

FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*

Humanitarian Responders

A topographic map of South America, showing the Andes mountain range and surrounding regions. A circular highlight is placed over the central part of the continent, specifically over the Andes. The map uses a color gradient from light green to dark grey to represent elevation.

in**focus**

NATIONWIDE

SAC Questioning
Non-Profit Finances

W25-27 | 2025

19
02

JUNE
JULY

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W25-27 | 2025
19 JUNE
02 JULY

in**focus**

Nationwide
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infocus

SAC Questioning Non-Profit Finances

NATIONWIDE

The “Committee for Risk Assessment of Terrorism Financing Related to Non-profit Organizations (NPOs)” — under the State Administration Council’s (SAC) Ministry of Home Affairs — recently called on non-profit organisations working in Myanmar to complete a lengthy survey, citing the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the global money laundering and terrorist financing watchdog. The survey, dated 17 June, consists of 200 questions about a wide scope of topics, from financial flows — including the use of virtual currencies and informal money transfer systems — to staff qualifications, religious activities, advocacy activities, and even the registration of other organisations working in the same part of Myanmar. The survey has rapidly raised major concerns among organisations conducting humanitarian response activities: senior INGO staff told this analytical unit that the SAC’s measures had raised major red flags for their operations, particularly for agencies which are registered under the SAC and carry out activities in both SAC- and non-SAC-controlled areas.

The FATF already [considers](#) Myanmar to be a “High-Risk Jurisdiction”, often termed a ‘black-listed’ country. Countries within this category — also including Iran and North Korea — “have significant strategic deficiencies in their regimes to counter money laundering, terrorist financing, and financing of proliferation.” In June 2025, the FATF [said](#) that “Myanmar should urgently work to implement its FATF action plan to address its key deficiencies.” However, it also noted that “When applying enhanced due diligence, countries should ensure that flows of

funds for humanitarian assistance, legitimate NPO activity and remittances are neither disrupted nor discouraged.” It should also be noted that many of the questions asked by the Ministry of Home Affairs appear to be in excess of information needed by FATF — especially regarding information around staff qualifications, advocacy, and activity-level information.

Aid subversion

The recent survey is the latest in a series of SAC measures that have constricted the humanitarian space, hampering response activities that are desperately needed. Humanitarian needs across the country have skyrocketed as a result of widespread fighting and terrible [economic conditions](#); the recent [earthquake](#) caused thousands of civilian casualties and massive destruction, but even before it struck, UN OCHA [reported](#) there to be 3.5 million people displaced and 19.9 million people in need of assistance in Myanmar. At the same time, the SAC has repeatedly taken measures that make it harder for humanitarian responders to operate. It has [raided](#) organisations’ offices, [detained](#) their staff, and [confiscated](#) their funds. In 2022, it [issued](#) an amended “Association Registration Law”, tightening restrictions on organisations’ registration and implementation of activities. Twice in 2023, it [ordered](#) its personnel to exert tighter control of NGO activities, accusing aid agencies and donor countries of intervening in Myanmar’s affairs. In 2024, there was reportedly [another](#) such order, and a local pro-SAC media outlet [reported](#) that the SAC had found links between at least six humanitarian agencies and “terrorist groups”.

The SAC's efforts have made humanitarian operations more difficult, but adaptations by both local and international actors have meant that support could still reach many in need; many of these actors have shifted away from formal registration, reduced engagement with Myanmar's formal banking system (instead using informal value transfer networks), and relocated their offices out of the country. The recent survey thus primarily poses threats to organisations that are still headquartered or operating in SAC-controlled areas, especially those with partners that are either unregistered or otherwise suspect in the eyes of the SAC. However, the SAC's past measures have caused some groups to stop operations or pause activities, and the recent survey could lead to the same consequence for others. This poses yet another threat to the operational landscape, and will likely increase both concerns of response actors and their practical ability to deliver aid.

Fishing expedition

It should be taken as a real possibility that the survey is an attempt to gather information about activities the SAC may perceive as contrary to its interests, disguised as compliance with the FATF's evaluation. It is true that the FATF has scrutinised the SAC and threatened to impose "countermeasures" if the SAC does not meet an October 2025 [deadline](#) to improve financial transparency. It is also true that non-profit financing is one of the [many](#) factors the FATF takes into account in assessing a country overall. However, the primary concern in Myanmar for the FATF — a body concerned with money laundering — is almost certainly not the activities of non-profit organisations; Myanmar is well known for hosting illicit industries such as scam centres and trafficking of drugs, people, and various goods. Particularly in the context of post-coup international sanctions, there may be many billions of dollars of shady financial transactions within Myanmar and involving Myanmar actors annually.

