

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

# Humanitarian Responders

## in**focus**

NAWNGHKIO, KYAUKME, AND HSIPAW  
TOWNSHIPS, NORTHERN SHAN STATE

SSPC Tightens Grip  
on Nawnghkio,  
Attacks up the Road

W31-33 | 2025

31  
13

JULY

AUGUST

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in**focus**

# SSPC Tightens Grip on Nawngkhio, Attacks up the Road

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**NAWNGHKIO, KYAUKME, AND HSIPAW TOWNSHIPS, NORTHERN SHAN STATE**

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Since re-capturing Nawngkhio town from the Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) on 17 [July](#), the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) has reportedly increased restrictions in the town while continuing to bomb TNLA-held Kyaukme and Hsipaw towns to the east. On 8 August, [local media](#) reported that the MAF was only allowing people with Myanmar identification cards showing residence in Shan State (card numbers beginning with 13/xxxx) to return to Nawngkhio town, [refusing](#) entry to former Nawngkhio residents with ID cards from outside Shan State. Within the town, the MAF has also reportedly detained over 30 people accused of supporting the TNLA or People's Defence Forces (PDFs). There have also been [reports that](#) the MAF sealed off the town's only mosque, citing "unauthorized renovations", and detained a religious leader and mosque caretaker there. Communications systems are still limited to 2G in Nawngkhio town, and internet is inaccessible to most people in Nawngkhio, Kyaukme and Hsipaw townships, according to a source who spoke to this analytical unit.

Meanwhile, the MAF continued to conduct airstrikes farther up the Mandalay-Muse highway, in [Kyaukme](#) and [Hsipaw](#) towns, at least as recently as 9 August. Increasing numbers of Kyaukme and Hsipaw town residents have reportedly fled, including to Shan State Progress Party (SSPP)-controlled Namlan village and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA)-controlled Kone Tha village, both in Hsipaw Township, and to Lashio town

farther east on the highway. One local told this analytical unit that approximately two-thirds of Hsipaw and Kyaukme residents had been displaced.

## No return to normal for Nawngkhio

The MAF's return to Nawngkhio town has heightened risks for civilians, including risks of detention, violence, and introduced severe restrictions on movement. While some residents may view the recapture as a source of stability due to reduced risk of MAF airstrikes, strict movement controls will likely threaten access to markets and essential services like healthcare and education, impacting economic activity. Individuals previously involved in TNLA public services or local administration in the town — especially those linked to the CDM movement — are particularly vulnerable, given the MAF's [targeting](#) of similar populations elsewhere since the coup. Meanwhile, there are continued challenges to humanitarian response: local responders in Nawng Ping — who have resources to support IDPs — are unable to reach Kyaukme and Nawngkhio towns due to road damage, ongoing fighting, and MAF restrictions according to a local who spoke to this analytical unit; and limited internet connectivity will also likely further hamper local responders, compounding the impact of any rise in humanitarian needs. The situation in Nawngkhio also likely provides a window into the potential situation in Kyaukme and Hsipaw towns if the MAF re-captures them, underscoring the potential for continued civilian hardships.


### Outlook bleak in Kyaukme and Hsipaw

For civilians in Kyaukme and Hsipaw townships, the threat of MAF airstrikes will likely continue to drive security concerns, prolong existing displacement, and trigger further displacement. Ongoing MAF airstrikes on monasteries — common shelters for IDPs — and health clinics (as on 3 August in [Kyaukme](#)) are likely to intensify fears and cause displacement. This can be expected to increase humanitarian needs, as can recent weather: heavy [rain-fall and flooding](#) in Kyaukme Township on 6 August reportedly caused a lake near the Luk Par village monastery to flood onto main roads, [damaging](#) houses and hundreds of acres of corn and sugarcane fields. Humanitarian needs have remained high in both townships since late 2023, when Operation 1027 began, and they may further increase if fighting escalates in the coming months. Recent airstrikes are likely part of MAF efforts to put pressure on the TNLA and thereby regain control of the Mandalay–Muse highway, although the TNLA has [expressed](#) resistance to handing back control. The two sides are [scheduled](#) for Chinese-mediated talks in late August in Kunming, Yunnan Province, but both sides would likely want to strengthen their positions ahead of the negotiations — regardless of whether or not they intend to reach an agreement. The outlook for Kyaukme and Hsipaw townships is particularly concerning as the MAF appears determined to secure the strategic Muse–Mandalay highway that would give it access to the Chinese border. With [boosted](#) confidence from its recapture of Nawngkhio town, the MAF may feel it has the momentum to retake TNLA-held towns before the negotiations and without concessions, suggesting continued hostilities, more displacement, and corresponding rise in humanitarian needs.

