

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

Humanitarian Responders

in**focus**

SAGAING TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION

SAC Airstrike Hits
IDPs in Monastery

W27-29 | 2025

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in**focus**

SAC Airstrike Hits IDPs in Monastery

SAGAING TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION

In the early morning of 11 July, State Administration Council (SAC) [airstrikes](#) reportedly struck a monastery in Lin Ta Lu village in Sagaing Township, killing around 30 IDPs and injuring 50 more. IDPs from Kyaw Zeya, Bagan Tu, and Yin Ma Gyin villages had been sheltering in the monastery since [15 June](#) due to fighting along the Shwebo-Mandalay road between the SAC and People's Defence Forces (PDFs). Fighting began to [intensify](#) in the township in April, blocking a section of the road; PDFs temporarily halted traffic near Sar Taung town and SAC forces imposed restrictions at Yone Pin Kan village. However, [since](#) the 11 July airstrike, SAC forces have shifted from inspections to a total ban on travel on this key road through the township. A Lin Ta Lu village resident [said](#) that villagers "cannot move the injured to Mandalay city or Sagaing town due to the military [SAC] outpost in Ohn Taw", a village at a road junction approximately eight miles from Lin Ta Lu. Sagaing Township locals told this analytical unit that medical treatment of Lin Ta Lu monastery airstrike victims could only be carried out overnight by local midwives and community health workers due to the presence of SAC ground troops and threat of further airstrikes.

Medical shortages exposed

The Lin Ta Lu village airstrike highlighted, yet again, the difficulties accessing healthcare and medical supplies for civilians — even those within 35 miles of the second largest city in the country. Although the severity of the human toll may be due in part to the hour of attack, when many people were likely sleeping, people's inability to receive timely (and adequate) medical care is likely to have allowed injuries to worsen or become fatal. Local responders' access to the area is limited by SAC restrictions on main roads and by fighting on secondary roads in the township. The disruptions to road transport also effectively prevent civilians — including those injured by violence or otherwise — from reaching health facilities when they need them most. Moreover, unlike some intermittent disruptions to roadways since the coup, the blockade on movement via SAC-controlled roads in Sagaing Township since early June has impacted the availability of goods, including medicine. This is particularly noteworthy given the township's proximity to the market hub of Mandalay and position along the Mandalay-Shwebo road; instability and shortages here could have broader implications for humanitarian access and market dynamics across parts of northwest Myanmar farther from Mandalay.

Kicking people already down


The Lin Ta Lu airstrike's high casualty underscores the threat to IDPs' safety and increased hardship in areas affected by the 28 March earthquake. While previous SAC airstrikes — including one in Pazigyí village that reportedly killed 170 civilians — have impacted large numbers of civilians in Sagaing Region, this one of the few aerial attacks to have hit a displacement site in central Myanmar since the coup. Sagaing Township was also the epicentre of the 28 March earthquake, which left many people in the township without shelter or reliable water sources. Since the earthquake, resiliency to further crises has reportedly declined significantly, and SAC raids, airstrikes, and arson have further increased displacement. Intense fighting, SAC restrictions, and a volatile landscape also predictably hinder local responders' ability to reach affected populations and put further stress on civilian populations; a day before the strike in Lin Ta Lu, SAC forces had reportedly stopped vehicles on the Sagaing Bridge and detained at least 30 young men there. Moreover, the fear of further SAC airstrikes may drive IDPs to avoid crowded locations and thus create additional challenges for humanitarian responders. For example, IDPs may flee to forested areas where malaria and waterborne diseases are more present, or other areas more isolated from medical facilities. Greater dispersal of IDPs would also make data collection and support more difficult.

Since the earthquake, resiliency to further crises has reportedly declined significantly, and SAC raids, airstrikes, and arson have further increased displacement.

