

On 15 August, an NUG-led resistance coalition reportedly captured an MAF camp in Htaw Thar village in Mawlaik Township, Sagaing Region, killing three MAF soldiers and capturing 190 personnel and family members.

On 24 August, PDFs reportedly ambushed MAF troops in Tanintharyi Township, Tanintharyi Region, killing four MAF soldiers.

CIVILIAN FACILITIES DAMAGES AND ATTACKS

TWO-WEEK TREND

2.00%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER

24

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 26 AUGUST 2025

Health Facility:
263Education Facility:
458Religious Facility:
656


TOTAL DAMAGE

1,377

■ Aerial ■ Shelling ■ EDA


IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks,
and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and
Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



trendwatch (cont.)

EAOs continued to fight the MAF (and aligned actors) in Kachin and Rakhine states.

On 16 August, KIA troops reportedly re-captured two SNA camps near Indawgyi Lake in Mohnyin Township, Kachin State.

On 20 August, fighting between the MAF and KIA reportedly continued at the Myitsone Hotel, Winlike Hotel, and GAD office in Bhamo town, Kachin State.

On 20 August, fighting between the AA and MAF reportedly continued in Kyaukpyu Township, Rakhine State, with MAF forces rumoured to have suffered heavy casualties and been forced to retreat.

Tensions remained high in Shan State.

During a 14 August meeting in Lashio, the MNDAA reportedly refused to return Hseni town to the SSPC. There were rumours that the MAF would re-take Hseni town in August, but building construction and public services under the MNDAA have reportedly continued to operate as usual.

On 18 August, the RCSS reportedly accused the SSPC of forcing residents in Southern Shan State's Mongnai, Mongpan, and Kunhing townships to protest against the TNLA and MNDAA, saying it was an attempt to create divisions among ethnic groups.

primaryconcerns

1 UEC Election Announcement

NATIONWIDE

On 20 August, the State Security and Peace Commission's (SSPC) Union Election Commission (UEC) [said](#) that the first phase of its planned elections would begin on 28 December and take place in every state and region of the country. No timeline was reportedly provided for when the election period would end. According to the UEC, first-past-the-post voting will be used for all 330 Pyithu Hluttaw (lower house) seats, 84 of the 110 Amyotha Hluttaw (upper house) seats, and 322 of the 374 state and regional parliament seats. The remaining seats will be elected through proportional representation. The UEC had earlier [said](#) that an election would be held in all 330 townships in Myanmar — which would include those under full control of other actors. However, according to the 20 August announcement, the first phase of the elections will reportedly cover only 102 townships. Most of these townships are under relatively stable SSPC control, though SSPC presence is limited to town centres in some, such as Hakha in Chin State and Kyaukpyu in Rakhine State. Meanwhile, the UEC also reportedly [informed](#) SSPC ministers, deputy ministers, and other officials that they are permitted to engage in party activities ahead of the election, despite such actions — when conducted prior to the official campaign period — being prohibited by the 2008 Constitution. In an 18 August meeting with Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) personnel and families in Magway Region, Min Aung Hlaing [said](#) that the MAF would shift its focus from political matters to defense once elections were completed and a government was elected.

In practice, however, a renewed emphasis on defense already appears to be underway. Local responders told this analytical unit that, just in August, approximately 70,000 people in Sagaing Region and 30,000 people in Myingyan District, Mandalay Region were displaced by MAF raids.

Election escalation


The SSPC's attempt to shift political power from an emergency military regime to an "elected" government is likely to increase armed hostilities, drive a rise in humanitarian needs, and create an increasingly difficult operating environment for responders. There is a heightened prospect of intensified fighting between the MAF and resistance actors as both sides jockey for control ahead of the elections scheduled for December. Resistance groups are highly likely to escalate attacks on SSPC administrations in contested areas, while MAF troops are highly likely to assert their presence — and in doing so commit violence — in those same contested areas. Indeed, new waves of displacement in contested zones have already been reported, as have rumours of restrictions on humanitarian agencies, their workers, and their operations. According to international humanitarian responders who spoke to this analytical unit, the SSPC is beginning to enact stricter controls on cash and healthcare deliveries, tighten visa screenings for foreign staff, and allow MAF personnel to enter the offices of INGOs. These measures point to an increasingly hostile operating environment for humanitarian responders — one that is likely to tighten further in the months leading up to the election.

For more on the SSPC's planned elections and relevant considerations for humanitarian responders in Myanmar, please see [Scenario Plan: Nationwide Elections](#).