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# Airstrikes and Other Key Security Incidents

## Northern Shan State

[1 Jan - 13 August, 2025]



### Legend

#### Security Incidents [1 Jan - 9 Aug 2025]

- ◆ Airstrike/drone attack
- Clash/shelling

- Areas controlled by ethnic armed organisations and/or resistance forces
- Areas controlled by MAF troops

#### Battalion Base Control Status

- ★ MAF
- ★ EAO/resistance forces
- ★ Unknown

#### Town Control Status

- ★ MAF
- ★ MAF [recaptured]
- ★ EAO/resistance forces

- Kyaukpyu - Kuming oil and gas pipeline
- +++++ Railway
- ==== Main road
- ==== Secondary road
- ==== Other minor road
- Township boundary
- State and region boundary

The term "control" in this infographic refers to administrative and/or military domains, with varying degrees of control, ranging from partial to complete.

The information on this graphic is from various open sources including social media such as Facebook. The information should not be considered comprehensive.

Disclaimer: This product is designed for information purposes only. This map may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Administrative boundary is indicative only and is provided by MIMU (copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>).

# trendlines

## HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK

TWO-WEEK TREND  
**0.35%**


## TWO-WEEK NUMBER

**16** NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)  
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 12 AUGUST 2025


TOTAL DAMAGE  
**90,510**

### TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



### ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION

with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



### trendwatch

EA0 and PDFs continued fighting with MAF and aligned forces.

On 4 August, KIA-led forces reportedly retook a camp near Sharaw Hka village in Hpakant Township, Kachin State.

On 5 August, the Shan Nationalities Army (SNA) reportedly fought against the Kachin PDF in Mogaung Township, Kachin State.

On 6 August, the Natogyi PDF reportedly ambushed an MAF truck travelling to Pyin Si village in Mandalay Region, killing three soldiers.

On 9 August, resistance forces reportedly attacked MAF troops near Ta Tan Ku village on the Kawkareik-Myawaddy Road in Karen State, killing 10 soldiers.

On 9 August, the MAF reportedly fought resistance groups near Yan Nyein Aung and Nan Montar villages in Tamu Township, Sagaing Region.

On 10 August, PDFs reportedly attacked an MAF outpost in Myaing town, Magway Region, killing four MAF soldiers and capturing three.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND  
1.00%


TWO-WEEK NUMBER  
132 NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES (NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 12 AUGUST 2025


TOTAL  
13,313

Civilian Civilian (Alleged Informer) Civilian (Other)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON  
..... [Q1 2021 – Q2 2025]



NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION



trendwatch (cont.)

Amid continued tensions in Northern Shan State, on 31 July, the TNLA reportedly closed travel on the Union Highway between Namhkam town and Muse Township.

The MAF air force and navy stepped up attacks on EAO-controlled territories.

On 2 August, MAF navy shelling on Thandwe town, Rakhine State, reportedly damaged one home.

On 4 August, MAF airstrikes on a school in Hpasawng Township, Karenni State, reportedly injured three children.

On 4 August, MAF airstrikes on a former police station in Ma-Ei town in Toungup Township, Rakhine State, reportedly damaged buildings.

On 10 August, MAF airstrikes on the KNU Hpa-An District headquarters in Hlaingbwe Township, Karen State, reportedly injured one person and damaged houses, vehicles, and a hospital.