Ongoing Violence in Sagaing Township

Sagaing Township, Sagaing Region


[1 Jan - 15 July, 2025]



Legend

- ◆ Airstrike/Drone Attack/UAV Attack
- Clash/Shelling
- Arrest/Detention/Abuction/Kidnapping
- Town
- Village
- ★ Armored Operations Command [AOC]
- ★ Light Infantry Battalion [LIB], Tank Battalion [TB]
- Main road
- Secondary road
- Other minor road
- +++++ Railway
- Major river/inland water boundary
- Township boundary

Earthquakes [28 Mar to 15 July]



Disclaimer: This product is designed for information purposes only. This map may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Administrative boundary is indicative only and is provided by MIMU [copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>].

trendlines

HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK

TWO-WEEK TREND

0.32%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER

22


NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 15 JULY 2025

TOTAL DAMAGE


89,871

TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION

with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



trendwatch

SAC airstrikes and drones hit civilians in displacement sites and residential areas.

On 4 and 7 July, the SAC reportedly bombed the Kamma-Yaepyar road in Pauk Township, Magway Region, displacing 3,000 civilians.

On 4 July, SAC airstrikes reportedly hit Thiri Mon village, on the Shwebo-Myitkyina road in Sagaing Region's Khunhla Township, killing at least two people and injuring 11 others.

On 4 July, SAC bombs reportedly killed two civilians and injured others in Myebon Township, and destroyed a school and damaged homes in Ann town (in Ann Township), both in Rakhine State.

On 5 July, SAC drones reportedly killed six IDPs at a school in Kyaukkyi Township, Eastern Bago Region.

SAC bombs in Maw Chee village tract, in Karenni State's Hpasawng Township, on 9 and 14 July, reportedly killed 11 civilians and injured at least 16 others.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND
0.76%


TWO-WEEK NUMBER
98
NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
(NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 15 JULY 2025


TOTAL
13,011

Civilian Civilian (Alleged Informer) Civilian (Other)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON
..... [Q1 2021 – Q2 2025]



NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION



trendwatch (cont.)

The SAC fought against ethnic armed organisations (EAOs).

On 5 July, SAC forces reportedly assaulted KIA positions in Hpakant town, Kachin State.

On 10 July, AA and SAC troops reportedly resumed fighting in three villages – Kat Tha Pyay, Ma La Kyun, and Gone Chein – of Kyaukpyu Township, Rakhine State, following a week-long pause due to monsoon rains.

SAC troops raided and torched civilian homes in central Myanmar.

On 7 July, SAC forces reportedly raided and torched 30 houses in Nan Gat village in Pakokku Township, Magway Region.

On 12 July, SAC forces reportedly raided and torched 100 houses in a village in Nyaung-U Township, Mandalay Region.

CIVILIAN FACILITIES
DAMAGES AND ATTACKS

TWO-WEEK TREND
1.07%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER
12
NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 15 JULY 2025


Health Facility: 256
Education Facility: 444
Religious Facility: 621

TOTAL DAMAGE
1,321

Aerial Shelling EDA


IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES:
DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES:
DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



trendwatch (cont.)

PDFs ambushed SAC convoys and outposts in central Myanmar.

On 3 July, PDFs reportedly ambushed an SAC convoy in Myingyan Township, Sagaing Region, killing 30 soldiers and capturing four others.

On 4 July, PDFs reportedly attacked an SAC outpost near Salin town in Magway Region, killing six soldiers.

On 9 July, PDFs reportedly captured three SAC outposts in and near Hin Thar Gyi village in Shwebo Township, Sagaing Region.

Flooding impacted swathes of EAO-controlled territory.

During 3-7 July, there was reportedly significant flood damage in the MNDA's Special Region 1.

On 11 July, local media reported that over 4,000 acres of farmland was flooded in Namhkam Township.

primaryconcerns

1 SAC Advances to Nawnghkio Town

NAWNGHKIO TOWNSHIP, NORTHERN SHAN STATE

On 14 July, State Administration Council (SAC) forces reportedly entered southern wards of Nawnghkio town, where intense fighting ensued between them and Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) forces. Some TNLA troops also reportedly moved towards the Gote Twin valley — which serves as a natural border between Nawnghkio and Kyaukme townships — while the SAC reportedly fired artillery toward Kyaukme Township and conducted drone attacks. The TNLA reportedly closed the Gote Twin switchback section of the Nawnghkio-Kyaukme road to all vehicles on 10 July and then destroyed it on 13 July. Most Nawnghkio town residents are rumoured to have fled, and residents of Kyaukme town told this analytical unit that only a third of their town's population remains, with civilians moving to Hsipaw and Lashio townships out of fear of SAC airstrikes and/or fighting advancing farther up the road. A resident of Nawng Pyit village — approximately three miles from Kyaukme town — told this analytical unit that fear of SAC airstrikes had displaced all villagers there.