Estimated Areas of Control and SSPC Election Townships [Phase-1]

Nationwide

(August, 2025)



Legend

Estimated Status of Administrative and/or Military Control
(As of July 2025)

- Fully MAF Control – No Resistance Control
- Mostly MAF Control – Partial Resistance Control
- Contested Control – Both Active
- Mostly Resistance Control – Partial MAF Control
- Fully Resistance Control – No MAF Control

Townships under SSPC's Election
(Phase-1, 28 Dec 2025)

*In many areas across Myanmar, control is contested or mixed. However, for simplicity of viewing, this map does not show gradations of control or break down control by type.

Disclaimer: This product is designed for information purposes only. This map may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Administrative boundary is indicative only and is provided by MIMU (copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>).

2. Sittwe Reinforcements

SITTWE TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

On 15 August, local media reported that the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) was reinforcing its [defensive positions](#) in Sittwe Township, including near villages along the main road into the township. MAF personnel also reportedly continued to [bulldoze](#) areas on the outskirts of Sittwe town, and establish bunkers and trenches, including near the Satt Yoe Kya bridge, which connects Sittwe town to nearby villages and a marine landing. The MAF has also reportedly planted [landmines](#) near the Sittwe University campus — near Sittwe town — and increased the activity of its [navy](#) vessels surrounding the township. A Rakhine State-based reporter told this analytical unit that the MAF had flown drones and fired artillery at Arakan Army (AA) positions on the Sittwe Township border on a near-daily basis. According to a 19 August local media report, residents of [over 20 villages](#) near the Ponnagyun-Sittwe township border have fled out of concerns about escalating hostilities. The AA has also reportedly directed dozens of villages in neighbouring townships to evacuate, a source told this analytical unit. AA activity in Sittwe Township also appears to be increasing: a local told this analytical unit that around 5,000 AA fighters moved towards the Sittwe Township border in August.

MAF and AA gear up

The MAF's reinforcement of troops into Sittwe and fortification of defensive positions, as well as AA troop movements, are likely to increase civilian suffering in Sittwe and surrounding townships and raise the possibility of an escalation in fighting. The AA has not seriously attempted an assault on Sittwe town since capturing the surrounding townships in 2024, cutting off road access to MAF-controlled Sittwe. However, the potential value of controlling the state capital to the AA's ability to project its power over an "Arakan homeland" suggests that this is likely a goal of the AA. Meanwhile, the MAF has not indicated any intent to forfeit control of its remaining positions in Rakhine State, and nationwide developments such as conscription and elections could push it to attempt to seize more territory, potentially through ground

assaults supported by air and naval power on AA-held areas nearby. People are already bearing the brunt of continued violence and restrictions, including detention by MAF forces (possibly for conscription), long-term displacement, and possible dispossession of property. If fighting escalates, the civilian cost would likely rise immensely as civilians are tightly confined in Sittwe town, meaning it would be difficult for them to escape areas of armed hostilities and more likely be caught in the crossfire. Humanitarian responders will likely continue to face major operational challenges. Sittwe's density, its geography — surrounded on three sides by water and with heavily militarised, allegedly landmine-filled areas — and the obstacles to crossing into neighbouring townships mean many civilians remain effectively trapped. Ongoing displacement is compounding the vulnerability of populations who have often already been displaced since the resumption of conflict in November 2023, lessening their resilience and heightening humanitarian needs.

3. Rohingya Conference

COX'S BAZAR, BANGLADESH

On 24 August, Bangladesh's Office of the High Representative on Rohingya Affairs and Ministry of Foreign Affairs [launched](#) a three-day "Stakeholders' Dialogue" on the Rohingya crisis. Bangladesh Interim Government Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus [attended](#) alongside Rohingya community representatives, diplomats, aid workers, and representatives from Bangladeshi political parties. Over 100 Rohingya in the camps reportedly [shared](#) their perspectives on repatriation and living conditions in Myanmar and Bangladesh. The dialogue was reportedly intended to provide Rohingya communities with a [platform](#) to speak to policymakers, who could hear Rohingya experiences in the refugee camps and in Rakhine State firsthand, and to [serve](#) as preparation for a conference on 30 September to address the Rohingya situation at the United Nations General Assembly in New York. A follow-up "Stakeholders' Dialogue" may

also be held in Qatar in late 2025. According to the Commissioner of the Cox's Bazar Relief and Rohingya Refugee Office, the conference [sought](#) to hear directly from the Rohingya, discuss how repatriation should proceed, and strengthen community morale. The executive director of Refugee Women for Peace and Justice, however, [stressed](#) that solutions must extend beyond repatriation. Without sufficient aid and protection in the camps, she warned, many Rohingya would continue to risk dangerous sea journeys.