## CIVILIAN FACILITIES DAMAGES AND ATTACKS

TWO-WEEK TREND

1.13%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER

15

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)  
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 12 AUGUST 2025

Health Facility:  
260Education Facility:  
452Religious Facility:  
636

TOTAL DAMAGE

1,348

■ Aerial   ■ Shelling   ■ EDA


### IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks,  
and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



### IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and  
Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



### trendwatch (cont.)

Medicine shortages and hunger  
affected civilians in Rakhine State.

On 2 August, local media reported  
that lack of income was causing  
some Gwa Township residents to  
reduce their daily rice consumption.

On 5 August, local media reported  
that medicine prices in AA-controlled  
parts of Rakhine State had increased  
by 50 per cent or more due to  
transport delays during the rainy  
season and restrictions at MAF  
checkpoints.

Heavy monsoon rains caused  
flooding and landslides in Kachin,  
Shan, and Karen states.

On 7 August, heavy rain caused  
flooding in Kyethi Township.

From 6-8 August, heavy rain caused  
flooding in Mongshu Township,  
submerging markets, shelters, and  
rice paddies.



# primaryconcerns

## 1 Suicides in Sittwe

### SITTWE TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

On 4 August, two unrelated individuals reportedly died by [suicide](#) in Ywargyi North ward, Sittwe town, due to financial hardship and hunger. One victim, a woman displaced from rural Sittwe Township, took her own life while sheltering at Mingala Nyunt monastery after reportedly becoming depressed over severe economic distress and livelihood challenges. The other victim, a male head of household, also died by [suicide](#), with local residents citing lack of income, hunger, and the inability to provide for his family. On 7 August, [local media](#) reported that around two-thirds of people in Sittwe town were experiencing severe difficulties obtaining food and basic necessities. The Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) has shut down civilian entry to and exit from the town, reducing the availability of goods and curtailing work opportunities as economic activity slows down. Although cargo ships and flights from Yangon continue to arrive at Sittwe's ports and airport, the supplies they bring are reportedly reserved primarily for MAF personnel, relatives, and associates. A Rakhine local estimated to this analytical unit that more than 20 people have died by suicide in Sittwe in 2025 due to hunger and financial hardship, and suggested that many additional cases have likely gone unreported. The most recent high-profile case occurred on 29 June, when the head of a household reportedly died by suicide and killed his family of five [in Mingan ward](#), also due to financial distress and hunger.

### Trapped and starving

The collapse in economic activity in Sittwe has left low-income communities — especially IDPs forced from rural areas by the MAF — at heightened risk of hunger and severe psychosocial strain. This forced relocation, and MAF prohibitions on civilian movement across the township's borders, have come amid what appear to be continued MAF efforts to prevent AA attacks in Sittwe town. As noted in a previous [Fortnightly Update](#), food insecurity is widespread across Rakhine due to State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) blockades on trade from the rest of Myanmar as well as electricity cuts and internet shutdowns. However, Sittwe town's situation is particularly severe as it is cut off from other areas by road, rendering it more tightly constricted (and heavily fortified) and effectively trapping civilians. This has effectively constricted all types of economic activity dependent on the free flow of goods and services — from traders, sellers, and casual labourers — triggering knock-on effects throughout the local economy. A Sittwe resident, now in Yangon, told this analytical unit that many IDPs unable to earn income are increasingly reliant on sporadic food aid, with some resorting to begging or sex work to survive. Other people may feel they have no choice but to take their own lives. In any case, the continued inability of residents to leave, combined with ongoing blockades, suggests that malnutrition and psychological distress may deepen without urgent improvements to food access and livelihoods.

## 2. AA Operations against ARSA

### MAUNGDAW TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

On 11 August, residents near the Rakhine State–Bangladesh border reportedly [heard intense gunfire](#) coming from Arakan Army (AA) camps near Taungpyoletwea village tract in Maungdaw Township, with local media saying that the gunfire may have been fighting between the AA and Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). On 6 August, local media [reported](#) that AA troops had been conducting operations to stem ARSA activity in the hilly terrain of northern Maungdaw Township since late July, when there were multiple reported incidents involving ARSA there: around 40 ARSA personnel reportedly [moved](#) from Bangladesh into Rakhine State, where one was said to have been injured by explosive ordnance; and on 27 July, AA forces reportedly [dismantled](#) an ARSA camp near Mee Taik village, killing two ARSA personnel and detaining another. The AA has so far not issued a statement regarding its latest operations against ARSA in northern Rakhine State. Local Rohingya from Maungdaw Township told this analytical unit that nobody they knew had witnessed AA troop movements.