Accordingly, the SAC's exploration of humanitarian agencies (and possibly other civil society actors) should be understood as a means of collecting data on actors that often operate outside its field of vision. In particular, the SAC is likely concerned that outside funding and materials

could be benefitting a range of resistance actors, some associated with entities that the SAC has [declared](#) "terrorist organisations" — such as the opposition National Unity Government (NUG) and numerous EAOs. In this respect, the earthquake may have galvanised an SAC crackdown: while some international funding went through the SAC, many affected areas are not under SAC control, and SAC leaders may suspect that assistance there was associated with "terrorists". For example, this analytical unit observed that, after one local partner of a multilateral agency engaged a local CSO for cash transfers to earthquake-affected households, SAC supporters accused this local partner of creating opportunities for People's Defence Forces (PDFs) to confiscate these funds. SAC forces reportedly detained leaders of the local partner and sentenced three of them to 18 years in prison. SAC leaders are likely aware that a significant amount of international aid has gone to resistance controlled areas, and SAC supporters have demanded (on social media) that SAC leaders take actions against those activities. By seeking information about humanitarian organisations and activities, including through a survey pressuring larger groups to disclose their local — potentially unregistered and low profile — partner agencies and their staff, the SAC increases its ability to control, obstruct, or punish actors across the humanitarian response landscape.

The earthquake may have galvanised an SAC crackdown: while some international funding went through the SAC, many affected areas are not under SAC control, and SAC leaders may suspect that assistance there was associated with "terrorists".

trendlines

HOUSES DESTROYED BY ARSON ATTACK

TWO-WEEK TREND
0.87%


TWO-WEEK NUMBER

30 NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 01 JULY 2025


TOTAL DAMAGE
89,557

TOTAL HOUSES DAMAGED OVER TIME



ARSON TREND IN AN INDIVIDUAL STATE/REGION

with the Highest number of Arson incident by Quarter



trendwatch

PDFs attacked SAC outposts and convoys, inflicting heavy losses.

On 19 June, resistance actors reportedly captured the Kan Daunt police station in Pale Township, Sagaing Region.

On 26 June, PDFs reportedly attacked an SAC outpost near the Nyaung Kone village police station in Pyawbwe Township in Mandalay Region, killing four soldiers.

On 27 June, PDFs reportedly attacked an SAC outpost in Chaung Ma Gyi village in Sagaing Township, Sagaing Region, killing four SAC troops.

Outbreaks of malaria and other diseases appeared to grow as the monsoon season continued.

On 1 July, local aid workers reported a malaria outbreak in Kachin State, saying that infection rates were particularly high in IDP camps.

Tensions remained between armed actors in Northern Shan State.

On 23 June, the SSPP and TNLA reportedly engaged in a brief skirmish near Mine Hauk village in Mongmit Township.

CIVILIAN CASUALTIES

TWO-WEEK TREND
0.58%


TWO-WEEK NUMBER
75
NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES
(NATIONWIDE) OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 01 JULY 2025


TOTAL
12,912

Civilian Civilian (Alleged Informer) Civilian (Other)

TOTAL CIVILIAN CASUALTIES OVER TIME AND QUARTERLY COMPARISON
..... [Q1 2021 - Q2 2025]



NUMBER OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES PER STATE/REGION



trendwatch (cont.)

SAC and aligned forces raided, torched, and displaced people from villages across Myanmar.

On 23 June, SAC forces reportedly raided and torched Zay Ma Gyi village in Nyaung-U Township, Mandalay Region, displacing around 10,000 people.

On 24 June, SAC and PNA troops reportedly attacked Saung Nan Khe village in Pekon Township, Southern Shan State, and torched civilian houses.

On 25 June, SAC forces reportedly raided Te Gyi village in Sagaing Township, Sagaing Region, and killed six civilians there.

On 29 June, around 100 SAC troops reportedly raided and torched houses in Panteinkone village in Salin Township, Magway Region.

SAC airstrikes hit civilian infrastructure, including hospitals, schools, and houses.

On 20 June, SAC airstrikes reportedly hit a school in Inn Gar village in Pinlelbu Township, Sagaing Region, killing a pregnant woman and injuring eight others.