At a moment when aid is shrinking and conditions in the camps are worsening, the meeting could also renew international attention to the plight of Rohingya in Cox's Bazar refugee camps and in Rakhine State.

Hope amid shrinking aid

The stakeholder dialogue has likely provided a better opportunity for Rohingya people to share their experiences and expectations directly with Bangladeshi policymakers, and may lead to more awareness among donors and possible aid increases. It is noteworthy that the dialogue facilitated direct engagement between Rohingya and the Bangladeshi government. As the executive director of Refugee Women for Peace and Justice [said](#), "this is the first time in history that Rohingya civilians got to sit in person with the host government of Bangladesh". Direct engagement between Rohingya civilians and Bangladeshi political parties provides an opportunity for Rohingya to better inform Bangladeshi policymakers, for example to stress that repatriation must be safe and dignified. This provides an important counterweight to repeated demonstrations in the camps calling for repatriation, some of which are reportedly [connected](#) to actors with specific agendas. The importance of this type of engagement has also increased since global 2025 funding withdrawal, whereafter the Bangladeshi government may have seen swift repatriation as

the primary objective over considerations of conditions necessary before repatriation. At a moment when aid is shrinking and conditions in the camps are worsening, the meeting could also renew international attention to the plight of Rohingya in Cox's Bazar refugee camps and in Rakhine State. This may help humanitarian agencies explore ways to increase humanitarian assistance from donors to Rohingya in refugee camps and Rakhine State.

4 Fuel Shortages in Myawaddy

MYAWADDY TOWNSHIP, KAREN STATE

On 18 August, [local media](#) reported that fuel prices in Myawaddy town, on the Thai-Myanmar border, had tripled over the previous two weeks. On 14 August, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) reportedly began to [block fuel](#) trucks in Mawlamyine (Mon State) and Hpa-An (Karen State) from heading toward Myawaddy town. By 19 August, local media reported that 10 fuel stations were [closed](#) in Myawaddy town due to the shortages. Myawaddy residents have begun to [travel across](#) the border to the Thai town of Mae Sot to personally purchase fuel before bringing it back across the border to Myawaddy. In February, Thai authorities restricted the [export of fuel](#) to Myawaddy as part of a crack-down on scam operations that operate in the border region. Since then, Myawaddy Township has significantly relied on fuel transported via road from Mawlamyine and Hpa-An, even amid disruptions caused by fighting between the MAF and KNLA on the Asia Highway. Informal Thai-Myanmar border gates in Myawaddy Township controlled by the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army (DKBA) and Karen National Army (KNA — formerly the Karen BGF) reportedly continue to allow the import of goods, including fuel, via river crossings from Thailand. However these informal crossings have not been enough to meet demand for the entire township, and the DKBA and KNA have reportedly levied [high tariffs](#) on fuel imports from Thailand.


Myawaddy squeezed

The MAF's blocking of fuel transport here may be connected to its campaign against the KNLA along the Asia Highway, but prolonged fuel shortages are also likely to impact humanitarian responders and local livelihoods. MAF troops have struggled to retake the portion of the highway between Kawkareik and Myawaddy, but their recent success in retaking the part between Kyondoe and Kawkareik may give way to renewed efforts. If fighting intensifies, this could create further supply bottlenecks in Myawaddy and elsewhere. Even in Kawkareik Township, dependence on fuel transported from Hpa-An and Mawlamyine means that the MAF's restrictions since 14 August could affect prices and availability. Meanwhile, the prolonged closure of the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge No. 2 threatens to further constrain the flow of goods into Karen State, adding pressure to an already fragile livelihood situation. Humanitarian responders who depend on private cars and drivers are likely going to face mounting challenges due to rising fuel prices and rainy season delays pushing up delivery costs and straining aid operations. The combined effects of transport disruption and rising costs is also highly likely to directly affect local livelihoods and humanitarian access in Myawaddy Township.

Meanwhile, the prolonged closure of the Thai-Myanmar Friendship Bridge No. 2 threatens to further constrain the flow of goods into Karen State, adding pressure to an already fragile livelihood situation.

KNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unity typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms "Karen State" and "Karenni State" preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at <https://tinyurl.com/4dtndak>. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at <https://www.khrgh.org/maps>.