Displacement prolonged

As fighting spreads to Nawnghkio town and up to the Gote Twin valley, civilians in these areas are increasingly threatened by violence and prolonged displacement. The displacement and damaged infrastructure will also likely disrupt economic activity and ability of civilians to travel to local markets. Nawnghkio Township has been a frontline in fighting between TNLA

and SAC forces since Operation 1027, but if the SAC succeeds in pushing TNLA units from the township, fighting could soon move eastward and envelop Kyaukme Township. The Gote Twin bridge, reportedly damaged by the TNLA, was one the main ways to cross over the Gote Twin valley; damage here and to other infrastructure could complicate civilians fleeing fighting as well as the ability of traders to use the route. Even following military operations, damaged infrastructure will likely increase transport times and prices of goods in the region. Residents who remain in Nawnghkio Township may also be at high risk of violence and raids by SAC troops who suspect them of harbouring sympathy and/or support for resistance actors. Humanitarian responders will likely have to navigate the disruption that fighting nearer to Kyaukme town and other urban areas will have on local markets, particularly for residents and traders who were just recovering from the intensity of hostilities and damage to infrastructure during Operation 1027.

Residents of Kyaukme town told this analytical unit that only a third of their town's population remains, with civilians moving to Hsipaw and Lashio townships out of fear of SAC airstrikes and/or fighting advancing farther up the road.

2 Rakhine-Bangladesh Border Trade Comes to a Halt

MAUNGDAW TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

On 12 July, local media reported that cross-border trade between Rakhine State and Bangladesh had significantly declined due to restrictive measures by Bangladeshi authorities, with the monsoon rains further impacting crossings. Bangladeshi authorities reportedly began to tighten security at trade gates in early July, seizing some goods imported from Maungdaw Township and blocking exports destined for Rakhine State. Merchants also told local media that trade at the Taung Pyo and Bandula land crossings in northern Maungdaw Township — two of the only such trading posts — had almost completely stopped. Trade had largely shut down at the end of 2024, amid fighting between the State Administration Council (SAC) and Arakan Army (AA) in Maungdaw Township, but then informally eased since late May 2025; locals told this analytical unit last month that authorities on both sides of the border had agreed, if tacitly, to allow a greater degree of trade. The restrictive measures at the border in early July came amid torrential rain in northern Rakhine State that reportedly damaged the main mountain road connecting Maungdaw and Buthidaung townships, with expectations that prices for goods typically transported along the road would increase. According to a local analyst, the decline in the import and export of goods across the border may be due to internal tensions between the Bangladeshi political and armed forces.

More trade woes for Rakhine

The re-introduction of restrictions to trade across the Naf River — as well as heavy rains — may lead to increased prices for goods typically imported into Rakhine State such as fertiliser, medicine, and food items. This is likely to be felt most immediately in the northern part of the state: for humanitarian responders operating here, a deterioration in trade across the Naf River and land border in northern Maungdaw Township could worsen the affordability and

availability of food aid and materials to displaced persons and vulnerable groups. However, parts of central and southern Rakhine State may also be impacted by the re-introduction of restrictions along the border; since the SAC began its blockade on goods destined for AA-controlled areas of Rakhine State in 2023, some goods are increasingly sourced from northern Rakhine. Across the State, a decrease in the import and export of goods could lead to higher prices, worsening the daily cost-of-living burden and household opportunities for income.