### Fighting threatens fragile stability

The activity of ARSA or other Rohingya armed actors in northern Rakhine State, and the AA's efforts to prevent such activity, increase the risk of Rohingya civilians being affected by violence and further AA restrictions. Since late 2024, when the AA removed the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) from northern Rakhine State, there has not been significant activity from Rohingya armed actors. However, recent statements around [unification](#) of Rohingya armed actors, and ARSA announcements of its [intention to fight](#), suggest that this could change. If Rohingya armed actors mobilising in Cox's Bazar enter Rakhine State to fight against the AA, Rohingya people in Rakhine State — particularly in Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships — could be gravely impacted. Rohingya armed actors themselves have inflicted violence on Rohingya communities, and their presence — or even the AA's perception that they are

present — is likely to result in AA abuses against these same communities. Furthermore, the AA's belief that Rohingya armed actors are present could prompt it to impose further restrictions on Rohingya communities, further damaging their ability to travel, earn income, seek medical care, and even receive humanitarian support. The humanitarian response will likely have to closely monitor developments in fighting and AA sentiment, address threats to social cohesion, and mitigate the potential for escalations in violence against Rohingya civilians.

## 3. Junta Rebrand and Election Law

### NATIONWIDE

On 31 July, the State Administration Council (SAC) was dissolved and [replaced](#) with a new ten-member State Security and Peace Commission (SSPC) to serve as the “interim government” until elections are held. This followed a sweep of announcements from the SAC and SSPC, including on the SAC [enactment](#) of a “Law on Protection of Multiparty Democracy General Election from Obstruction, Disruption and Destruction”, or ‘Election Protection Law’. The legislation introduced penalties for interference with, or violence against, officials preparing for the election — currently slated for late 2025 — as well as other electoral provisions and expanded powers for local authorities. The newly arranged SSPC also updated its [martial law](#) designations, bringing the total to 63 townships under martial law, ostensibly for “law enforcement and stability” ahead of the election. Human rights activists told this analytical unit that the ‘Election Protection Law’ will primarily be used to censor and detain civilians opposed to the late 2025 planned elections — a large proportion of the public. On 9 August, the New Ramonya Federal Force — a coalition of Mon resistance actors — [said](#) it and allied forces had called on political parties to refuse cooperation with what they described as a fraudulent election.

## Escalating risk before polls

The recent actions from the SAC and SSPC appear designed to facilitate a political transition, but they can be expected to negatively impact civilian security in the lead-up to the planned election. Implementation of the ‘Election Protection Law’ poses a significant threat to civilian safety in townships where the SSPC appears intent on holding an election, where the SSPC may use it as yet another pretext for punishing its detractors. The new ‘Election Protection Law’ also closely mirrors a [1996 law](#) enacted by the previous Myanmar military regime that was used to detain and sentence political prisoners and activists who opposed or criticised the national assembly. Given the institutional continuity between the previous military regime and the current one, it is highly likely SSPC’s ‘Election Protection Law’ will be used to justify detentions of civilians in townships under its control, which could deepen civilian suffering and constrain people’s ability to seek or receive humanitarian assistance. Meanwhile, the martial law designations — in many cases merely [extensions](#) — highlight the prospect of increased fighting as the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and resistance actors jockey for control ahead of the elections scheduled for December. Indeed, the updated list of townships seems to reflect areas where the MAF has lost influence — for example, most of Rakhine State is now under martial law. At the same time, resistance groups are highly likely to intensify attacks on SSPC administrations in contested areas as election plans advance, raising the risk that escalating violence will further drive humanitarian needs.