5. MAF Retakes Demoso Town

DEMOSO TOWNSHIP, KARENNI STATE

On 20 [August](#), the State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) said that it had regained control of [Demoso](#) town following a weeks-long advance. Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) troops based in Ngwe Taung village, north of the town, began advancing towards Demoso on 4 August, and continuously fired artillery [shells](#) across the township, leaving villagers in the eastern part of Demoso Township trapped. On 10 August, the Karenni Nationalities Defense Force (KNDF) [urged](#) civilians to avoid using the Loikaw–Demoso–Hpruso road due to fighting in and around Demoso town and risks from MAF artillery on civilian areas. Following the capture of Demoso town, MAF troops continued to [advance](#) toward Hpruso town, where they engaged in fighting with Karenni resistance forces.

Following the capture of Demoso town, MAF troops continued to advance toward Hpruso town, where they engaged in fighting with Karenni resistance forces.

Risks to civilians escalate

Civilian safety in rural parts of Demoso Township is likely to deteriorate following the MAF's return to Demoso town, primarily due to increased chance of shelling and raids on surrounding areas. The recapture of Demoso town marks another notable MAF victory, following the capture of Moe Bye in Pekon Township earlier in August. With Karenni resistance forces likely determined to halt advances and MAF troops similarly pushing to build on recent momentum, fighting can be expected to continue at pace. Demoso is located along important road

networks in Karenni State, potentially allowing the MAF to more easily establish supply lines and launch operations on neighbouring townships. Travel on the Demoso–Maw Chee and Mese–Demoso–Loikaw roads will likely remain highly risky, with potential impacts on urgent medical travel and [shortages](#) of commodities in local markets. Accordingly, humanitarian needs in Karenni State — even beyond the approximately [16,000](#) IDPs in western Demoso — can be expected to rise further, and physical access for humanitarian responders in the area is likely to suffer. Continued fighting over control of Hpruso town is also likely to drive humanitarian needs for IDPs in Hpruso Township.

6. MAF and Resistance Fight on Yebyu Roads

YEBYU TOWNSHIP, TANINTHARYI REGION

On 17 August, local media [reported](#) that the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and resistance actors fought several times in August near Kaw Hlaing village and the Ma Lwe Taung checkpoint in Yebyu Township. The Ma Lwe Taung checkpoint is approximately 28 miles north of Kaw Hlaing village on the Ye–Dawei section of the Union Highway 8, near the Tanintharyi Region–Mon State border. Fighting and MAF shelling reportedly [displaced](#) residents of Kaw Hlaing and nearby villages. Fighting also reportedly occurred just south of Kaw Hlaing on the highway, along the road between Kaleinaung and the border post of Nat Eain Taung, which is a transit point along Thai–Myanmar gas pipelines and is still controlled by the MAF. A resistance coalition — including Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and People's Defence Force (PDF) fighters — [reportedly](#) continues to attempt to block MAF movement on the Kaleinaung–Nat Eain Taung road. A spokesperson for the National Unity Government's (NUG) Dawna Battalion 3 reportedly said that fighting is ongoing on the Kaleinaung–Nat Eain Taung road, and resistance actors [advised](#) the public to travel with caution.

Escalation on key roads

The MAF appears to be intensifying efforts to regain control of road networks in Dawei District, driving a new wave of displacement and escalating humanitarian needs in Yebyu Township. Fighting along the Ye–Dawei and Kaleinaung–Nat Eain Taung roads is not unprecedented. Residents of Kaw Hlaing and surrounding villages have already endured displacement due to [earlier](#) hostilities tied to checkpoints and camps. After briefly returning home, they are once again being forced to flee, highlighting a repeated cycle of violence and displacement in this area. Kaw Hlaing village sits on Union Highway 8, a critical north–south artery which also connects to the Thai border. Control of these roads has significant value, particularly towards the Nat Eain Taung camp, which secures parts of the Thai–Myanmar gas pipeline — a revenue source that the MAF may also see as underpinning state legitimacy. For civilians, upticks in fighting and increased likelihoods of MAF punitive measures on the civilian population will likely compound pressure on local aid groups, who are navigating multiple and recurring needs in the region.

The CDF–Matupi split into two factions in December 2023, with CDF–Matupi Brigade 2 joining the Chinland Council and CDF–Matupi Brigade 1 (now MRO) joining the Chin Brotherhood. In early 2024, tension between CDF–Matupi Brigade 2 and the MRO escalated over who should launch operations against the MAF to capture Matupi town. In June 2024, the MRO — alongside Arakan Army (AA) and Chin Brotherhood forces — captured Matupi town, but CDF–Matupi Brigade 2 retained control in parts of rural Matupi Township.