3 Intense Floods Hit Rakhine

RAKHINE STATE

As of 10 July, continuous rainfall across much of Rakhine State — since the first week of July — had reportedly flooded around 20 villages in Kyauktaw, at least 16 villages in Minbya, and dozens of villages in Mrauk-U, Buthidaung, and Maungdaw townships. The rainfall reportedly submerged tens of thousands of acres of farmland, and killed livestock, in five townships. In Kyaukpyu Township, torrential rains caused the Yoe Chaung and Tha Yi Chaung streams — tributaries to the Kaladan River — to overflow. The banks of the Lemro river — a major waterway separating Mrauk-U and Kyauktaw townships — reportedly eroded, flooding cropland and forcing entire villages to relocate. The Arakan People Revolutionary Government (APRP) — the United League of Arakan's (ULA) governance wing — reportedly urged the public to avoid riverbanks and stay alert to potential landslides. A meteorologist told local media that rainfall could be expected to continue until late July and advised that people still living near rivers and streams relocate to higher ground. One source told this analytical unit that the Humanitarian and Development Coordination Office (HDCO) — the ULA's humanitarian wing — and local welfare groups usually respond to flooding but that the HDCO's involvement thus far has not been reported.

Displacement and crop loss worsen

This year's torrential rains in Rakhine State are exacerbating humanitarian needs and are likely to put further pressure on agricultural production. Displaced civilians are likely to need adequate shelter and warm clothing, mosquito nets, and medicine for waterborne diseases, particularly in Minbya and Kyauktaw townships — which appear to have been hit most heavily. As reported in a previous [Fortnightly Update](#), paddy production was already expected to suffer this year — even more so than recent years — because of high costs for agricultural inputs, including fuel and fertiliser. It may also be too expensive for some farmers to replant paddy damaged by flooding due to high input and labor costs; according to [local media](#), the cost of cultivating one acre of farmland is now between 600,000–1,000,000 Myanmar Kyat (approximately 130–217 USD at the informal market rate). People's loss of investment and potential earnings could lead to a worsening of livelihoods for farmers who once relied on annual harvests. Ongoing State Administration Council (SAC)–imposed restrictions on internet and mobile phone communication, which may have complicated early warning systems and education on safety precautions with respect to flooding already, will also likely continue to impose challenges on local humanitarian response activities.


4 KNLA Isolates SAC on Thai Border

MYAWADDY TOWNSHIP, KAREN STATE

On 12 July, forces led by Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) Brigade 6 reportedly [captured](#) the State Administration Council's (SAC) Ou Krita base in Myawaddy Township, on the border with Thailand. Around 100 SAC soldiers reportedly fled into Thailand from the base, which had been under Myanmar military control for 35 years. KNLA forces have reportedly continued to [assault](#) the nearby Waw Lay base — the last SAC base in this [pocket](#) of Karen State. On 4 July, it was [reported](#) that three

KNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unity typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms “Karen State” and “Karenni State” preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at <https://tinyurl.com/4dtfnfdak>. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at <https://www.khrgh.org/maps>.

locals, injured by SAC artillery fired from the Waw Lay base, were receiving medical treatment in Thailand and around 3,000 people had fled from near Waw Lay village tract into Thailand. The latest surge in KNLA attacks on SAC camps and outposts along the Karen State–Thailand border began in May, triggering SAC [airstrikes](#) and [artillery](#) shelling that have caused casualties and displacement — including roughly 4,000 [people](#) still displaced from Waw Lay and nearby areas. A local who was displaced to Thailand this week [told](#) media that they fled Karen State due to fear of SAC heavy weaponry but now fear their livelihoods will worsen as they cannot legally earn income in Thailand.

The humanitarian response may also have to navigate greater food insecurity in light of decreased monsoon harvests.

Fighting hampers access and trade

As fighting continues around the border, humanitarian needs are likely to rise. KNLA attacks in the area are likely to continue, as the removal of remaining SAC bases would give resistance actors greater economic control over and political sway on the border. It is also likely that the SAC will continue to use airstrikes and artillery in response to KNLA operations in Myawaddy Township, either to recapture lost positions or to defend the remaining Waw Lay base. Thus, civilian casualties and displacement, including into Thailand, are likely to continue in the near term here. If IDPs and others cannot travel due to threat of SAC violence or fighting on road networks, their ability to go to the Waw Lay market — the largest in the immediate vicinity — to buy items or trade will be limited. Access to the Waw Lay–Myawaddy road, which connects the village tract to the market hub of Myawaddy town, could also be impeded. The humanitarian response may also have to navigate greater food insecurity in light of decreased monsoon harvests; this monsoon season primarily involves corn cultivation, which requires increased attention from the farmers due to the risks of flooding and the need for proper fertilisation.