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Implementation of the ‘Election Protection Law’ poses a significant threat to civilian safety in townships where the SSPC appears intent on holding an election, where the SSPC may use it as yet another pretext for punishing its detractors.

## 4 Flooding in Laiza

### MOMAUK AND WAINGMAW TOWNSHIPS, KACHIN STATE

On the early morning of 4 August, heavy rainfall reportedly caused [flooding](#) on the Mung Lai Hkyet River near Laiza, home of the Kachin Independence Organisation/Army (KIO/KIA) headquarters on the Kachin State-China border, reportedly submerging villages and IDP camps. A KIO spokesperson [said](#) that a bridge across the river — used to reach IDP camps from Laiza — was destroyed. Power lines were also reportedly damaged, leaving some areas without electricity. On 5 August, the KIO said that flash floods in Laiza had caused the [deaths of six people](#), damaged up to 460 houses — including IDP camp shelters — and seven bridges, and affected around [30 acres](#) of farmland. IDPs appeared to be affected most significantly, as many had resided in temporary shelters vulnerable to heavy rains and in camps closer to waterways. Over [5,000](#) people have reportedly been impacted by the floods. Health-related issues are also reportedly [on the rise](#), with cases of fever and vomiting increasing and local responders without enough medicine supplies.

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IDPs appeared to be affected most significantly, as many had resided in temporary shelters vulnerable to heavy rains and in camps closer to waterways.

### Trade routes severed

The recent flooding near Laiza is likely to hurt residents’ access to goods and services. Though it appears to have most severely affected IDPs, all residents now face increased isolation due to flood damage to infrastructure and Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) checkpoint restrictions, leaving them vulnerable to shortages and heightened needs. This is particularly so because of MAF checkpoints in eastern Kachin State, particularly near Myitkyina town, where

it can disrupt trade to KIO-controlled areas such as Laiza. Stricter MAF checkpoint restrictions since 2024 — when the KIA made sweeping territorial gains — have already hampered the flow of goods into KIO territory from Myitkyina. Moreover, damage to hospitals and clinics will further strain civilians' access to healthcare during the monsoon season, when illnesses like malaria and dengue are typically at their peak. For the humanitarian response, the speed at which electricity is restored and infrastructure such as bridges is rebuilt will also be crucial for both IDPs and residents. Moreover, local responders are also likely already stretched thin due to ongoing fighting and displacement in Bhamo town, limiting their capacity to address needs in Laiza.


## 5 Landslides in Northern Karen State

### THANDAUNGGYI TOWNSHIP, KAREN STATE

Since 4 August, heavy rainfall has reportedly caused flooding and landslides in Thandaunggyi Township, including in [Thadaunggyi town](#). On 6 August, local media reported that heavy rainfall caused the [Taung Kya](#) river to overflow and triggered landslides, disrupting travel on the Taungoo–Thandaunggyi road (between East Bago Region and Karen State), which was also partially damaged during the March 2025 earthquakes. On 10 August, [local media reported](#) that flooding and landslides had killed at least 13 people in the township, and that several others were still missing. Around [1,000 acres](#) of farmland was reportedly destroyed, and 50 villages were affected. Residents of at least five villages reportedly needed to [relocate](#) to Thandaunggyi town, enduring a day-long trek due to [damage](#) to roads and bridges, and needing to leave some vulnerable people behind. Response activities were led by local community church and parahita groups. A social media post raised concerns by local [elders](#) that this year's rainfall caused some of the most severe landslides in living memory.

### KNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unity typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms “Karen State” and “Karenni State” preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at <https://tinyurl.com/4dtnfdak>. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at <https://www.khrg.org/maps>.

These hostilities have repeatedly forced closures along parts of the Taungoo–Thandaung–Leik Tho road toward Karenni State, while the MAF has continued to block medicine and other essential supplies being transported farther along the same route.