On 22 June, SAC airstrikes reportedly struck a hospital in Yat Kan Sin Taung village in Singu Township, Mandalay Region, killing a pregnant woman and injuring ten other people.

On 22 June, SAC airstrikes reportedly hit Gwe Rut Yang village in Waingmaw Township, Kachin State, injuring one woman and damaging five houses.

CIVILIAN FACILITIES DAMAGES AND ATTACKS

TWO-WEEK TREND

1.08%

TWO-WEEK NUMBER

12

NUMBER OF INCIDENTS (NATIONWIDE)
OVER THE PRIOR TWO WEEKS.

AS OF 01 JULY 2025

Health Facility:
254Education Facility:
437Religious Facility:
615


TOTAL DAMAGE

1,306

■ Aerial
 ■ Shelling
 ■ EDA


IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks,
and Explosive Device incidents damaging civilian facilities



IMPACT ON CIVILIAN FACILITIES: DAMAGES AND ATTACK TYPE TRENDS BY STATE/REGION

Based on the combined count of Shelling, Aerial Attacks, and
Explosive Device incidents damaging civilians facilities



trendwatch (cont.)

Violations against Rohingya people continued to be reported from Rakhine State.

On 23 June, local media reported that the SAC was conscripting residents of the Kyauk Ta Lone relocation site in Kyaukpyu Township and “Muslims” in Sittwe town.

On 26 June, AA troops reportedly looted Rohingya villages in Maungdaw Township and harassed residents.

On 28 June, local media reported that the AA was using four Rohingya mosques in Buthidaung Township as recruitment centres.

Ethnic Rakhine residents of the state reportedly faced increasing difficulties and isolation.

On 20 June, local media reported that ethnic Rakhine diaspora donations had become a lifeline, supporting over 500,000 IDPs amid a lack of international aid.

On 24 June, local media reported that the SAC’s blockade of land and sea access to SAC-controlled areas of Kyaukpyu Township had led to shortages and surging prices.

primaryconcerns

1 Foreign Aid Cuts Hit Rohingya Education

COX'S BAZAR, BANGLADESH

On 25 June, Human Rights Watch released a [report](#) drawing attention to the impact of global funding shortages on Rohingya youths' access to education in Bangladeshi refugee camps. According to the [report](#), funding withdrawals have worsened a pre-existing crisis for 437,000 school-age children in the Cox's Bazar camps, with schools serving hundreds of thousands of children already reportedly shut down. It was recently announced that thousands of "learning centers" run by non-governmental organizations in the camps would be suspended due to a lack of funding, and while some [community-based](#) — self funded — schools continue to operate, they lack recognition by the Bangladeshi government and significant donor support, with fees unaffordable for most camp residents. A teacher at a community-based school in the camps [told](#) a media outlet that only a small number of Rohingya children are able to enroll in the community-led schools, as they do not receive charitable support. A migration expert told the same outlet that "a lack of formal education opportunities for Rohingya children will mean that children grow up uneducated and at increased likelihood of involvement in informal or unsafe work".

Few options for Rohingya children

School closures will have both immediate and long term impacts on Rohingya children in Cox's Bazar. The education cuts effectively curtail access to education for most children in the camps, as the Bangladeshi government has not signalled it will integrate Rohingya children into its education systems, and families are likely to prioritise food (and possibly other needs) over education. As children leave schools, immediate impacts are likely to include increased mental instability — as schools provide structure and opportunities for children whose families are confined to densely populated refugee camps — and protection concerns as youths spend less time in a safer environment (schools) and are more likely unsupervised. Children may be expected to seek income (or may seek it of their own accord), often at risk of exploitation; there are few work opportunities in the camps, which could push children to engage in illicit activities — including with armed actors — or try to work illegally in host communities. Others may try to reach a third country, most likely in conditions often characterised as human trafficking. Rohingya armed actors are also rumoured to be increasingly active and organised in the camps, and these actors may see an opportunity to increase recruitment among disenfranchised youth. In the longer term, school closures could lead to difficulties integrating into other school systems and limited education and skills, perpetuating cycles of poverty, aid dependency, and social instability.