5 Htee Khee Border Gate in Limbo

DAWEI TOWNSHIP, TANINTHARYI REGION

On 8 July, the Karen National Union (KNU) Mergui-Tavoy district secretary [said](#) that Thai officials had not permitted the resumption of cross-border trade at the Htee Khee border gate, in Dawei Township. This followed what appeared to be a [leaked](#) letter from a district-level Thai administrator, saying that movement of people and cargo across the border would be permitted from 5 July. The Htee Khee gate was opened to official cross-border trade in [2011](#) but closed in 2022 amid fighting between State Administration Council (SAC) and Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) forces. Forces led by KNLA Brigade 4 captured Htee Khee village on [9 May](#), since which time local Thai authorities have reportedly [allowed](#) Thai civilian food traders to cross the border — to sell their goods at the local market — but prohibited import or export via cargo trucks. One local told this analytical unit that Myanmar civilians are also not allowed to cross into Thailand. Meanwhile, SAC forces have not withdrawn from points farther inland along the Dawei–Htee Khee road — and in fact have re-established camps with heavy weaponry in Myitta and Kyauk Me Taung villages.

SAC forces have not withdrawn from points farther inland along the Dawei–Htee Khee road — and in fact have re-established camps with heavy weaponry in Myitta and Kyauk Me Taung villages.

Even if trade resumes, fighting unlikely to stop

KNU Mergui-Tavoy District appears to find itself in a precarious position. A resumption of cross border trade in Htee Khee border — via informal agreements with local administrators — would likely improve civilian livelihoods and strengthen resistance administration in Dawei Township; on 20 June, the KNU Mergui-Tavoy district secretary [said](#) that regaining control of the Htee Khee border gate would be a boon for KNU administration and KNLA momentum. At the same time, the SAC might respond violently to any resumption of cross border trade — and is also unlikely to accept the loss of Htee Khee, due to its economic and diplomatic significance. The KNU district secretary's response to the leaked Thai letter may be due to concerns within the KNU that formal recognition from Thai authorities would spark significant SAC action, such as bombing or heightened diplomatic pressure on the Thai military or Thai business interests. If trade does resume at the Htee Khee border gate, this could support economic activity and humanitarian aid in Tanintharyi Region, where a major share of the current response is conducted remotely through local partners relying on local markets. However, the movement of goods between the border and points farther inland would still be hindered by SAC checkpoints and, during the monsoon season, poor road conditions. In any case, if the SAC launches counter-attacks on the Thai-Myanmar border, or if the KNLA and aligned forces step up attacks against the SAC's re-established bases on the Dawei-Htee Khee road, civilian casualties and displacement could increase.

If trade does resume at the Htee Khee border gate, this could support economic activity and humanitarian aid in Tanintharyi Region, where a major share of the current response is conducted remotely through local partners relying on local markets.

6 SAC Retakes Moe Bye Road

PEKON TOWNSHIP, SOUTHERN SHAN STATE

On 10 July, State Administration Council (SAC) and Pa-O National Army (PNA) forces reportedly [wrested](#) control of the Moe Bye-Loikaw road, in Pekon Township, from Karenni joint forces. The SAC reportedly [gained control](#) of the railway line and part of Highway 54 in Moe Bye village tract on 6 July, then advanced east on the road toward Loikaw road. Sources told this analytical unit that, following the SAC's capture of Moe Bye village tract, around [30](#) villages along the Moe Bye-Loikaw road prepared to flee in anticipation of SAC raids, and 100 households resettled on the Demoso-Moby road. However fighting reportedly prevented [hundreds](#) of locals — particularly those living to the east of Moe Bye village tract — from fleeing.

Sources told this analytical unit that, following the SAC's capture of Moe Bye village tract, around 30 villages along the Moe Bye-Loikaw road prepared to flee in anticipation of SAC raids.