### Flood hits harvest and infrastructure

Damage, ongoing fighting, and Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) restrictions are set to complicate short-term recovery efforts and undermine long-term livelihoods. The damage to the Taungoo–Thandaunggyi road will likely delay aid deliveries and disrupt recovery efforts, due to the township's former reliance on import of some goods from Bago Region. Thandaunggyi Township borders parts of East Bago Region, Karenni State, and Southern Shan State, but there is currently fighting in all of these areas, posing barriers to the transportation of goods. These hostilities have repeatedly forced closures along parts of the [Taungoo–Thandaung–Leik Tho](#) road toward Karenni State, while the MAF has continued to block medicine and other essential supplies being transported farther along the same route. Floods and landslides have destroyed acres of farmland — reportedly dominated by cardamom crops — just weeks before the September harvest, making it unlikely that affected farmers will recover their losses. The combination of infrastructure damage, trade restrictions, and harvest setbacks will likely hinder both immediate humanitarian operations and possibly long-term recovery. If reduced economic activity persists into the next harvest season, this could potentially alter the focus of humanitarian response activities in the area.s step up attacks against the SAC's re-established bases on the Dawei–Htee Khee road, civilian casualties and displacement could increase.

## 6. Myeik-Palaw Road Closure

### MYEIK DISTRICT, TANINTHARYI REGION

On 31 July, local media reported that [fighting](#) on the [Myeik–Palaw](#) section of National Highway 8 had effectively closed this road and driven up prices in Myeik District. On 25 July, traffic on the road began to slow down due to renewed fighting between the Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) and People's Defense Forces (PDFs), according to a [statement](#) from Myeik District PDF Battalion 1. Civilians who wish to bypass the road closure reportedly travel down the coast on speedboats but pay fares [eight times](#) what they would for a bus between Myeik and Palaw. Likewise, traders are reportedly using coastal waterway transport from Palaw to Myeik towns to move food, medicine, and other goods — a shift that is contributing to increased prices due to the higher cost of this mode of transport. Since the closure of the Myeik–Palaw road, prices have reportedly risen sharply in Myeik town, with the cost of eggs doubling and some costs tripling. Meanwhile, cases of [malaria](#) in the forested parts of east Myeik District are increasing according to some reports, particularly in IDP sites where health workers rarely have access to enough malaria test kits or medication. Moreover, local media estimated that 20 [civilians](#) were killed and 16 injured in Myeik Township during 24–26 July from MAF airstrikes, artillery, and drone attacks.

Traders are reportedly using coastal waterway transport from Palaw to Myeik towns to move food, medicine, and other goods — a shift that is contributing to increased prices due to the higher cost.



## Price hikes

If fighting continues on the Myeik–Palaw road, it will likely drive further price increases and possible shortages of goods, with displaced and ill people among the most vulnerable. Myeik town serves as a key transit hub; goods sent to Tanintharyi and Bokpyin townships are often transported to Myeik via the National Highway 8. In Tanintharyi Township — located east of Myeik on the Thai–Myanmar border — a large IDP population and significant PDF influence have already prompted the MAF to impose restrictions on goods, including medicine, at its checkpoints. These restrictions push up the costs of transporting malaria medication — common here during the monsoon season — to IDP sites via secondary dirt roads and other informal channels. Ongoing trade disruptions on the Myeik–Palaw road are likely to further push up costs and reduce the availability of medicines and malaria prevention materials in Myeik District. This risk is compounded by existing cross-border import restrictions from Thai authorities and continued fighting along the Tanintharyi–Mawtaung road, the main route linking Tanintharyi Township with the Thai border.

main Mandalay–Shwebo highway. At the same time, the MAF has reportedly been restricting the transport of goods, including medicine and sanitary items, via road from Mandalay city to resistance strongholds in Sagaing Region. Local traders and truck drivers told this analytical unit that the flow of all goods has recently stopped, with cargo trucks parked and unable to move as MAF personnel increase inspections at the Swe Taw checkpoint — a truck terminal near Mandalay city. The same sources added that MAF may soon completely close off the flow of goods and other essential items to Sagaing Region, and Chin and Kachin states.