2 PDF Ambushes and SAC Raids

MINHLA TOWNSHIP, BAGO REGION


During 20–25 June, State Administration Council (SAC) forces reportedly raided, [torched](#) buildings, and [detained](#) at least 36 people in at least 10 villages in Minhla Township, leading to an estimated 20,000 people [fleeing](#) their homes. The SAC raids followed [attacks](#) by a coalition of resistance actors — including the Thayawady District People's Defence Force (PDF), Ayeyar Nyi Naung PDF, Myanmar Defence Force-Special Force, and Asho Chin Defence Force — on an SAC checkpoint and SAC convoys on 16 June that [allegedly](#) left 20 SAC troops dead. In response, the SAC [sent](#) around 500 troops — reportedly led by the Light Infantry Division 66 commander — to eastern Minhla Township, close to the Bago Yoma mountains. Fighting on 16 June also disrupted travel on the Yangon-Pyay road, with four [civilians](#) reportedly killed by SAC artillery shelling. On 20 June, resistance actors attacked another convoy of SAC reinforcements between Taw Pyat Ywar Ma and Taung Pyat Ywar Thit villages, reportedly killing another five soldiers. A person displaced from Khwat Ma village — raided by the SAC — [said](#) that “SAC troops torched houses without any fighting near those villages”.

A person displaced from Khwat Ma village — raided by the SAC — said that “SAC troops torched houses without any fighting near those villages”.

The SAC often responds to losses with acts of extreme violence, as seen so many times since the coup, which may explain the intensity of raids in Minhla Township.

Burning houses, fleeing occupants

The location of Minhla Township suggests that fighting will continue there and rising humanitarian needs may be difficult to address. Resistance actors have increased the scale and frequency of attacks on SAC troops in the township, likely finding that the sparsely populated forests of the Bago Yoma provides favourable terrain for guerrilla-style tactics. As well, because of the proximity to areas in which the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and other resistance actors operate in East Bago Region, smaller actors here may benefit from east-west supply lines. The Bago Yoma has historically hosted insurgent activities, likely in part for these two reasons. At the same time, the SAC is likely to fight hard to quell resistance activity here: the Yangon-Pyay road runs through the township, and disruptions to this north-south artery could affect the SAC's ability to move troops and materiel. In any case, the SAC often responds to losses with acts of extreme violence, as seen so many times since the coup, which may explain the intensity of raids in Minhla Township last week. However, the location of Minhla Township — in what has been firmly-held SAC territory — also likely means that humanitarian response activities here would be challenging. There is reportedly little in the way of response infrastructure in the area, and the SAC's presence means even local actors would likely have to contend with heavy scrutiny and barriers to movement. At the same time, any disruptions to the Yangon-Pyay road would likely impact cargo transport from the market hub of Yangon and increase surveillance at SAC checkpoints.



Key Security Incidents

Minhla Township, Bago Region (West)

[1 Jan - 30 June, 2025]

Legend

- Clash/Shelling/Airstrike/ Drone attack
- Other/Unknown security incident
- Village affected by arson attack
- Village
- Main road
- Secondary road
- Other minor road
- - - - - Railway
- Major river/inland water boundary
- Township boundary



The shaded relief map is for illustrative and general interpretative purposes only. Elevation data is based on HydroSHEDS (version 1, 2019), available at www.hydrosheds.org.

Disclaimer: This product is designed for information purposes only. This map may not show all topographical areas due to scale limitations. Administrative boundary is indicative only and is provided by MIMU (copyrighted to MIMU at <https://themimu.info/mimu-terms-conditions>).

3 Malaria Outbreak in Arakan Yoma

ANN TOWNSHIP, RAKHINE STATE

On 23 June, local media reported malaria and dengue outbreaks among IDPs in [Ann](#) Township, saying that [15 IDPs](#) in the township had already died from these illnesses. According to a local healthcare worker, over [700](#) people have been infected with malaria across Arakan Army (AA)-controlled parts of Rakhine State within the previous two months, marking a significant increase in cases. Though the AA removed the State Administration Council (SAC) from Ann town in December 2024, there remain SAC outposts in the Arakan Yoma mountain range, and the AA has barred civilians from returning to urban areas, citing dangers of explosive ordnance and SAC airstrikes. Many IDPs in the township thus remain in heavily forested areas with a high risk of the presence of malaria-borne mosquitos. Continued AA and SAC fighting in the Arakan Yoma mountains and SAC-imposed blockade of goods via main roads is also continuing to disrupt movement of critically ill patients as well as medical supplies. On 26 June, it was reported that the United League of Arakan (ULA) Health Department had [formed](#) one mobile clinic for every five villages in Ann Township, but that medical supplies were insufficient. Another media report [said](#) malaria-affected individuals were increasingly relying on traditional medicine.