SAC strengthened in Moe Bye

Civilians along the Moe Bye-Loikaw road will likely be at continued risk from the renewed presence of the SAC — and potential violence by its troops against a population seen as supportive of Karenni resistance actors. This could impact their ability to tend to and harvest monsoon season crops; agriculture is a primary income source for residents along the Moe Bye-Loikaw road and for most Karenni IDPs, meaning that, despite the fighting and displacement, farmers are likely busy tending and planting paddy for the monsoon harvest. The SAC's re-capture of the Moe Bye-Loikaw road is also important because it will allow the

SAC to more easily supply its troops in Loikaw — the Karenni State capital — from central Myanmar via Southern Shan State. SAC forces also control the other major land route connecting southern Shan State to Karenni State, the Hsihseng–Loikaw road. Thus, the SAC’s control of the Moby–Loikaw road now provides it with the ability to continue further military operations in other parts of Karenni State, with the probable effect of more fighting, village raids, and artillery shelling — and greater humanitarian needs. Moreover, most of the Karenni State population has already been displaced for several years, which means humanitarian responders’ resources are stretched and any sudden increase in humanitarian needs may be difficult to navigate.

7 Tensions Flare Between Chin Actors

FALAM TOWNSHIP, CHIN STATE

On 15 July, local media [reported](#) that nearly all of the 3,000 people recently [displaced](#) from Falam Township’s Rihkhawdar town — by fighting between Chinland Council and Chin Brotherhood forces — had [returned](#) home following the withdrawal of the Chin National Defense Force (CNDF) from the town. The CNDF, a member of the Chin Brotherhood, had attacked and overrun positions of the Chinland Defense Force (CDF)–Hualngoram and Chin National Army (CNA) — both part of the rival Chinland Council — in Rihkhawdar on 5 July, causing 3,000 people to flee to Zokhawthar, across the Indian border. Following the CNDF attacks, fighting between the opposing Chin factions also escalated in other pockets of Falam Township, including near the CNDF headquarters. On 7 July, the Advocacy Group for Peace — a Mizoram Government advisory body — began to [engage](#) with the two sides to seek a ceasefire. However, CNA sources told this analytical unit that it remains unclear whether the CNDF withdrawal is directly related to the ongoing negotiations; on 11 July — just before the CNDF withdrawal — the CDF–Hualngoram and

CNA had [massed](#) troops near Rihkhawdar and were reportedly planning an assault to retake the town. Chinland Council forces captured Rihkhawdar town from the State Administration Council (SAC) in November 2023, with the CDF–Hualngoram subsequently taking the lead in administering the town. A Zokhawthar resident told this analytical unit that other residents and the Young Mizoram Association (YMA) had supported people while they were taking refuge in Zokhawthar.

Following the CNDF attacks, fighting between the opposing Chin factions also escalated in other pockets of Falam Township, including near the CNDF headquarters.

A fragile calm

Despite recent conditions in Rihkhawdar town allowing the return of displaced people, tensions between the Chin factions remain — in Falam and other townships of Chin State — in the absence of a mediated settlement. As noted above, the CNDF withdrawal may have had more to do with an imminent attack than the Mizoram government’s mediation. Thus, the dispute between the CNDF and CDF–Hualngoram — primarily over territorial claims in Falam Township but also over competing claims to political legitimacy and long-standing ethnic grievances — may be merely dormant and unresolved. If similar confrontations happen again in Falam Township, this could also spark fighting between [other](#) factions associated with the Chinland Council and Chin Brotherhood. Tension between the Chin factions could worsen coordination for local responders, such as for travel permission between territory with the Chinland Council and Chin Brotherhood, respectively, or service delivery from a Chinland Council aligned-ethnic group to a Chin Brotherhood-aligned ethnic group. There is also the potential that fighting threatens the functionality of non-SAC administrative mechanisms, which could further impede service provision and coordination.