## Supply lines strained

Continued MAF raids and airstrikes along roads through Sagaing Township, along with restrictions on goods from Mandalay city, could impact the affordability and availability of goods in both Sagaing Region and Kachin State. Much of upper Myanmar depends heavily on Mandalay city’s markets for certain goods, such as medicine and fertilizer, whether locally produced or imported. The Mandalay–Shwebo highway and the Sagaing–Shein Ma Kar road serve as key northbound routes, meaning that their disruption, including by People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) who regularly attack MAF convoys, could seriously impact the flow of goods. Meanwhile, Highway 31 — running through northern Mandalay Region on the eastern banks of the Irrawaddy River — is also facing severe disruption due to intense fighting between the Mandalay PDF and MAF. While these are not the first such disruptions since the coup, the current escalation in restrictions likely compounds existing vulnerabilities, particularly for IDPs in Sagaing Township, many of whom are still contending with the impacts of the March earthquakes, ongoing hostilities, and persistent threats of MAF violence. For local responders, this means navigating rising humanitarian needs amid dwindling resources. For the international community, it signals an urgent need for sustained monitoring and support to prevent deepening instability and humanitarian deterioration in the region.

# 7 Sagaing–Shwebo Road Disruption

## SAGAING TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION

On 11 August, Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) airstrikes near Taung Yin and Pa Du villages on the Sagaing–Shein Ma Kar road (“strategic road” in Burmese language), on the western bank of the Irrawaddy River, reportedly killed at least 16 people, injured several others, and destroyed several vehicles, including a tanker truck. The aerial attacks followed raids, on 6–8 August, during which MAF troops torched hundreds of houses in villages between MAF-controlled Sadaung and Ohntaw towns on the

## 8 MAF Detains Youths in Hakha

### HAKHA TOWN, CHIN STATE

On 3 August, Myanmar Armed Forces (MAF) troops reportedly [detained](#) 40 youths in Hakha town who were returning from Hakha Baptist Church — though they allegedly [released](#) eight the following day. On 10 August, MAF troops reportedly [detained](#) 10 more church-going youths, including several under 18 years old. A local told this analytical unit that the MAF's detention of youths is likely linked to an increased number of attacks on MAF personnel. On 3 August, the Chin Defence Force (CDF)-Hakha reportedly [ambushed MAF](#) vehicles in the town, after which MAF artillery shelling injured three civilians in the town. On 7 August, the CDF-Hakha reportedly attacked an MAF vehicle, [killing](#) a police officer. Although Hakha Township was removed from martial law under the State Security and Peace Commission's (SSPC) 31 July announcement, a source told this analytical unit that concerns rose among local residents and IDPs in Hakha town following the recent MAF detentions, with youths refraining from walking around the town during the day-time. A local also told this analytical unit that at least 3,000 IDPs — the majority of whom are ethnic Chin — are sheltering in Hakha town, with most living in rented accommodation or community halls.

### Mounting civilian concerns

MAF detentions of Chin youths — possibly spurred by attacks by Chin resistance actors — raise safety concerns for people in Hakha town, including IDPs sheltering there. As long as the MAF retains a foothold in Hakha, the capital of Chin State and the linchpin for SSPC's claim of control of the state, it is both able and likely to detain (and possibly perpetrate other abuses against) those it suspects of resistance affiliation. This poses particularly high risks for male

youths, who across Myanmar are often perceived as more likely to be affiliated with armed actors. In Hakha, IDPs may also face heightened risk, as they may be more readily labelled “outsiders” and linked to resistance strongholds outside of the town. Their presence could also increase the likelihood of residents being targeted for alleged association with, or support to, the IDPs. These risks to civilians can be expected to persist as the SSPC's planned elections draw nearer, as Chin resistance groups aim to disrupt preparations for the SSPC's planned December election by showing that SSPC/MAF personnel do not have the ability to move freely in the area. Though MAF detentions may present the primary threat to civilian safety, humanitarian responders will likely also have to navigate possible restrictions on free movement by other actors, such as a [recent diktat](#) from the CDF-Hakha Central Council (the administrative wing of CDF-Hakha) that youths must remain in Hakha Township and participate in armed training.

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**FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE** *for*  
**Humanitarian  
Responders**

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