Malaria-stricken IDPs stuck

Malaria cases in the remote and densely forested Arakan Yoma mountains are rising sharply as a result of prolonged displacement, ongoing fighting, and restrictions on trade routes. Malaria is a seasonal — May to October — occurrence in Rakhine State, but the response to this year's malaria outbreak is particularly challenging because fighting in late 2024 generated large-scale displacement in the Arakan Yoma mountains. A combination of inadequate shelter, heavy rains, proximity to water sources (like creeks and rivers), and lack of mosquito protection makes IDPs especially vulnerable to malaria outbreaks. Amid a lack of tested

malaria drugs, the use of traditional medicine may risk a rise in other health ailments. With limited resources available to the ULA Health Department, humanitarian needs are escalating rapidly, compounding threats from SAC airstrikes and insecurity in densely forested regions of the Arakan Yoma mountains. It is also important to note that malaria outbreaks are typically at their highest at the beginning (May) and end (October) of the monsoon season, though local responders will have to navigate delivery to remote and inaccessible communities in need of medical supplies and vector control throughout the season.

4 Urban Areas Bombed

KYAUKME TOWNSHIP, NORTHERN SHAN STATE

During 24-29 June, several State Administration Council (SAC) airstrikes hit Ta'ang National Liberation Army (TNLA)-controlled Kyaukme town, reportedly killing at least five civilians and injuring over 22 others, and causing partial damage or destruction of dozens of buildings including [houses](#), [clinics](#), schools, and [religious](#) sites. Days prior to the first strikes, phone connectivity was reportedly [cut off](#), before which Kyaukme locals say phone connectivity was possible in the town. Since then, the only internet or phone connectivity has reportedly only been possible at alternative internet — particularly Starlink — hotspots established by the TNLA or the Shan State Progress Party (SSPP), which is also active in the township. The airstrike barrage came amid hostilities between the SAC and TNLA in Nawngkhio Township, with the [frontline](#) only around one hour by car from Kyaukme town. Kyaukme town has reportedly hosted around 1,000 people displaced from Nawngkhio Township, while other villages in Kyaukme Township likely also host large numbers of IDPs. The TNLA and SAC are scheduled to [meet](#) again for Chinese-mediated talks in [August](#), and while there have been rumors that the TNLA would withdraw from Nawngkhio, its public posture appears to be wanting to focus on [strengthening](#) its administration in the area it currently [controls](#) — rather than giving it up.

Civilians confront SAC air attacks

The recent attacks on Kyaukme town underscored the SAC's ability — and apparent intent — to conduct airstrikes on TNLA-controlled towns in Northern Shan State, which it may continue to use ahead of talks reportedly scheduled for August. Indeed, the bombing may get worse; in the lead up to its ceasefire with the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA) — and eventual return of Lashio town — the SAC conducted successive air strikes on MNDAA-controlled towns, significantly disrupting economic activity and prolonging displacement. As in MNDAA-controlled areas previously, the SAC's attacks along this TNLA-controlled section of the Muse–Lashio–Mandalay highway may be aimed at reasserting control over this economically lucrative route. Regardless, the renewed air attacks threaten to worsen civilian security in TNLA-controlled towns, undermine education (by damaging schools) and healthcare (by damaging hospitals), and disrupt market access and functionality. Barriers to trade and access to agricultural inputs, as well as likely fear of airstrikes and explosive ordnance, are also likely to prevent farming activity, further hurting livelihoods in rural parts of Kyaukme Township. Humanitarian actors may also face greater operational and protection risks amid intensified airstrikes or restricted access to affected populations.

Barriers to trade and access to agricultural inputs, as well as likely fear of airstrikes and explosive ordnance, are also likely to prevent farming activity, further hurting livelihoods in rural parts of Kyaukme Township.