Contested influence in Matupi Township between the MRO and CDF–Matupi Brigade 2 means that efforts by one group to increase troop strength — and ultimately control — in the township directly impact the other group.

Concern drives displacement and fear of fighting

Alleged forced recruitment by Chin resistance actors has created serious tension among local communities and could drive displacement of youths, and possibly hostilities between Chin factions. It is important to note that other groups have also reportedly engaged in forced recruitment practices in southern Chin State, including the AA in Paletwa Township. However, reports of forced recruitment by the MRO are particularly concerning due to the large presence of a rival Chin faction in the same township. Contested influence in Matupi Township between the MRO and CDF–Matupi Brigade 2 means that efforts by one group to increase troop strength — and ultimately control — in the township directly impact the other group. Tensions between the two could also affect ongoing efforts to improve relations between the Chinland Council and Chin Brotherhood, which have repeatedly been plagued by both local and state-level disputes.

Locals Protest CDF Recruitment

MATUPI TOWNSHIP, CHIN STATE

On 22 August, residents of Thlangpang village in Matupi Township reportedly [protested](#) the forced [recruitment](#) of civilians between the ages of 16–40 by the Matupi Revolutionary Organization (MRO) — formerly Chinland Defence Force (CDF)–Matupi Brigade 1. On 24 August, the Matupi Administrative Area 3 — associated with CDF–Matupi Brigade 2 — [issued](#) a statement condemning the MRO’s forced recruitment in areas where CDF–Matupi Brigade 2 operates and vowing to resist the practice. The next day, CDF–Matupi Brigade 2 [accused](#) the MRO of detaining children and teachers.

The persistence of forced recruitment in southern Chin State — even after the withdrawal of the MAF — will likely be closely monitored by local responders, given the likelihood of increased displacement and the potential intensification of intra-Chin tensions.

8 MAF Airstrikes on Mogoke

MOGOKE TOWNSHIP, MANDALAY REGION

On 14 August, the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) reportedly **bombed** a monastery sheltering IDPs in eastern Mogoke Township, Mandalay Region, **killing** 21 civilians (16 women, 5 men), injuring seven, and destroying 15 houses. On 17 August, MAF aircraft reportedly dropped two more **bombs**, **killing** a child and two other people. These airstrikes came amid **repeated deadly** MAF **attacks** in Mogoke Township, which was **captured** by the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) and aligned People's Defence Forces (PDFs) in 2024. On 14 August, TNLA spokesperson Lway Yay Oo **told** the media that the MAF is deliberately targeting civilians as a means of pressuring the TNLA, and that the MAF had carried out six airstrikes on residential areas in Mogoke in July, killing and injuring numerous civilians, including children and monks, and destroying nearly 50 homes and buildings. On 18 August, Mogoke town residents **told** local media that people were fleeing in fear due to the MAF's frequent airstrikes.

Ruby red skies

The MAF's relentless airstrikes are likely to raise humanitarian needs in the short term, and they suggest that a campaign to retake the area — further driving needs — could be imminent. In 2024, the TNLA's gains in Northern Shan State appeared to also drive MAF losses in northern Mandalay Region, where both the TNLA and aligned PDFs seized territory: the TNLA in Mogoke Township; and PDFs in Thabeikkyin, Singu, and Madaya townships. In 2025, the MAF has clawed back territory in both areas: in Northern Shan's Nawnghkio Township, to the south of Mogoke; and in Mandalay's Thabeikkyin Township, to the west of Mogoke. As the MAF continues fighting to retake territory in the area, it is likely to have its eyes set on Mogoke, a valuable possession famed for its lucrative ruby mines — which are likely to be currently providing the TNLA with revenue, and which could be providing the MAF with revenue if it were to retake the area. Its airstrikes also suggest that a ground offensive may be forthcoming; this pattern of airstrikes paving the way for troop movement has been seen repeatedly since the coup, including recently in Nawnghkio Township and now onward toward Kyaukme Township. Accordingly, the death and destruction caused by the recent MAF airstrikes may only be a precursor to heavier violence in Mogoke Township that drives displacement and needs, and which — as a consequence of the violence on multiple sides of the township — leaves civilians without safe places to go.

As the MAF continues fighting to retake territory in the area, it is likely to have its eyes set on Mogoke, a valuable possession famed for its lucrative ruby mines.

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*
**Humanitarian
Responders**

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