8. CDF-Hakha Confiscates Drugs

HAKHA TOWNSHIP, CHIN STATE

On 8 July, the Chinland Defense Force (CDF)-Hakha reportedly [detained](#) five people — including three members of armed resistance actors — in Hakha Township for allegedly transporting heroin and methamphetamines. Two others involved reportedly [escaped](#). The detained resistance members had a letter of recommendation from the commander of Yinmarbin District Battalion 15, and were reportedly on the way to Falam Township. On 10 July, the Salingyi Special Task Force (SSTF) [said](#) that the detained resistance members were its own, but that it had no part in drug smuggling and would apprehend the relevant individuals and hand them over to the National Unity Government (NUG) Ministry of Defence. One of the two people who escaped detention later [handed himself in](#) to an NUG-linked group in Salingyi Township, and reportedly said this was the fourth time he had been involved in smuggling narcotics. He said that he had [coordinated](#) the deliveries through personal connections in Northern Shan State.

Harmful side effects

The possible reliance on illicit revenue among resistance actors since the coup could shape aid dynamics in Myanmar and conditions in India. Resistance actors' involvement in smuggling may have been fueled by a decline in local donations to them, due to chronic displacement and economic disruption, as well as the NUG's inability to fully fund these outfits or enforce prohibitions on illegal activity. However, in addition to threatening greater violence in the short-term due to involvement with criminal elements, drug smuggling in Chin State could impact humanitarian response operations that span the India-Myanmar border. Some political actors in India have already [publicly cited](#) drug smuggling as a reason to tighten borders, and if Indian media and political actors use the seizure to condemn resistance elements as involved in the trade, this could increase border restrictions and hurt the cross-border flow of goods into Myanmar. Authorities in Mizoram

State could face internal political [pressure](#) to eliminate drugs in Mizoram and tighten border restrictions in response, ultimately hindering the flow of aid to Myanmar. These same authorities — which have supported or allowed significant support to Myanmar refugees since the coup — could also face increased pressure to investigate and otherwise make life more difficult for Myanmar nationals taking refuge in the state.

9. Malaria Surge in Kachin

KACHIN STATE

On 11 July, local media reported that there were [increased](#) cases of malaria and [shortages](#) of medicine for treatment in remote areas of Kachin State. While cases appear to be rising across the state, the majority of reported cases appear to be in rural and isolated areas of the northernmost townships and in IDPs camps along the eastern border with China. Malaria medication in Kachin State had previously been sourced from Yangon and Mandalay and transported through central Myanmar, but the State Administration Council (SAC) tightened restrictions on the flow of goods — including medicine — in the state in response to the Kachin Independence Army's (KIA) offensive in 2023. Transport to northern Kachin State, in particular, has been further impacted by roadblocks along the Myitkinya-Sumprabum-Putta-O road since the KIA captured Sumprabum town in May 2024. SAC restrictions on the flow of goods into KIA-controlled territory has reportedly pushed up prices, as now traders must rely on secondary roads and pay [greater](#) checkpoint fees. Rapid diagnostic tests (RDT) for malaria reportedly [cost over](#) 30,000 Myanmar Kyat (approximately 6.5 USD at the informal market rate), which is increasingly unaffordable, especially for IDP camp residents. An IDP in Myitkyina Township told local media that [there were](#) 3-4 malaria cases per month last year but now over 20 cases, and that in some households there were multiple people with high fevers.

The prolonged nature of displacement in Kachin State and donor funding shortages have also likely led to a decrease in the availability of protective materials, leaving IDPs more vulnerable to mosquito-borne diseases.

SAC restrictions fuel surge

Ongoing fighting between the SAC and KIA, and SAC restrictions, have contributed to an apparent surge in malaria cases. For one thing, these have driven up prices for malaria medication. The prolonged nature of displacement in Kachin State and donor funding shortages have also likely led to a decrease in the availability of protective materials, leaving IDPs more vulnerable to mosquito-borne diseases. In previous years, local responders had much greater access — and likely more funding — to distribute malaria medical drugs, but access has worsened since 2023, and funding for humanitarian and other support has likely suffered over the course of 2025. These concerns are also compounded by the SAC-imposed internet shutdown across Kachin State since July 2024, making access to information incredibly challenging for local responders. Humanitarian responders in Kachin State will therefore likely have to continue navigating restricted travel routes and internet connectivity.

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*
**Humanitarian
Responders**

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