5 SAC Soldiers Raid and Rape

KANBALU TOWNSHIP, SAGAING REGION

During 23–26 June, around 100 State Administration Council (SAC) troops and Pyu Saw Htee members reportedly raided and torched houses in Kyaung Gon, Tha Pyay Thar, and Phul Kone villages in Kanbalu Township, [displacing](#) approximately 8,000 people. While there, they reportedly [killed](#) 15 civilians and detained dozens of others, and allegedly [raped](#) 25 women. Then on 30 June, the same SAC contingent reportedly raided and [torched](#) houses in Zee Kone town. Kanbalu Township residents have experienced intense violence since the coup, with resistance actor footholds contested by a strong Pyu Saw Htee militia presence, including one militia — led by [monk](#) Warthawa — accused of [detaining](#) and forcibly conscripting civilians. A village administrator in the township [told](#) local media that civilians detained and killed during the 23–26 June raids were not resistance fighters, but had merely become stranded by SAC assaults elsewhere in the area.

Violent raids continue

The SAC raids, detentions, [forced](#) recruitment, killings, and rapes of civilians continues to drive displacement in Kanbalu Township, and could intensify in the coming year. Kanbalu Township is likely important for both resistance and SAC forces due to its location on the Shwebo–Indaw highway, which leads into Kachin State. The township also has a particularly strong Pyu Saw Htee presence, which appears to have resulted in a particularly high level of insecurity for civilians there. This is because Pyu Saw Htee strongholds provide islands of SAC support, and knowledge of terrain and intelligence, which these troops can then use to launch raids on nearby villages. In addition to the strength of Pyu Saw Htee actors, SAC air power has increased across the country and could be deployed in Kanbalu Township if resistance actors conduct further attacks. Amid the continued threats from Pyu Saw Htee members and SAC troops often working hand in glove, and the constant threat of SAC airstrikes, insecurity can be expected to rise further in Kanbalu Township, even beyond levels seen elsewhere in northwest Myanmar.

6 SAC Bombs Lead Mine

HPASAWNG TOWNSHIP, KARENNI STATE

On 25 June, State Administration Council (SAC) [airstrikes](#) reportedly struck lead mines in Maw Chee village tract, Hpasawng Township, killing seven people, injuring 20 other mine workers, and destroying dozens of buildings. The airstrikes came amid [intense fighting](#) in Hpasawng town as Karenni resistance actors reportedly attempted to capture SAC camps in the town. There were reportedly additional [strikes](#) on 30 June, although no significant damage was reported. Thai media [said](#) that 38 injured people — from the 25 June airstrikes — were being treated at hospitals in Mae Hong Son and Chiang Mai in Thailand. Due to the lack of adequate [facilities](#) close to Maw Chee, patients need to be transported along dirt roads to Mese town and/or Border Point No.14 on the Thai-Myanmar border. The lead mining industry in Maw Chee has reportedly become a large employer for Karenni IDPs from Hpasawng Township. Karenni resistance actors began to launch significant assaults in Hpasawng, Bawlake, and Mese townships in [2023](#), with large increases in displacement generated by the fighting. According to the Karenni Civil Society Network ([KCSN](#)), in May 2025 there were 24,000 IDPs in Hpasawng Township.

Healthcare sparse in western Karenni

The SAC airstrikes in Maw Chee village tract highlight the risks civilians in Karenni State face from aerial bombardment away from the frontlines (approximately 17 km from Hpasawng town), the lack of medical treatment in Hpasawng and surrounding townships, and continued threats to livelihoods. As long as fighting continues in Karenni State, civilians in Hpasawng Township will remain at a high risk of aerial bombardment. Due to inadequate health facilities and few medical professionals in western Karenni State, solutions for injured airstrike victims may increasingly involve transport along dirt roads to the Thai-Myanmar border for treatment. Karenni resistance actors commonly encourage civilians to halt travel on main roads and use dirt roads following SAC airstrikes, but many of these roads

will become muddy and potentially impassable during the monsoon season, increasing travel times and hindering timely access to critical medical care. Humanitarian responders will likely also have to navigate the impact of decreased usage of main roads driving commodity shortages, as they have for Karenni IDPs in western [Demoso](#) Township in recent weeks. Meanwhile, the impact of the strikes on IDPs working in mines illustrates the tenuous access to income for many people in the state.

7 Fighting Continues on Hpakan-Kamaing Road

HPAKANT TOWNSHIP, KACHIN STATE

On 26 June, it was reported that State Administration Council (SAC) and Kachin Independence Army (KIA) forces continued to fight [near](#) Hpakant town and along the Hpakan-Kamaing road. Hostilities have been intense in the township since the SAC launched operations to re-establish control of [checkpoints](#) into and out of Hpakant town in March. The KIA has controlled routes into and out of Hpakant Township since 2024, isolating SAC troops at a [handful](#) of bases. The SAC began sending troops toward Hpakant town along three routes in March, reportedly leaving at least 50 civilians [dead](#), but has reportedly stalled at two of them — in Indawgyi Lake and Sezin town. In May, SAC troops broke through KIA lines along the third route, the Kamaing-Hpakant road, to reach Hpakant town. As of 26 June, SAC forces were reportedly attacking outposts in the Lamawng and Mawmau hills, overlooking Hpakant town. Around [5,000](#) people remain displaced from villages from the Hpakan-Kamaing road, and SAC and KIA roadblocks have reportedly led to shortages of some goods in Hpakant Township. An IDP displaced from a village along the road highlighted the impact of monsoon rains on travel along dirt roads. They also [said](#) that IDPs were “living off the little remaining dried rations we had stored

earlier and foraging for wild fruits and leaves [...] with the roads blocked, when someone gets sick, there's absolutely nothing we can do".

Contested jade routes

Continued fighting is likely to exacerbate challenges for IDPs cut off from access to markets along the Hpakant-Kamaing road. Fighting is likely to continue due to the economic significance of Hpakant, particularly taxation of the roughly 30 billion USD [jade](#) trade. The economic significance of routes into and out of Hpakant Township suggest the KIA will be inclined to defend its 2024 gains, while the size of the SAC deployment suggests a top brass intent on reclaiming control. In previous rounds of fighting in Hpakant, armed actors have minimised damage, including to infrastructure, likely so as not to significantly undermine revenue from the jade trade — which benefits both sides and a number of other actors in Myanmar. However, intense fighting in the short term could leave IDPs sheltering in churches, host communities, forested areas, and in Kamaing, Hpakant, and Mogaung towns. The monsoon season rains will increase humanitarian needs for shelter and medicine, with disruption to cargo along the Hpakant-Kamaing road, likely putting further stress on food prices. These concerns are also compounded by the SAC-imposed internet shutdown across Kachin State since July 2024, making access to information incredibly challenging for local responders.

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8 SAC Bulldozes Tedim-Rihkhawdar Road

TEDIM TOWNSHIP, CHIN STATE

On 26 June, State Administration Council (SAC) Light Infantry Battalion (LIB) 269 reportedly [bulldozed](#) a section of the road from Tedim to Rihkhawdar, the sole official India-Myanmar border gate in northern Chin State — controlled by the Chinland Council. The damage to the road reportedly [stranded](#) dozens of cargo trucks and passenger vehicles. LIB 269 had been largely isolated in Tedim town; there has been intense fighting along the [Kale-Tedim road](#) since 19 May, with Chin armed groups ambushing three separate SAC convoys — ostensibly [reinforce-ments](#) — sent from Kale town. Commodity prices have reportedly increased in Rihkhawdar town and other border areas in Tedim and Tonzang townships since 27 June as traders speculatively inflated prices in response to the road-block. This is not the first time SAC forces have intentionally damaged transportation routes on the Tedim-Rihkhawdar road; in June 2024, they [razed](#) the Man Saung bridge over the Manipur River, around 15 km west of the latest damage site. Local residents reportedly [constructed](#) a temporary bridge that is only usable for smaller vehicles, meaning that transport had been somewhat stifled for the preceding year. However, the latest damage to the Tedim-Rihkhawdar road will likely increase journey times, push up prices, and potentially lead to shortages of some goods in Tedim Township.

Roads targeted

Damage to one of the few paved roads in northern Chin State — and connecting its only international border crossing to elsewhere in the state — could have significant implications for aid flows and the emergency flight of civilians. Granted, the SAC may have damaged the road to prevent Chin armed actors from assaulting Tedim town, to shore up its ability to hold an 'election' in northern Chin State (which [Chin armed](#) actors have [expressed](#) opposition toward and [targeted](#) with violence in the past), or, as a source close to the Chin National Front told this analytical unit, to restrict Chin resistance actors' cross-border revenue streams. In any case, the impact of

the damage on trade flows could also worsen the affordability, and possibly availability, of essential goods coming from India. The humanitarian response may have to navigate all this and deteriorating livelihoods for residents in northern Chin State if disruption to trade flows from the India–Myanmar border proves significant. Moreover, Chin armed groups are rumoured to have aimed to attack Tedim town since the capture of Falam town in April 2025. Should armed hostilities escalate for control over Tedim Town, the now damaged Tedim–Rihkhawdar road could hinder the ability of the over 7,000 people estimated to remain in Tedim town to flee fighting.

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
9 Surge in Skin Infections and Dengue

KYAIKTO TOWNSHIP, MON STATE

On 25 June, local media reported that **infectious** skin outbreaks — such as tetter, scabies, and hives — were spreading among IDPs sheltering in forested areas of Kyaikto Township. Many of those **affected** appear to have been **displaced** from Win Kan and Ka Ywe village tracts, where tensions between SAC and resistance forces reportedly escalated in May, with SAC artillery shelling hitting the villages. Karen National Union (KNU) healthcare workers have reportedly attempted to respond to the skin infection

KNU brigades and districts

For purposes of clarity and consistency only, this analytical unity typically utilises geographic terminology adopted by MIMU. However, publications now employ the terms “Karen State” and “Karenni State” preferred by local actors most affected by and most actively responding to the current crises across these states. While this is a neutral analytical unit, a key part of its mission is to amplify local voices. To fulfil this objective and reflect the preferences of local stakeholders, this analytical unit has adjusted its terminology with respect to the names of these states.



Source: Monthly Summary: Security Incidents in Karen State, Karen National Union (KNU) available at <https://tinyurl.com/4dtfnfdak>. KNU Brigades and District Area is sourced from KHRG (Karen Human Rights Group) available at <https://www.khrg.org/maps>.

(and seasonal dengue fever cases) but lack [adequate](#) medical supplies. As of 12 May, there were reportedly [141,385 IDPs](#) in the KNU's Thaton District, which includes Kyaikto Township. The Karen Peace Support Network reported on the urgent need for assistance, including [mosquito nets](#) and tarpaulin, for IDPs in Kyaikto Township in May. Moreover, the Committee for Internally Displaced Karen People has [said](#) that needs in Brigade 1 are particularly high due to tensions between armed actors, and that IDPs there will likely be displaced for a long duration.

Perils of monsoon season

Disease outbreaks typically occur in forested areas of southeast Myanmar during the monsoon season, but the intensity of fighting in Kyaikto Township (as discussed in a previous [Fortnightly Update](#)) and restrictive SAC measures could hinder aid delivery and heighten risk to vulnerable populations. On 25 June, the Kyaikto Township KNU secretary [noted](#) that skin infections have likely occurred due to consumption of water from unsafe streams, as IDPs in densely forested areas have few choices of clean water sources. During the monsoon season, unpaved roads — which typically see increased use during upticks in fighting — also sometimes become unpassable. Local response actors are likely already overburdened, while dealing with limited funding resources and SAC transport restrictions, making activities to counter a rise in skin infections even more challenging. As well, in addition to the SAC's targeting of welfare groups since the coup, it has recently started curtailing use of, and in some cases impounding, [unregistered](#) vehicles in [Mon](#) and [Karen](#) states. This has reportedly hindered transport into and out of urban areas for medical purchases, as local responders have likely become increasingly reliant on private, unregistered rented vehicles rather than organisational cars for their response work. SAC surveillance, and restrictions on unregistered vehicles, could harm aid workers' ability to transport medical supplies to treat skin infections and dengue.

10. Medicine Shortages for IDPs

LAUNGLON TOWNSHIP, TANINTHARYI REGION

On 26 June, local aid workers [told](#) a media outlet that around 1,000 people displaced from at least five villages — Ka Nyon Kyun, Nyin Maw, Lay Thun Khan, Sit Pyea, and Ka Htaung Ni — were in need of medicine for diarrhea, malaria, and dengue fever. Meanwhile, [violence](#) by State Administration Council (SAC) [forces](#) continues to cause protection-related concerns and prevent people displaced from other nearby villages from returning home. IDPs have also faced heavy rainfall and SAC transportation restrictions, which compel local responders to use waterways to transport medicines and essential items. This increases travel times and poses challenges for people affected by chronic diseases and others who need medicine (either urgently or chronically). SAC restrictions have also reportedly impeded access to medicines for IDPs in mountainous and forested regions — as well as people not displaced by living in more remote areas, who have also seen fighting destroy local markets and clinics. A regional health focal person told this analytical unit that, despite approved and distributed budgets for medicine supplies, the SAC's restrictions hinder effective transportation.

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FORTNIGHTLY UPDATE *for*
**Humanitarian
Responders**

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